![]() Financial Daily from THE HINDU group of publications Monday, Sep 20, 2004 |
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Opinion
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Economy Columns - Vision 2020 Saving the steel frame P. V. Indiresan
THE PRIME MINISTER, Dr Manmohan Singh, is rightly credited with the economic reforms that saved our country a decade ago from impending disaster. He has now embarked on another major exercise, administrative reforms this time. There are significant differences between economic crisis and administration failures: The former is like a heart attack, and the latter is like diabetes. The former is sudden and needs emergency treatment. It makes headlines. The latter debilitates the patient gradually; it may take years before the patient is even aware of the affliction. It has no dramatic remedy like currency devaluation. Hence, it does not make headline news. That is why the Prime Minister's moves on administrative reforms have not caught public fancy the way his economic reforms did. Administrative quality depends on three features: One, as a Chinese proverb says, servants do not do what the master directs them to do but what he inspects. Two, as Dr Nayudamma used to say, a society throws up the kind of persons it honours. Three, as William Ouchi has explained in his book Z-theory, the Japanese economic miracle emanated from its culture of trust, both in colleagues and subordinates. Indian administration fails on all three counts: It depends almost solely on direction and not on inspection. It has no system to identify and honour outstanding contributors. It is based entirely on mistrust. Because of these lifestyle defects, Indian administration has acquired a reputation internationally for corruption and competitive inefficiency. It is so expensive that the tax income does not cover even revenue expenditure, let alone pay for future development. The faults of Indian administrative practice are many. For instance, the public sector telephone service provider. It is facing severe competition from private companies. Normally, the threat of competition would have forced it to make its services customer friendly. Our administrative culture is such that it has not: For instance, it will not accept payment by credit card. If a bill is lost in post, the subscriber has to go to its divisional office and collect a duplicate; it will not post a duplicate bill, nor accept payment without a bill. Unless you are an important person (then, you can run up bills for lakhs of rupees with impunity), the telephone will be cut off even though the fault is that of the company in not reaching the bill to the customer. The subscriber has to take the initiative to collect the bill. Even when the subscriber tries, it requires calling three different persons before the subscriber can find out where to get the duplicate bill. When the final number is reached, the official is rarely polite. For the officials government-owned service provider, the subscriber is a burden, not the breadbasket. Its management has many bright minds. They are sincere and work hard. Even then, the quality of service remains poor because they do not inspect how their operations appear to the subscriber. Whenever they want a telephone service for themselves, a red carpet is laid for them. So, they have no notion what difficulties subscribers face. As they do not know what is wrong, they introduce no remedies. They do not inspect; they are ignorant. No wonder, the quality of the service they provide is unsatisfactory. Such absence of inspection and poor service is typical of all government institutions. Another public sector undertaking in the fertiliser business exemplifies the second kind of administrative shortcoming. In its decades of existence, it has not produced even one bag of fertiliser. Yet, it has been employing thousands. All these officials who do no work get fat salaries, which places them at the top of the economic pyramid. They also get promotions from time to time. This company has cost taxpayers thousands of crores of rupees, and continues to do so. This company has been able to extract its pound of flesh because we honour irresponsible trade union leaders above wealth-generating entrepreneurs. We honour the workers they represent, even if they do no work. We do not honour sincere workers who toil for a pittance because they have no trade union leaders to champion them. As a recent article in these columns pointed out, in our country, wages of government employees is 5.6 times the national average, whereas in the US that ratio is only 1.2. In spite of such generous wages, hundreds of thousands of employees hardly perform any useful work. They need not work because our administration respects only the privileged, and not the competent. Our government is notorious for its policy of mistrust. The cardinal principle of Indian administration is everyone must be a crook even if there is no evidence of dishonesty. Our rules are loaded with safeguards against every conceivable misconduct. There are no rules to support efficient and honest conduct. Due to this mistrust, government operations are rigidly compartmentalised both vertically and horizontally. They are subject to rules that defy logic. In the Indian administration, "working-to-rule" is the same as bringing work to a grinding halt. Yet, administrators swear by rules; they do not trust themselves nor trust others to use discretion in making decisions. Disasters resulting from following rules are acceptable; invaluable innovations for which no rules exist are taboo. Since Independence, there have been over 50 proposals for administrative reforms. None of them has been implemented. As a matter of interest, the obstruction has not come from the political class but from officials. Apparently, our officials have maximised the benefits extractable out of the system that they fear that any change will only diminish what they get now. Evidently, our officials are not serving the government; instead, the government serves them. At the same time, officials too have several genuine grievances. Thus, the country is having the worst of both worlds: Neither is the public happy with the administration nor are the officials happy with their lot. Alternatively, officials may be afraid that their so-called steel frame has rusted so much that the slightest change will bring it down. There is a third view: the basic problem is not with the bureaucracy but with ever-escalating corruption, even criminality, of politicians. No reform will be complete if it does not address these issues too. Unfortunately, all proposals for administrative reforms are narrow in scope. In particular, they do not address the environment created by politicians. That is like whitewashing your house without attending to the coal yard next door. Thus, most proposals for administrative reforms have sought to treat symptoms, not the underlying disease. Some times, they have suggested drastic remedies. We need instead, a change in the lifestyle. The illness of our administration needs Ayurvedic treatment, not an allopathic one. Healthy diet, exercise, yoga and pranayama cure diabetes (even heart disease) better than allopathic medicines do. Indian administration too needs similar changes in daily routine much more than a one-time surgical intervention. The Hota Committee has made two interesting recommendations: Contract appointments and recruitment at the school level. Both are like drastic surgery. They have their uses, and their risks too. Lifetime security has been the cornerstone of the IAS system. Unfortunately, the IAS has income security only, not job security. IAS officials can be shifted at the whim and fancy of the political masters. Mr T. N. Seshan was once shifted three times in one day. Some argue that the IAS officers should not complain because, in any case, their emoluments and perquisites are protected at all times. That is an illogical argument. As Jesus Christ said, no man lives by bread alone. Youngsters join the IAS not for the money but for the authority and the responsibility that they expect to enjoy. Take away authority and responsibility, the sweetness of the IAS turns into ashes. Apparently, not all officials will be on contract. In that case, we will have a two-caste system: Those entitled to lifelong employment and those subject to short-term contracts. Such dichotomy is a call for disaster. Even then, contract appointments will be useful if two conditions are met: One, such officials are not transferable and two, they perform different tasks. For instance, they may take on Five Year Plan projects in the Mission Mode while regular officials undertake non-Plan tasks. Otherwise, those on contracts will be even more insecure than permanent officials, and even more susceptible to political pressures. The proposal for recruitment at the school level has one advantage: It will help the poor because only rich parents can give their children expensive college education, and poor children cannot have that advantage. Thus, selection at the school level will remove that extra advantage the rich now enjoy with recruitment at graduate level. Recruitment at the school level has the disadvantage of creating a monoculture. Candidates coming from different disciplines enrich the service. All officials emanating from an identical programme of training destroys that diversity. Further, the proposed system runs the risk that future officials will be well trained but poorly educated. (To be continued)
(The author is former Director, IIT Madras. Response may be sent to: indresan@vsnl.com)
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