The Hindu Business Line : EU turmoil: Lessons for European integration

WITH the stunning negative vote from the two founding members of the European Union against its constitution, there is a whole new look being taken at the remarkable post-World War II institution built and nurtured in Europe.

The Maastricht Treaty of February 2, 1992, led to the foundation of the European Union, the Central European Bank advocating a single currency and the development of European industrial policy.

The Amsterdam Treaty opened up long-term possibilities of full integration and the Helsinki European Council gave momentum to the European identity, in terms of security and defence.

In 2000, with ten countries of central and eastern Europe joining the Union, Europe was poised to represent more than just the "tip of Eurasia" which Paul Valery visualised.

The last five decades over which the process of integration has progressed are lessons in globalisation. Post 1945, Europe was threatened with a new conflict between the East and West.

The Moscow Conference on the German issue ran into a stalemate on April 24, 1947; the Prague coup of February 25, 1948 guaranteed domination of communism in Czechoslovakia; and the Berlin blockage in January, 1948, resulted in the division of Germany.

In spring 1950, Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Affairs Minister, aided by Jean Monnet, was asked to make a proposal to bring Federal Germany back into the western fold.

Instead, he authored the idea of creating a community of pacific interests, forging bonds of amity and understanding among enemies of yesteryears, erasing the bitterness of war and forsaking the burden of the past.

An inter-governmental conference convened by France on June 20, 1950 in Paris had the three Benelux countries and Italy at the negotiating table.

On April 18, 1951, the 50-year Treaty establishing the Coal and Steel Community was signed, to be ratified by the six signatory countries.

The fast unfolding events provided a thrust to the European Economic Community and Euraton, which culminated in the Treaty of Rome in 1957, considered the bedrock of European integration. In 1972, the UK, Ireland and Denmark joined the Communities followed later by Greece, Spain and Portugal. In 1995, a 15-member European Community emerged with the induction of Austria, Finland and Sweden.

Jean Monnet had aptly said: "We are not forming a coalition between states, but a union among people." Thinkers and philosophers like Montesquieu, Kant, Leibniz, Vico, Rousseau and others had called for European unity to achieve a balance between the individual and society.

The idea of European unity was first conceived of by a movement in the 1920s. Gaston Riou expressed the need for unity in his 1929 book To Unite or to Die. Aristide Briand, spurred by Coudenhove-Kalergi and the emerging "European movement", proposed to forge "a sort of federal link", between European countries.

The Germans, British and French felt they were Europeans, recognising themselves as nations, identical in culture and in their superiority complex.

To be European in the 19th century meant adherence to an individual code of conduct or to an elitist way of life. The period between World War II and the Cold War constituted a fundamental turning point in the unification process. Western geopolitics had changed the geographical meaning of the term `Europe'.

Winston Churchill had no desire of involving England in European unity, instead he favoured an association sharing interests of European countries. The Americans wanted a prosperous Germany; while France desired a weak Germany.

Jean Monnet proposed the Pleven Plan in October, 1950, which envisaged a European Defence Community (EDC) that also commenced negotiations for creating a European Political Community (EPC). Soon a paradox presented itself. France, which had taken the initiative, declined to surrender its defence and armies, ratifying the EDC in 1954. Monnet resigned from his post as he realised how difficult it was to get six countries of unequal sizes and sensitivities to forgo the option of a veto.

General de Gaulle did not want the Europe of Jean Monnet. He wanted a confederation of States constituting among themselves a common confederal power, to which each would delegate a part of its sovereignty, especially in the spheres of economy, defence and culture.

On his return to power in 1958, de Gaulle formulated the main points of a European policy within the inter-Ministerial Council: "the main thing is the Common Market which is not a bad thing in itself but what is required is the political and cultural organisation of Europe".

The concept resembled the model advocated by political scientist Joseph Rovan, who spoke of "a loose federation with a number of political layers, where only those issues are passed to a higher floor that cannot be taken care of on a lower level".

The Germans have had their own perceptions. They were sceptical of the Gaullist conception of Europe being too "nationalistic" and oriented towards French hegemony. Konard Adenauer is believed to have said that Asia started on the right bank of the river Rhine! For most Germans, Europe came to an end on the Eastern border with Portugal.

The Poles believed that their Eastern border divided the Roman Catholic half of Europe from the Slavic, orthodox and Byzantine Russian Empire and its satellites.

After de Gaulle resigned, an economic and monetary union was supported by Georges Pompidou and Willy Brandt. It was given an impetus by Helmut Schmidt and Valery Giscard `d Estaing.

With the prospect of further enlargement, (of an already large Union) the establishment of a coherent and cohesive administrative structure at a regional level appeared to be an unattainable goal. Another concept doing the rounds then, was the creation of satellite groupings with common institutions, for example, Nordic nations, which talk of a Baltic economic area to bring together Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Russia and Sweden or the countries of central Europe that are looking forward to a resuscitated Mitteleuropa.

The then French Prime Minister, Pierre Moscovici, elaborated on President Jacques Chirac's concept of "enhanced cooperation", a coalition of member-states united around common financial, industrial and defence policies; a second wing of countries constituting a loose "political and economic space" associating themselves with the inner core; while the fringes, a "third circle", would link the EU with countries such as Russia, Ukraine and Georgia.

The growing fluidity within the EU raised doubts in the unification of central and eastern Europe, despite their common legacy in religion and culture — literature, art, music and science. Central Europe remained, to a large extent, a place where people wanted to negate their geography.

Countries such as Austria craved for a union of the old Hapsburg zone which once extended from Vienna across Hungary, the Czech lands, part of southern Poland, parts of Ukraine and the northern slice of the Balkans.

Then there were the post-Tudjman Croats, Romanians and Bulgarians, tenaciously clutching EU candidacies. The rest of the Balkans have been relegated to a group almost of their own.

A disparate EU that would so emerge would have a multiple system, helping the countries of central and eastern Europe feel more at home.

As Austrian Chancellor Wolfgang Schuessel maintained, Europe was being unified for the first time "through the cooperation of equal partners" unlike, by hegemonic powers, as in the past. Some euro-sceptics (those disillusioned with their governments perceived to be hamstrung by EU edicts) may somehow be tempted to opt out of the Euro zone.

With proper communication and salesmanship, and the realisation of a really democratic and egalitarian bloc in the new world order, the disenchantment among the French, or the Dutch, can be duly brought around to an optimal EU structure that is consistent with the demands of the time.

It is difficult not to acknowledge a general perception that the new Europe would be dominated by a Franco-German directoire. For it is they who invented the union; they have been the biggest beneficiaries; they view themselves as its prime movers. As often acclaimed, in the heart of every Frenchman is a piece of Jean Monnet, de Gaulle and Richelieu.

The saga of European integration owes much to the insight of these statesmen who rose above the circumstances. The French political philosopher Jean Bodin once remarked that changes in the nature of states should happen slowly. He compared states and their institutions to old buildings: "If you tamper with the foundations, there is a great danger of the whole structure collapsing".

While the world constantly shrinks, and embraces a rapidly evolving global village, several regions in south Asia maintain the hiatus.

Little does one perceive the impact of the strides taken by the European countries. EU today symbolises an urge, and a hope.

The countries in Europe demonstrate a union of unparalleled dimensions and importance, nurtured with care and dexterity.

(The author is former Managing Director, CONCOR.)

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