The Hindu Business Line : Non-alignment today

In the changed world circumstances, is the concept of "non-alignment" still valid? The `movement' aspect of NAM can remain valid because what it basically means is that a number of countries are close knit enough to adopt common positions on international politics. It can be said that the NAM of yesteryear has transformed into the Group of 20 of today.

DISCUSSING INDIA's stand on the IAEA vote on the Iran nuclear issue, someone said the other day that New Delhi's action in voting with Washington and the EU-III (the UK, France and Germany) comprised a `defection' from the line pursued by the Non-Alignment Movement and had damaged New Delhi's standing, particularly with countries such as Brazil and South Africa which now "can legitimately wonder at India's reliability". The logic is sound but will withstand scrutiny only if it is established that the category of `non-aligned countries' still exists. In other words, if you have to defect from a camp, then that camp must exist. If there is no such camp, the `defection' does not arise.

Briefly, if you have a `non-aligned camp', it means that there are two or more focal points of international diplomacy and that the `non-aligned camp' in question comprises countries which do not belong to any of these competing groups. From the end of the Second World War till the end of the 1980s, this was substantially true in that there were at least two camps (arguably three if one considers the emergence of Beijing — then Peking — as an independent centre of power and influence drawing to itself a number of maverick countries such as North Korea) led by Washington and Moscow. However, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, this situation changed decisively leaving Washington to lord it over the international scene.

The question to ask is whether, in these changed circumstances, the concept of `non-alignment' continues to remain valid and whether there can be any Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in the new set-up. Quite clearly, the `movement' aspect of NAM can remain because what it basically means is that a number of countries are knit close enough to adopt common positions on matters of interest involving international politics and diplomacy. If this is granted, it can be said that the NAM of yesteryear has been transformed into the Group of 20 countries of today. In such a situation, one can think of a `defection' — and it can be argued that New Delhi has `defected' from the G-20.

But is G-20 a movement at all in the sense NAM was? The short answer is, it is not because the G-20 has been formed specifically vis-a-vis the on-going World Trade Organisation negotiations on the Doha Round and, therefore, cannot be compared to the multi-faceted NAM at all? Indeed, does the G-20 have a specific policy on world nuclear issues, such as proliferation and all that, from which New Delhi has deviated? For that matter, does it have any considered policy on the reform of the UN Security Council, or what the world should do with the Myanmar regime's continuing incarceration of Aung San Suu Kyi?

Clearly, as far as is known publicly, the G-20 does not have a formal common policy on these, and other, issues. But it does have a significant presence on the WTO map and, in fact, members like Brazil and South Africa, not to mention India, can take full credit for stopping the developed economies in their tracks in having everything their way. If this is accepted, can it be argued that India's `reliability' vis-à-vis its partners in the G-20 has in any way been affectedby New Delhi's IAEA vote on the Iran nuclear issue?

Seen differently, will India be ready to sacrifice the interests of other developing economies at the WTO talks because of its perceived closeness to Washington on defence and nuclear issues? If the answer is yes, then New Delhi will certainly have become less reliable to its G-20 partners. But there is another way of looking at the whole issue. Is it not possible for New Delhi to exert counter-pressure on Washington at the WTO in return for what it is seen to have `conceded' on the nuclear and defence fronts?

If India is on the way to becoming a Big Power on the international stage, it must be seen to be free of stereotype images applied to it in the past. It must play the game boldly and energetically, keeping the world guessing but always pushing its own national interest. If India were to `align' itself with China on defence and nuclear matters in the way it has with the US, what would the reaction be? One wonders.

Ranabir Ray Choudhury

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