The Hindu Business Line : The Dragon and Elephant

While India need not be inhibited in efforts to promote bilateral relations with China because of the Pakistan factor, New Delhi should stop pretending that Beijing is a "strategic partner". India may share common interests with China in maintaining peace and tranquility along the border and in forums such as the World Trade Organisation, but it should stop pretending that Beijing is ready to call Delhi for the next waltz, says G. Parthasarathy.

The Chinese Premier, Mr Wen Jiabao and the Prime Minister, Dr Manmohan Singh, in New Delhi. — Rajeev Bhatt

IN JULY 1949 India's Political Officer in Sikkim, Hugh Richardson, warned the then Secretary-General of the Ministry of External Affairs, Girija Shanker Bajpai, of the possible adverse military consequences of Mao's Communists assuming power in Beijing and extending their power to Tibet.

Rejecting Richardson's warnings, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru observed: "Whatever the ultimate fate of Tibet in relation to China, I think there is practically no chance of any military danger arising from any possible change in Tibet... I do not feel that there is any necessity at present for our Defence Ministry, or any part of it, to consider military repercussions on the Indo-Tibetan Frontier... "

Following its assertion of authority over Tibet, the Mao regime assured the world in a 17-point Agreement in 1951 that it would respect the "religious beliefs, customs and habits of the Tibetan people" and would not "alter the existing political system in Tibet. The central authorities will also not alter the established status, functions and powers of the Dalai Lama". Needless to say China has consistently violated this solemn undertaking. India, in turn, has lacked the military power to challenge the Chinese move in Tibet.

Sensing that the hard-headed realism of the Chinese could result in their laying territorial claims on India, Nehru decided by 1954 to make it clear that as far as India was concerned there was no doubt about where the border was located and that its location was "not open to discussion with anybody".

We were soon faced with a situation wherein we claimed that there was a well-defined, customary and traditional boundary with China, while the Chinese claimed that they would need to negotiate new boundaries with all neighbours. We bolstered our claims with references to agreements or treaties, evidence of historical control and geographical features.

The Chinese argued, not without basis, that the boundaries had never been formally demarcated. They backed their claims with military muscle and well-built roads. We presented our case by putting forward legalistic arguments to back our claims about the Sino-Indian boundary. The Chinese spoke of a "package deal" in which it was hinted that they would accept the realities of the McMahon Line and our sovereignty in Arunachal Pradesh in return for our agreeing not to challenge their claims over the Aksai Chin area linking Xingjian and Tibet.

To keep us uneasy, the Chinese also periodically insisted on adjustments in the Eastern Sector. When we challenged their claims with forward deployments, we suffered severe military setbacks while confronting a well-planned military assault backed by overwhelming firepower, in October-November 1962. China's supreme leader Deng Xiaoping proudly proclaimed in 1979 that India had been taught a `lesson' in 1962.

The visit of the Chinese Premier, Mr Wen Jiabao, to India has been as trumpeted as a great success with claims of a "breakthrough" on the border issue. The Agreement the National Security Adviser, Mr M. K. Narayanan, inked with his Chinese counterpart speaks of a "package settlement" to the boundary issue after "mutual adjustments to their respective positions". The boundary is to be "along easily identifiable natural geographical features".

It has also been agreed that the two sides "shall safeguard due interests of their settled populations in their border areas". This provision bolsters our claim to the monastery border town of Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh. (China has laid claim to Tawang in bilateral discussions.) In agreeing to a "package settlement" of the boundary question we have, in effect, accepted the approach put forward by Zhou Enlai to Nehru and by Deng Xiaoping to Rajiv Gandhi. This is a realistic approach. The Sino-Indian border on the western sector was after all never formally delineated. The only proposal that British-ruled India put forward on this issue to the Chinese was the Macartney-McDonald proposal submitted in Beijing in 1899.

Under this proposal the boundary in the western sector moves along and beyond the Karakoram Range and constitutes a viable defence frontier for India. What we need are strategically defensible frontiers as those proposed in 1899. Quite obviously India should not make any concessions, especially when it comes to populated areas in the eastern sector where the McMahon Line meets all the criteria for defining the boundary in the recent agreement signed in New Delhi.New Delhi can be satisfied about the progress that has been made by successive governments in addressing the boundary question with China, ever since the December 1988 visit of Rajiv Gandhi. But one does find the hype and reversion to slogans such as "Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai" both immature and disconcerting.

China remains the foremost power practising a policy of "containment" of India by its continuing nuclear and missile proliferation and supply of conventional arms to Pakistan. Just on the eve of the visit of Mr Wen to Pakistan, China agreed to supply Pakistan four modern F-22 frigates. At the same time the Pakistani President, Gen Pervez Musharraf, inaugurated a plant for the production of over 100 Chinese origin JF-17 fighter aircraft. China is now set to deepen the Gwadar Port at the mouth of the Persian Gulf. Gen Musharraf announced in 2001 that he was prepared to make the Gwadar port available for use by the Chinese navy in the event of Pakistan facing a security threat.

China continues to supply Pakistan with capabilities for producing its medium range Shaheen I and intermediate range Shaheen II missiles. It has announced its readiness to provide further assistance for nuclear power plants at Chashma. It is well-known that the so called assistance of China for nuclear power plants in Chashma is really a cover for Chinese assistance for Pakistan's nuclear and missile complexes at nearby Fatehjang or Khushab. Significantly, Pakistan and China signed a `Friendship Treaty' during Mr Wen's visit. While the provisions of the Treaty have significantly not been made public, Pakistan's Ambassador to China, Mr Salman Bashir, asserted that it contained a "clear, unambiguous and categorical assurance by China to defend Pakistan's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity".

While we need not be inhibited in our efforts to promote bilateral relations with China because of the Pakistan factor, we should stop pretending that China is our "strategic partner". We make a mockery of our credibility when we do so. We also lack credibility when we appear to be taken in by stray comments by the Chinese Prime Minister that his country positively views our aspirations to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

China's Ambassador to the UN, Mr Wang Guangya, made it clear on April 4 that "it is essential that an agreement on enlarging the Council should be reached by a unanimous vote of the 191 members of the UN General Assembly". China is determined to prevent Japan from becoming a Permanent Member and appears all set to quietly back efforts by countries such as Italy, South Korea, Pakistan, Mexico and Argentina that are opposed to one or other of the four main contenders for permanent Security Council membership — Japan, Germany, Brazil and India.

China has not backed our candidature for membership of such forums as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation or the Asean-East Asia Dialogue. While we may share common interests with China in maintaining peace and tranquility along our borders and in forums such as the World Trade Organisation, we should stop pretending that the Middle Kingdom is ready to welcome us at the high tables where it dines.

(The author is a former High Commissioner to Pakistan.)

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