The Hindu Business Line : The nuclear doctrine — For ensuring global strategic stability

A stable multipolar world order is feasible only when there is a strategic balance of power within the Asia-Pacific region. Especially in the context of the bogey raised in the West, of India and Pakistan being in a nuclear race, New Delhi has to contribute pro-actively to building a stable strategic balance, says G. Parthasarathy.

Nuclear-capable Prithvi missile at R-Day parade... Even while being responsible, India must keep its options open. — S. Subramanium

ON JULY 8, 1996, the World Court ruled that countries possessing nuclear weapons have not just a "need" but an "obligation" to commence negotiations leading to disarmament. The World Court also declared that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to the principles of international law. Some doubts were expressed about the use of nuclear weapons when the "very survival of a state" was threatened.

The paradox

Despite this ruling the use of nuclear weapons remains central to the national security doctrines of the five NPT (Nuclear non-Proliferation Treaty) "recognised" weapons powers. Releasing the Bush Administration's Nuclear Posture Review in 2002, the Defence Secretary, Mr Donald Rumsfeld, stated that American nuclear strategy aims at providing "a range of options to pose a credible deterrent to adversaries whose values and calculations of risk and loss of lives may be very different and more difficult to discern than past adversaries". The recently formulated US Draft Nuclear Doctrine also speaks of the pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons.

In negotiations held with Iran recently, the UK and France reserved the right to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states in the event of an attack on them, "their dependent territories, their armed forces or other troops, their allies or on a state towards which they have a security commitment".

The use of nuclear weapons is an integral part of the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) nuclear strategy, under which nuclear weapons can be used even on the presumption that a potential adversary possesses weapons of mass destruction. The Russian Federation also has discarded the Soviet pledge that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons.

Despite their own readiness to use nuclear weapons, many NATO countries implicitly assert that India and Pakistan are less "responsible" and "rational" than the five "recognised" nuclear weapons powers. The Americans dispatched the Gates Mission to India and Pakistan in 1990 claiming that both countries had readied their nuclear arsenals for use against each other. The then US President, Mr Bill Clinton's Adviser, Mr Bruce Reidel, has claimed that Pakistan was readying its nuclear weapons for use during the Kargil conflict in 1999. American claims of India and Pakistan being "saved" from a nuclear holocaust by their diplomacy have been vigorously denied by the South-East Asian neighbours. Mercifully, the Bush Administration has not stated that India and Pakistan were on the verge of nuclear conflict in the events following the December 13, 2001 attack on India's Parliament by Pakistani terrorists.

Western propaganda about India and Pakistan being less than "responsible" nuclear weapons states has unfortunately led sections of the elite and the media in India to actually believe it.

Pakistan and the bomb

Pakistan decided to acquire nuclear weapons not because India had nuclear weapons, but because its ruling elite believed that after the dismemberment of the country during the Bangladesh conflict, it needed such weapons because of India's size and conventional superiority. This decision was taken by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in January 1972, well before the Pokhran blast of July 1974. Pakistan has subsequently endeavoured to use its nuclear weapons to blackmail the international community to endorse its ambitions on Kashmir by repeatedly asserting that Kashmir is a "nuclear flashpoint". This propaganda no longer works. Pakistan has realised that such propaganda lacks credibility and reinforces the international perception that it is "irresponsible".

Not much has changed since Bhutto decided in 1972 that nuclear weapons were essential for Pakistan to deter India from overrunning his country. Pakistani strategic thinkers such as former Foreign Ministers Abdul Sattar and Agha Shahi and Air Chief Marshal Zulfiqar Ali Khan have also envisaged use of nuclear weapons by Pakistan for similar reasons.

The only authoritative enunciation of when Pakistan would use nuclear weapons has been by the Head of the Strategic Planning Division of its National Command Authority Lt Gen Khalid Kidwai, who asserted that Pakistan's nuclear weapons were "aimed solely at India". Gen Kidwai stated that Pakistan will use nuclear weapons if India conquers a large part of Pakistan's territory, or destroys a large part of its land and air forces. He also held out the possibility of use of nuclear weapons if India tries to "economically strangle" Pakistan, or pushes it to political destabilisation. The last two reasons given by Gen Kidwai are obviously propagandistic. No Indian Government is ever going to seek to conquer large parts of Pakistan territory. Current international compulsions are such that a prolonged conflict with Pakistan can be ruled out. The possibilities of India and Pakistan resorting to a nuclear conflict are, therefore, virtually nonexistent.

India's strategy

It is in this background that Indian military strategists have looked for "strategic space" to respond militarily to Pakistani provocations in Jammu and Kashmir and elsewhere. The "Cold Start" concept recently adopted by the Indian Army is one such strategic option to counter Pakistan's efforts to escalate support for its Jihad in Jammu and Kashmir and elsewhere in India. It is heartening that young Indian scholars such as Dr Rajesh Rajagopalan of the JNU are carrying out serious studies on these issues. The public and even Parliamentarians should be better informed on such crucial issues of national security.

Unlike Pakistan, India's nuclear arsenal and strategy are not "Pakistan centric". India has categorically committed that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons and will never use nuclear weapons against countries that do not possess such weapons. At the same time, as a measure of abundant precaution, we have reserved our right to use nuclear weapons if our territory or Indian armed forces anywhere come under attack by an adversary using weapons of mass destruction. China remains a crucial factor in formulating our nuclear doctrine. China's nuclear and missile assistance to Pakistan, its deployment of nuclear weapons and missiles in Tibet and Xingjian and the signing of a Friendship Treaty with Pakistan during the recent visit of the Premier, Mr Wen Jiaobao, to Pakistan, are factors that Indian strategic planners cannot overlook in determining nuclear and missile capabilities.

China has offered to sign agreements on "no first use" of nuclear weapons with the other five NPT "recognised" nuclear weapons states.

It has signed such an agreement with Russia and a "non-targeting" deal earlier with the Clinton Administration, immediately after our nuclear tests. While China claims that it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons against any state, it has introduced an element of ambiguity in its nuclear policy on India, by also stating that it's "no first use pledge" is for those countries that have signed the NPT, or are members of regional nuclear weapons free zones. The time has come for New Delhi to formally ask China whether it is prepared to categorically commit itself to a "no first use pledge" with India.

We also need to take some hard decisions on how we are going to counter China's nuclear and missile assistance to Pakistan. China has several border problems with its Asia-Pacific neighbours such as Vietnam and the Philippines. Our response to China's efforts to "contain" India should, therefore, involve a more focused approach to security relations with countries like Vietnam. With Mr Junichiro Koizumi returned to power in Japan with an overwhelming mandate for effecting significant policy changes, a more intensive security dialogue with Tokyo should also be initiated.

A stable multipolar world order is feasible only when there is a strategic balance of power within the Asia-Pacific region. India has to contribute pro-actively in building such a stable strategic balance.

(The author is a former High Commissioner to Pakistan.)

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