The Hindu Business Line : Why most e-government projects fail

The simplistic assumption that e-governance is all about technology, and not reform, is one of the main reasons why many an e-government project fails. Only countries strong in governance and committed to reform can hope to succeed in their e-government efforts, says K. Ashok Vardhan Shetty

The Tamil Nadu Governor, Mr P. S. Ramamohan Rao, watches as a computer operator browses the database for information on welfare schemes at Ulagapichanpatti village, near Madurai... The `government' as much as the `e' in e-government is crucial.

There is nothing more difficult to undertake, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things.

Niccolo Machiavelli

in "The Prince"

ACCORDING to analysts from Gartner Inc., more than 60 per cent of e-government initiatives around the world fail or fall short of their objectives. Prof. Richard Heeks of the University of Manchester, UK, also arrived at somewhat similar conclusions based on his survey of cases and studies in the literature and a poll of those with e-government expertise.

Given the high failure rates of e-government initiatives even in developed countries, and the huge direct and indirect costs of such failures (including the raising of barriers for future projects due to loss of morale and credibility and the strengthening of the hands of the doomsayers), can developing countries such as India afford to waste scarce public resources by indulging in such a costly and risky venture as e-government? This is a difficult question which each government must answer according to its individual circumstances.

The figures of e-government failures may be alarming but they should not lead to a mood of cynicism and despair among e-government enthusiasts for two reasons:

First, as Ms Judith Carr, Vice-President at Gartner Inc., says, the number of failures among e-government initiatives is not all that bad when we consider that about 60 per cent of traditional government initiatives also fail to fulfil expectations. This, in spite of the fact that traditional government projects are subject to fewer implementation risks than e-government projects.

Second, the private sector's track record in the management of information technology projects is not any better. For example, the latest report (2003) of the Standish Group analysed 13,522 IT projects in the US (a majority of them in the private sector) and found that only a little over 30 per cent were `successful' while nearly 70 per cent were `challenged' (that is, the projects were completed but with cost and time overruns and with fewer features and functions than initially specified) or `failed' completely (that is, the projects were cancelled before completion). Another recent survey (2003) in the UK by Oxford University and Computer Weekly found that only about 15 per cent of IT projects were successful, while nearly 75 per cent were challenged, and around 10 per cent were abandoned, with similar results for both private and public sectors.

Comparable data are not available for India, but it is reasonable to assume that the figures are not any better. And we know that nearly 98 per cent of `dotcom projects' failed in the great shakeout of the late 1990s. Viewed in this light, the performance of e-government projects is not that bad after all.

There are several reasons why so many e-government projects fail.

First, in a manner similar to the `dotcom doom', many governments simplistically assumed e-government to be a technology programme. But e-government is not about technology, it is about reform. For instance, it is Utopian to expect governments of countries lacking a powerful Freedom of Information Act and a culture of participatory governance, to suddenly become open and transparent and begin engaging with their constituents in a big way — simply because the Internet and Web-based technologies afford them an opportunity to do so.

And, in the case of governments with poor work culture and lax supervision, the Web sites are not likely to be regularly updated; online queries and clarifications will not be replied to promptly; and online transactions will most likely be beset by delays and plagued by errors, thereby causing the public to be disenchanted with the whole e-government exercise.

Only countries which are strong in governance and committed to reform can hope to succeed in their e-government efforts. Thus, it is not the `e' but the `government' in e-government that is the significant part.

Second, e-government initiatives will surely fail if they do not enjoy the unstinted support of the top political leadership, which alone can provide long-term commitment of funds; overcome the bureaucracy's inevitable resistance to change; and `knock heads together' to make diverse departments work in concert.

It must also publicly champion the e-government initiative, ensure stability of tenure to project managers, and be willing to devote time for periodic monitoring and for sorting out problems. Such enlightened political leadership is, however, hard to come by, and the few Indian e-government success stories come from those States or Central Government departments which are fortunate to have it.

Third, attempts to implement e-government by merely `bolting on' a Web-enabled front office to existing back-offices without re-engineering their internal functions and processes and without computerisation and networking of the back-offices have seldom resulted in sustainable success.

For example, there can be little improvement in the speed or quality of service delivery if citizens and businesses are merely enabled to apply online for an income-tax refund or a trade licence or a change of address while the back-office operations of the departments or agencies concerned are still paper-based, and the processing of an application takes the same amount of time as before.

This is the main reason why the highly acclaimed Gyandoot initiative of Madhya Pradesh or the FRIENDS citizen payment centres of Kerala have not lived up to their initial promise.

Finally, e-government projects fail when governments turn a Nelson's eye to the risks and barriers to e-governments instead of trying to identify, understand and manage them. There are broadly four types of risks:

Take-up risks: Online provision of services is no guarantee of online usage. The following are some barriers contributing to poor user take-up:

Digital divide, which deprives the people most in need of government services from the benefits of e-government due to lack of Internet access or the lack of will or skill to use it. It is not one but several divides — income, age, urban-rural, gender and language.

Inability to make or receive electronic payments (via credit cards, e-cheques, and so on), which restricts users to only informational and interactive services.

Low expectations of what e-government can do due to the corruption, inefficiency and rent-seeking behaviour of public servants.

Lack of familiarity: Potential users are not aware of existence of e-services due to poor marketing and PR.

Not easy to use: A poorly designed Web site that is difficult to navigate, slow to load and uses dense bureaucratic language can put off users.

Lack of incentives: Users may not switch over if incentives of lower costs, faster transactions or more personalised service are not offered.

Lack of trust due to unresolved issues of security and privacy.

Government-side barriers: Valiant efforts will be required to overcome the following barriers peculiar to governments:

Complexity: The sheer size of government, and the huge volume of data that it must generate, update, and manage online pose major technical and managerial challenges.

The Silo effect: The narrow departmental view often overrides the enterprise-wide perspective. Government agencies are also not well disposed towards sharing of data, information and resources.

Lack of user input: There is a tendency to seek input from only a few experts and top officials without consulting frontline employees or citizens and businesses on what they want.

A culture of risk avoidance due to fear of criticism by audit, the media, and so on for failed initiatives, and the prevalence of a perverse system of incentives whereby `doers' are more likely to be punished than non-performers. Further, reliability in delivery of public services is more prized in government than innovation.

Budgetary constraints: E-government requires substantial upfront investments. Moreover, government's traditional budgeting practices are not suited for multi-departmental, multi-year initiatives such as e-government.

Human resources constraints: Rigid civil service rules pose hurdles in recruiting, retaining and retrenching staff, and in paying higher emoluments to persons with special skills.

Vendor risks: These include:

Lack of skills in government to be an `intelligent client' with the result that departments are often taken for a ride by unscrupulous vendors.

Paucity of reliable suppliers who can deliver on time, to budget, and to departmental specifications.

Short lifespan of vendors owing to the fast-moving nature of the IT industry. This makes long-term public-private partnerships inflexible and risky.

Technology risks: These include:

Rapidly changing technology.

Lack of interoperability between disparate departmental computer systems rendering them unable to work together and share data.

The need for fast, robust and reliable systems to handle exploding future demand for e-services.

The technological risks have been deliberately dwelt upon last to emphasise the point that managing the non-technological barriers associated with e-government is often more critical to project success. It is also easy to see why e-government implementation should not be left to the `techies'; overcoming the various non-technological barriers is not within their capability.

(The author, an IAS officer, is Special Officer-cum-Managing Director, SAGOSERVE, Salem. The views are personal.)

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