The Hindu Business Line : Pakistan plots return of Taliban

Pakistan wants to restore Taliban control over Southern and Eastern Afghanistan so as to establish "strategic depth" throughout that country in the conviction that the Americans are bound to leave in due course. With elections approaching in Afghanistan, Islamabad is bound to become active in its effort. New Delhi must not hesitate to join countries with which it shares a common interest in preventing Afghanistan from again becoming a Pakistani backyard and haven for terrorism, says G. Partha sarathy.

JUST A few days before he died in a mysterious air crash on August 17, 1988, Gen Zia ul Haq shared some of his thoughts with a German correspondent.

Zia was ecstatic that following the Geneva Accords, Mr Mikhail Gorbachev was all set to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

Asked what Pakistan would do next in Afghanistan his eyes glittered.

Displaying a map of Pakistan's neighbourhood to his visitor, Zia placed the palm of his hand over Afghanistan with his fingers extending into neighbouring Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Pointing to his palm and fingers he breathlessly proclaimed: "You know all this (Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) will soon be ours."

This, then, was the grand strategy of the Pakistan military seeking "strategic depth" against India, by the virtual takeover of Afghanistan and its northern neighbours.

This is an objective that has not yet been abandoned by the military establishment in Pakistan.

Pakistan's apologists have often sought to pander to these fanciful geo-strategic ideas by saying that Islamabad's real aim is to seek a rear base to position its forces in the event of a deep armoured thrust by Indian forces.

But will any sane government in India ever seek such a deep thrust that will almost certainly risk nuclear escalation? And if the Pakistan military's aim is only to position its air force out of range of the IAF, then it should surely know that it would be as easy for the IAF to attack Kabul or Kandahar, as it would be to attack Peshawar or Quetta.

Thus, the concept of "strategic depth" in Afghanistan has no military rationale. What Pakistan appears to be really seeking is the establishment of a Sunni dominated "Islamic Emirate" covering Pakistan, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and, of course, Jammu and Kashmir. Being predominantly Shiite, Iran can have no place in such a scheme.

But a single Sunni Islamic entity on these lines would serve as a useful counter to an India weakened by prolonged low-intensity conflict. Hence, Gen Pervez Musharraf's assertion on April 12, 1999, that low-intensity conflict with India would continue even if Kashmir is resolved.

When American cruise missiles hit the town of Khost near the Pak-Afghan border in 1998 as it was suspected to be a hideout for Osama bin Laden, they destroyed an ISI-Taliban camp for training jehadis of the Harkat ul Mujahideen for terrorism in Kashmir.

It was also clear during the hijacking of IC-814 to Kandahar in December 1999, that Taliban-administered Afghanistan was merely an extension of Pakistan, with even the air traffic control run by Pakistanis.

It is known that following the ouster of the Taliban in 2001, some 10,000 of its fighters along with around 35,000 armed Pakistanis fled into the areas along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.

Pakistani officers up to the rank of Brigadier were then commanding joint Taliban/Pakistani formations in Afghanistan.

Hundreds of these Pakistani officers and combatants were hastily evacuated by the PAF, with American concurrence, when American and Northern Alliance forces laid siege to the northern town of Kunduz in 2001.

The US Ambassador to Afghanistan, Mr Zalmay Khalilzad, and the President, Mr Hamid Karzai, have frequently alleged that Taliban fighters have been provided assistance and shelter in Quetta and elsewhere in Pakistan.

While over 350 Al Qaeda activists have been apprehended by Pakistani agencies, not a single Taliban leader has yet been apprehended in Pakistan.

After three years of military operations, the Americans have succeeded thus far in eliminating only two senior Taliban leaders within Afghanistan — Mullah Sakhi Dad Mujahid and Mullah Omar's brother-in-law, Mullah Amanullah.

According the well-known Pakistani writer Ahmed Rashid, the diaries seized during the arrest of Mujahid a few weeks ago revealed that Mullah Omar was resident in or near Quetta in Baluchistan.

There is no doubt now that despite Mr Richard Boucher of the State Department showering praise on Gen Musharraf, the ISI still assists the Taliban.

Presidential elections are scheduled to be held in Afghanistan on October 9. The United Nations has done splendid job in registering around 7.8 million out of an estimated 10 million voters. Given the weaknesses of the Afghan National Army, the limitations in numbers of the American and ISAF Forces and the continuing presence of the Taliban cadres bent on voter intimidation, it remains to be seen whether genuinely free elections can be conducted throughout Afghanistan.

Mr Karzai is seeking election, with the brother of the legendary Ahmed Shah Masood and Shiite Hazara leader, Karim Khalili, as Vice-Presidential nominees. Ranged against him are leaders of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance such as the Vice-President, Gen Mohammed Fahim, the former Interior Minister, Mr Yunus Qanooni, the Uzbek leader, Mr Rashid Dostum, and the influential Hazara leader, Mr Mohammed Mohaqiq — figures who were for years backed by Russia, India, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Iran and shunned by the Americans.

Mr Karzai has also sought to marginalise other powerful anti-Taliban military commanders such as Ismail Khan, Hazrat Ali and Khan Mohammed. All this has evidently been done with American encouragement and support.

There is a growing fear amongst who opposed and fought the Taliban that the Bush Administration is attempting to appease Gen Musharraf by marginalising those who fought the Taliban, labelling them "Warlords", while at the same time seeking to accommodate so-called "Moderate Taliban" leaders. Northern Alliance leaders bitterly complain that the Americans and their NATO partners demand that they and their allies labelled as "Warlords" should unilaterally disarm, while Pakistan continues to arm and assist the Taliban and its allies.

The Pakistani effort seems to be to re-establish Taliban control over Southern and Eastern Afghanistan by getting the Americans to marginalise those who opposed the Taliban. Pakistan also favours the disbandment of forces in the Northern Alliance and its allies who fought the Taliban, while continuing to assist and arm the Taliban.

Quite obviously, the Pakistanis are seeking to lay the groundwork to re-establish "strategic depth" throughout Afghanistan, in the conviction that the Americans are bound to leave that country in course of time.

While New Delhi has been quite happy to assist the Karzai Government in its efforts to promote stability and development, it can obviously not acquiesce in the Americans pandering to Pakistani ambitions of "strategic depth" in Afghanistan. Mr Karzai himself has been friendly towards India and is an Afghan nationalist.

But India should make it clear that any deal being made with so-called "moderate Taliban" would be quite unacceptable, as we would be back to the situation that prevailed during and before the Kandahar hijack episode.

New Delhi has offered Pakistan unfettered transit rights to Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal under the South Asian Free Trade Agreement.

Pakistan is, however, determined not to allow the use of its territory for transit of Indian goods to Afghanistan. We need to expedite development of the Chahbahar Port in Iran and the road linking it to Herat in Afghanistan, to provide Afghanistan with a viable access to the sea, free from Pakistani blackmail.

These developments are obviously going to be assessed in Moscow, Tashkent, Dushanbe and Teheran. The Russians are now boosting security cooperation with Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Russia recently signed a strategic cooperation agreement with Uzbekistan and an agreement with Tajikistan on June 4 that reinforced its existing troop presence there with provisions that would reportedly give it access to military facilities outside the capital, Dushanbe.

Iran would likewise be averse to the marginalisation of anti-Taliban leaders such as Ismail Khan and Haqiqi.

While India should not interfere with the forthcoming elections in Afghanistan, New Delhi cannot ignore our friends there, or hesitate in joining countries with whom we share a common interest in preventing Afghanistan from again becoming a Pakistani backyard and a haven for terrorism directed against us.

(The author is a former High Commissioner to Pakistan.)