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Defence vs development dilemma is back

S. Venkitaramanan

`GUNS OR butter' is an age-old question that every society must ask itself. In the early years of planning, the Indian leadership struggled hard to meet both these opposing goals. Defence expenditure does eat into the available resources; to that extent, less is available for development. India has been in a state of quasi-alertness, ever ready to battle strident neighbours since Independence _ distinct from the rather more peaceful environment that helped the growth of the South-East Asian countries.

We have to continue to press forward within the confines of the geopolitical situation we are placed in _ unless we choose to modify it.

As we near Budget 2000-2001, a pressing issue is to accommodate the demands of defence within the limited resources we have. The Budget process, as it has evolved in India, usually depicts the resources available for development after providing for all e ssential non-Plan outlays, including the demands of the Defence Ministry. Inevitably, this means there is first a dialogue between the Defence Ministry and the mandarins at the Finance Ministry. In this discussion, the demands of defence are pared down t o the extent possible at the bureaucratic level. Ultimately, the size of the Defence Budget is determined not only based on what the Ministries agree on, but on the strategic threat perception. The size of the Defence Budget is important not only for wha t it provides, but also for the signal it sends to friends and foes across the borders.

The Defence Budget also accommodates, apart from the salaries and allowances of the forces, the resources needed for the purchase of ammunition, equipment and armaments. The capital budget of the Defence Ministry, at around Rs. 12,000 crores, is separate from its current expenditure of Rs. 33,000 crores and shows the type of outlays the government incurs on adding to the defence infrastructure and equipment. Incidentally, the fiscal purist can argue that the very definition capital outlays is a misnomer for spendings on instruments of destruction and defence infrastructure.

Again, the conflict between defence and development has come to the fore, in the aftermath of the increasing tensions on our borders. The armed forces chiefs naturally try to secure the best equipment they can get; merchants of death from abroad try to s ell the latest weaponry. Inducements include concessional terms of credit with the active and full backing of their governments, as is evidenced by the recent exposes of transactions which, allegedly, involved the German Chancellor, Mr. Helmut Kohl.

This is only to point out that armaments suppliers from around the world are mainly responsible for competitive enhancement of defence budgets in countries such as ours. It is difficult to turn down the proposal for even costly equipment when the defence chiefs argue that the other side (enemies have it) has it. Further, under our accounting system, the year's defence budget needs to provide only for the annual instalments payable and not for the full cost of the costly toys. A tough battle ensues betwe en the mandarins of Finance and a Defence Ministry on the offensive.

I recall, in particular, a dialogue in the 1980s between a powerful Secretary of Defence and the Ministry of Finance when an impossibly high outlay was sought for by the former. The Defence Secretary stated, characteristically flamboyantly, ``I cannot gu arantee the defence of India if I am not given the budget I want''. The Finance Ministry's retort was, ``there may be no India left to defend if your budget is conceded (to)''. The then Defence Minister, now Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, ha d even sought the postponement of the Budget were it to provide less than asked for. Fortunately, he did not press the proposal and the budget was passed. The economy will be the first casualty, if we yield to the enthusiasms of the `defence' advocates.

Defence outlays are treated as holy cows. All defence expenditure is not necessarily related to security needs. It also comprises, to a large extent, the nitty-gritty needed for provisioning the Army, the Air Force and the Navy. Trucks, tyres, clothing, tent material, p. o. l., spares for the vehicles, tanks and guns _ all non-glamorous materials that have to be kept available. Inventory optimisation techniques can help reduce wasteful accumulation of stocks.

Horror stories about the scarcity of necessary spares on the field abound and serve to highlight the imperative need for better management techniques. On discussing this with a young captain, who had taken honourable discharge on health grounds after ser vice in high altitudes, I was told that vehicles often had to be cannibalised for want of spares; or target practice is often denied or deferred because of lack of adequate shells. It is time the Defence Ministry top-brass devoted attention to these prob lems, even as it tries to get larger budgetary allocations.

Napoleon said that an army marches on its stomach. Even Napoleon could not have anticipated the extent to which we in India vulgarised his precept. We must be one of the few countries where free rations were supplied to the members of the armed forces ev en in peace stations. It was not only the size of these outlays on food supplies that is cause for concern.

The Army Supplies Corps had to concentrate its efforts and attention an obtaining, storing and distributing food materials. Far better would have been to add to the salaries of these brave men and officers than to humiliate them by giving them free food; though, there is, admittedly, some dissatisfaction in the armed forces about the way they are treated when they serve, retire or are discharged.

Ultimately, the Defence Budget is determined not merely on what the North Block and South Block discuss and decide on, or on how other nations pump in military aid, but also on strategic threat perception. We have to concede that Jammu and Kashmir is the focus of most of our defence efforts. It is obvious that a solution to India's `defence versus development' problem does not lie merely in sophisticated econometrics, or in better management of our defences, but in a bold act of diplomacy. That alone ca n help us solve our border issues.

There are models available, Northern Ireland for instance, where a settlement has been reached between contending parties. Of course, this can be done only if the political leadership on both sides has the courage and the will.

It is to be hoped that the new millennium will see us solve this apparently insoluble conundrum. Therein will lie the solution to the defence versus development dilemma _ not only for India, but also for Pakistan and the entire region. The prospects for a more sustainable and durable economic future for the poor of India and Pakistan depend on the willingness and courage of the political leadership of both the countries to solve the Kashmir problem. All other approaches are mere rhetoric.