The Hindu Business Line : A. Q. Khan's `confession'

The revelations on Pakistan's clandestine nuclear transfers are only the tip of the iceberg, and the US has to be persuaded that the policies of making the Pakistan military feel it is a strategic partner have only led to the emergence of the jeha di culture, says G. Parthasarathy, and hopes Islamabad will not see in the American forbearance a licence to resume the jehad across the Line of Control.

"I have chosen to appear before you to offer my deepest regrets and unqualified apologies to a traumatised nation. It pains me to realise in retrospect that my entire lifetime achievements of providing foolproof national security to my country have been placed in serious jeopardy on account of my activities. I wish to clarify that there was never any kind of authorisation for these activities by the Government..."

THUS spoke the "Father of the Islamic Bomb," Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan in a nationally-televised address on the state-run Pakistan Television. Interestingly, Dr Khan, who is known to be a skilful orator in Urdu, chose to speak in English — a language that less than two per cent of his countrymen understand.

The "confession" was obviously directed at persuading the international community that the Pakistani army was a knight in shining armour that had played no role in his proliferation escapades.

Responding to the "confession" with a Presidential pardon, the Pakistani strongman, Gen Pervez Musharraf, described Dr Khan as "my hero," adding, "I revere him for his contribution to making the defence of the country impregnable."

Seeking to reassure his shaken countrymen, Gen Musharraf swore that there would be no compromise on the country's missile and nuclear programmes. He vowed to test the Shaheen 2 missile with a 2000-km range within a month. (He conveniently forgot to mention that the Shaheen 2 was a missile designed and supplied by China.)

Clearly rattled by implicit threats of sanctions because of Pakistan's reckless proliferation of nuclear weapons technologies and designs, and by accusations of the involvement of his predecessors like Generals Aslam Beg, Abdul Waheed and Jehangir Karamat and his own personal involvement in such transfers, Gen Musharraf warned the Pakistani media to be "responsible" in their comment.

He said that if the Government or Army were implicated "the UN Security Council will immediately impose sanctions against us; next we will be asked to sign the NPT and CTBT and roll back; then we will be declared a rogue state and finally our vital interests would come under imminent physical danger".

While there is no doubt that the nuclear transfers to Iran and North Korea were effected with the approval of the Pakistan army, one cannot positively assert that there was high level army clearance for the deals with Libya — a development that will further embarrass China.

The design data provided by Dr Khan to Libya was that of a Chinese nuclear warhead. Dr Khan is also known to have offered assistance to the Saddam Hussein regime to develop nuclear weapons. A number of American and Indian analysts however, firmly assert that the Pakistani army establishment was fully in the know about the transfer of the nuclear warhead design to Libya.

But the current revelations on Pakistan's clandestine nuclear transfers are only the tip of an iceberg. A former Saudi Arabian diplomat, Mr Mohammed Khilewi, revealed in 1994 that Pakistan had cooperated with his country on nuclear transfers.

Eyebrows were thereafter raised when the Saudi Arabian Defence Minister, Prince Sultan, was granted access in 1999 to Dr Khan's nuclear and missile complex in Kahuta — access to which had been denied in the past even to Ms Benazir Bhutto, when she was Prime Minister. This was followed by a visit to Saudi Arabia later the same year by Dr Khan. He is also reported to have established clandestine contacts with Syrian officials early last year.

There is also evidence of Pakistani scientists like Sultan Bashiruddin Mehmood meeting and sharing information on nuclear related matters in Kandahar with Osama bin Laden. Then there are instances of Pakistani scientists with suspected Al Qaeda connections disappearing from the backwoods of Myanmar.

The confessions of Dr Khan have also shattered Pakistani illusions about Islamic solidarity within the so-called Muslim Ummah. When push came to shove, Pakistan's Islamic brethren had no hesitation in exposing its role in clandestinely transferring nuclear know how.

The Iraqis gave UN inspectors details of "offers" for assistance from Dr Khan. Iran and Libya did likewise.

The Libyans even acknowledged that they had paid the "Father of the Islamic Bomb" around $50 million for the design of a nuclear warhead. An embittered Gen Musharraf exclaimed: "Have you seen them (Muslim countries) who could not face any pressure and told others everything before telling us? We should not live in idealism."

This was a clear attack on the assertions of persons like Generals Aslam Beg and Hamid Gul who continuously speak about Islamic countries uniting in adopting a posture of "strategic defiance" of the US. Gen Musharraf has nevertheless become the first Pakistani military ruler to pay tribute to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto as the pioneering spirit behind Pakistan's quest for the "Islamic Bomb".

New Delhi has wisely refrained from being critical about Pakistan's nuclear transgressions. Criticism from India will only lead to others claiming that we are exploiting Pakistan's difficulties.

The Americans, the IAEA and the EU will pursue this issue further. I had occasion to speak to a few visiting American friends who had held high offices in the US.

They appeared concerned about the directions that events in Pakistan are taking and feared that nuclear weapons and technology could end up in the hands of extremist Islamist elements.

India and the US share a common interest in ensuring that Pakistan proceeds in the direction of modernity and economic progress. Regional economic integration and interdependence could be important factors in catalysing such a directional change.

The Americans have to be persuaded that their policies of giving the Pakistan military a feeling that it is a long-term strategic partner in military terms, has only led to internal destabilisation and the emergence of the jehadi culture within Pakistan.

Pakistan is strategically located between India and other SAARC members, on the one hand, and Iran and Central Asia, on the other. It can serve as a bridge for energy flows if it replaces jehad and terrorism as instruments of state policy with an interest in collective economic prosperity.

oes Gen Musharraf have the strategic vision to change course and join India and others in a quest for progress and prosperity, or is he going to remain glued to old clichés that low-intensity conflict with India will continue to be waged and used as a tool for Pakistani ambitions on Kashmir?

There seems to be some optimism in India on this score after the Islamabad Summit. But his statements on February 5 indicating that there had been no change in his thinking about the so-called "freedom struggle" in Kashmir are a source of concern.

We will get a clearer picture about his real thinking only after the Himalayan snows melt in July.

In the meantime, one can only hope that he does not get the feeling that American forbearance on Pakistan's nuclear transgressions is a licence for him to resume his jehad across the Line of Control at a time of his choosing.

(The author is a former High Commissioner to Pakistan.)

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