The Hindu Business Line : New issues in non-proliferation: Self-reliance, the only answer

American non-proliferation policies are arbitrary. Pakistan and China have been found to have transferred enrichment technology and equipment and weapons designs to Libya, Iran and North Korea. Yet, Washington imposes sanctions on two Indian nuclear scientists, for their alleged transfer of unconventional weapons and missile technology to Iran. While one has never visited Iran and the other has, under the IAEA aegis. G. Parthasarathy laments the action against India, which has scrupulousl y avoided transfer of nuclear weapons and missiles knowhow.

UNLIKE in the Clinton Administration, the nuclear non-proliferation mandarins of the Bush Administration have never sought to stage a Crusade to "cap, roll back and eliminate" India's nuclear weapons programme. The "Next Steps in Strategic Partnership" Agreement, signed by the US President, Mr George W. Bush, and the former Prime Minister, Mr Atal Bihari Vajpayee, outlined a shared commitment to build greater cooperation between India and the United States in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, space, high technology transfers and in missile defence. This was a landmark agreement symbolising an acknowledgement by the US that it recognised the need to move a way from a regime of sanctions in hitherto forbidden areas, to a new era of cooperation with India.

It was in this environment that the Foreign Secretary, Mr Shyam Saran, was able to get some of the existing sanctions eased on India's space research activities and on a very limited area on non-reactor components for safeguarded power reactors, during his visit to Washington, just ahead of the Bush-Manmohan Singh meeting in New York. This process was never going to be easy because of existing US commitments with partners in groups such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group and its own domestic legislation such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978.

While the spin doctors in both the NDA and the UPA dispensations and journalists would like us to believe that each meeting between India and the US at the highest level is a great "breakthrough," realists acknowledge that the process of easing past American sanctions is going to be painstaking and time consuming. The Bush Administration, at the highest levels, seems to be committed to this new "strategic partnership". Given the comments of Mr Strobe Talbot, one of the High Priests of the Democratic Party Foreign Policy establishment, during his recent visit to India, it appears that if Senator John Kerry is elected on November 2, the process initiated by the Bush Administration could well be brought to a halt.

But even if we have a very friendly President occupying the White House, American non-proliferation legislation and commitments are such that it would be a pipedream to imagine that the US would offer us technology pertaining to nuclear power reactors in the foreseeable future, as it now appears ready to do for China. What we need to do in the long run is to persuade the US to ease its objections to nuclear transfers to us by countries such as Russia and France, in the same manner that it has acquiesced in the Chinese decision to build yet another nuclear power plant for Pakistan at Chashma.

While the Manmohan Singh Government has handled India-US relations with considerable skill thus far, there are naturally misgivings about the propensity of its Communist partners to restrict and sabotage any meaningful partnership with Washington.

Given the interest of the Bush Administration in a meaningful partnership with India, there is naturally amazement at the recent action to impose sanctions on two Indian nuclear scientists. This was announced as part of sanctions imposed by the US on 14 "entities" from China, Russia, Spain, India, Belarus, Ukraine and North Korea. The five Chinese "entities" named have evidently been involved in nuclear and missile transfers to Pakistan. But it is odd that the National Development Complex in Fatehganj headed by Pakistani nuclear scientist Samar Mubarak Mand has not yet been subject to any sanctions, though it is well known that the nuclear and missile facilities in Fatehganj have links with Chinese "entities".

What is even stranger is that the two Indian scientists named have been `sanctioned' for their alleged transfer of unconventional weapons and missile technology to Iran. One of the scientists, C. Surender, has never visited Iran.

The other scientist, Y. S. R. Prasad, visited Iran while in service, at the request of the International Atomic Energy Agency, to advise on safety related issues. He visited the nuclear power plant being built in Bushehr as a consultant on nuclear safety after he retired. The Bushehr reactor is being built with Russian assistance. It is subject to IAEA safeguards. Referring to these visits, New Delhi has clarified; "No sale of material, equipment or technology was involved. No transfer of sensitive technology has taken place. The US Government has been asked to review the issue and withdraw the sanctions".

If it is the US policy to impose sanctions on any scientist who advises on issues pertaining to the safeguarded nuclear facility in Bushehr, is the Bush Administration going to similarly impose sanctions on every Russian scientist who works on the construction of this nuclear power plant?

India has scrupulously avoided transfer of the knowhow for nuclear weapons and missiles. When Col Muammar Gadhaffi's erstwhile deputy, Major Jalloud, visited India in 1978, Libya made a request for Indian nuclear technology. Broad hints were made of Libyan oil supplies at concessional terms and construction contracts for Indian companies in return for Indian nuclear technology. The proposal was rejected by the Morarji Desai government. Shortly thereafter, the architect of the 1974 nuclear explosion, Dr Raja Ramanna, was shocked when the Iraqi President, Mr Saddam Hussein, personally sought his assistance for nuclear weapons development, when Dr Ramanna was on a visit to that country. The Narasimha Rao Government backed off from a proposal to supply Iran with a nuclear research reactor, even though many questioned why India should fight shy of supplying a fully safeguarded nuclear facility to Iran, like Russia is doing now.

It is evident that American non-proliferation policies are arbitrary. Pakistan has been found to have transferred enrichment technology and equipment and weapons designs to Libya, Iran and North Korea. China is known to have transferred nuclear weapons designs, nuclear reactors, plutonium processing facilities and ring magnets for Pakistan's nuclear programme. Its missile transfers to Pakistan's missile facilities in Fatehganj for the Shaheen 1 and Shaheen 2 missiles are a violation of MTCR guidelines.

Rather than taking firm action against China and Pakistan for engaging in blatant nuclear and missile proliferation, the Americans have sought to obfuscate issues. Mrs Madeline Albright loftily proclaimed that the Clinton Administration was unable to make a firm "determination" that there had been missile and nuclear transfers from China to Pakistan.

And we are now asked to believe that A. Q. Khan actually ran a worldwide nuclear weapons department store for over a decade and his bosses ranging from Generals Aslam Beg to Pervez Musharraf were blissfully unaware of what the wicked and money hungry Khan was up to.

We also have the strange spectacle of Iran and North Korea being harangued and sanctioned for receiving nuclear weapons capabilities and Pakistan being lauded as a champion of non-proliferation for acknowledging that it has supplied these capabilities. What has been revealed so far would appear to be only the tip of an iceberg. Saudi Arabia has sought nuclear capabilities for several years now and generously funded Pakistan. Many skeletons could well start tumbling from the Pak-Saudi nuclear closet.

We live in an inequitable world. We should realise that sanctions will end only when we demonstrate that we can make our own supercomputers, launch commercially viable satellites and build our own nuclear power plants with reactors larger than the 238 MW reactors we obtained from Canada. Rajiv Gandhi refused to accept American conditions for supply of a second supercomputer.

Within a few years a team of scientists headed by Dr A. P. J. Abdul Kalam produced the Param supercomputer, substantially more powerful and at a fraction of the cost of American equivalents. The Americans then rushed in with fresh offers for supercomputer supplies. India gained international respect when it resisted the post-Pokhran sanctions in 1998 and demonstrated that it could develop economically even in the face of sanctions. Self-reliance is not merely a slogan. It is a national necessity.

(The author is a former High Commissioner to Pakistan.)

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