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Ranabir Ray Choudhury

The Prime Minister, Dr Manmohan Singh, the Russian President, Mr Vladimir Putin, and the Chinese Premier,Mr Wen Jiabao -- A new meeting of minds.

IN THE post-Cold War world, the rule governing the flow of long-term international relations appears to be one where politics follows economics. In the earlier dispensation, when the world was riven by the struggle between the "capitalist" camp, led by the US, and the Communist band, headed by the erstwhile Soviet Union, the sequence was different — one where economic developments followed in the footsteps of political decisions taken at Kremlin and in Washington D.C.

With the eclipse of ideology in the direction of international relations (after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s), economic issues have come to the forefront, with the result that, today, one is seeing all sorts of permutation and combination of alliances between nations and among groups of countries unthinkable even 10 years ago.

One such grouping now being talked about now is to bring together India, Russia and China — three emerging economies which would carry substantial weight in the world economy going by numbers alone.

Of course, the entire concept of a three-way "alliance" is still in a rudimentary stage, but it is clear that should it be formed it would force a revision in the policies — economic and otherwise — of most of the other important players on the international stage.

An indication of what such changes would be like was provided just the other day when China and the 10-member Association of South-East Asian Nations (Asean) agreed to come closer to each other economically which would result in, among other things, a market of two billion people.

Immediately after the accord was finalised between China and Asean, there was flurry of activity involving South Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand, all of which were keenness on arriving at an economic adjustment with Asean which would accord them tariff advantages almost similar to those offered to China by the South-East Asian grouping

But, of course, the million-dollar question is whether such a trilateral grouping (comprising New Delhi, Moscow and Beijing) will at all be formed and, if so, in what specific shape?

On the face of it, the prime mover of the idea appears to be the Russian leader, Mr Vladimir Putin, whose reasons for seeking such an "alliance" are not too difficult to fathom.

Briefly, Mr Putin and his colleagues in Moscow still nurse a Big Power mentality, which is very normal indeed for reasons too obvious to recount.

Since there is simply no way the Russia of today can flesh out this craving single-handedly, it is only natural that it should try to do so with the aid of other countries.

The fulcrum of such a grouping will inevitably have to lie to the east of Russia because of, among other things, a sheer lack of opportunities in Europe and Latin America (with perhaps the exception of Brazil).

If such a grouping has to be to the east of Russia, what other candidate can one think of but China, which not only has a gigantic presence on the international scene in terms of population and the economy but also is eminently suited because o its ideological pedigree.

The choice of India to be a part of Mr Putin's group is also not surprising given the country's standing in the developing world and, perhaps more importantly, the traditional close ties between New Delhi and Moscow going back to the Cold War days.

It is hardly surprising that, initially, New Delhi had given a cautious welcome to the idea primarily because of the sheer scope and breadth of its global implications and also because of the impact a quick favourable response would have on the gradual warming of ties between New Delhi and Washington.

Further, it would be far more sensible to get to know Beijing's mind on the issue before enthusiastically committing oneself to it.

Also, from India's point of view, close economic ties with all the major economic powers would, at anytime, be far more preferable than sacrificing or upsetting some links in order to forge newer ones in today's highly competitive economic environment.

Today, there appears to be a change in the responses of both New Delhi and Beijing compared to their earlier stands (China had taken a firm stand against any such "alliance" when it was first proposed), which itself is an interesting development because it draws attention to, among other things, the rapid movements in the international economic and political scene.

The most important movement is of course that by China, which signalled a subtle shift in its stance towards India when its Prime Minister, Mr Wen Jiabao, told Dr Manmohan Singh, recently in Vientiane that "The handshake between you and me will catch the attention of the whole world."

Why Beijing has chosen to make the shift it has in its policy towards India at this juncture is, of course, a complex issue by itself.

But the fact remains that the change has been made, and one which will perhaps be limited to the economic sphere as opposed to, say, the border issue on which Beijing's response to Indian initiatives has been lukewarm.

Going by the reports, a number of meetings on the subject have already been held by the Foreign Ministers of the three countries, the next one being slated for the shores of Lake Baikal in the first half of 2005.

One can never be certain whether anything at all will come out of these meetings that will be useful to the three countries economically and otherwise.

On the face of it, it appears that should a trilateral grouping be given a definite shape, its focus would probably be jointly to pursue non-economic subjects as opposed to economic issues, which would perhaps be left to the bilateral efforts of the countries concerned.

The main basis for this view lies in the fact that an economic pact between China and India at this moment would seem to be a rather farfetched possibility. In any case, should there be a mutual desire to engage in such a relationship, there really would be no need to bring Russia into the picture.

Indeed, come to think of it, is there any need for a trilateral grouping involving India, Russia and China in today's world, especially when the economic benefits flowing from such an "alliance" would be practically non-existent?

Moscow may have a specific extra-economic reason to push through the idea, but would New Delhi enjoy any spin-offs particularly regarding its relations with China? On the contrary, some applecarts could be upset, which could harm Indian economic interests.

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