![]() Financial Daily from THE HINDU group of publications Thursday, Oct 06, 2005 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Opinion
-
Foreign Relations Government - Insight India's vote on Iran at IAEA National interest versus foreign policy G. Parthasarathy
India and Iran have cooperated in supporting the Northern Alliance against the Taliban in Afghanistan. They share a common interest to see that landlocked Afghanistan is not subject to Pakistani economic blackmail. Iran benefits by transit of Indian goods to Russia and Central Asia. But Indian and Iranian interests do not always coincide. Iran, unlike Indonesia and Algeria repeatedly backs resolutions in the Organisation of Islamic Conference that condemn alleged human rights abuses in Jammu and Kashmir and echo the Pakistani views on J&K.
Backing for Iran
This happens despite the consistent backing that India gives Iran, by opposing Western-sponsored resolutions that condemn human rights violations by the Iranian Government. Teheran voiced serious concern and was critical of our May 1998 nuclear tests. When Pakistan tested nuclear weapons, Iran found reasons of national security to justify that action. Iran also moved a resolution in the UN earlier this year seeking universal compliance with the provisions of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) despite objections by India. Should India automatically support non-aligned countries disregarding its own national interests on every issue? Every non-aligned country, except Bhutan and Mauritius, voted against India during the Bangladesh crisis in 1971. The position was no different when it came to voting on the American-backed Pakistani proposals to declare South Asia a nuclear weapons free zone. South Africa led the chorus of condemnation against us after our nuclear tests and became the first non-aligned movement Chairman to raise the Kashmir issue at a non-aligned Summit.
Continuing pressure
Even today the "New Agenda Coalition," spearheaded by South Africa and Egypt, demands that India sign the NPT. India, Pakistan and Israel did not accede to the NPT in 1968. They were, therefore, not required to place their nuclear facilities under international safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). All three countries possess nuclear weapons, without violating any international commitment or obligation. Iran signed the NPT and was required to place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. In 2003, the IAEA received substantive and irrefutable evidence, that Iran had violated its commitments under the NPT. From 1987 onwards, Iran secretly undertook the construction of facilities to enrich uranium. The centrifuges and designs for the enrichment facilities were provided to Iran by Pakistan's now disgraced nuclear scientist Dr A. Q. Khan. The clandestine development of these nuclear enrichment facilities was a violation of Iran's obligations under the NPT. Under Article XII.C of the Statute of the IAEA this "non-compliance" with the NPT safeguards provisions has to be reported by the IAEA Board to the UN Security Council and the UN General Assembly. This report has thus far not been filed by the IAEA because Iran agreed in November 2004 to suspend "all tests or production at any uranium conversion installation" pending the conclusion of an agreement with three European Union powers (EU-3) Britain, France and Germany. Just one day before the EU-3 was scheduled to present its proposals to Iran, Teheran announced that it would resume uranium conversion activities at its Isfahan plant. The IAEA Board thereafter decided by a vote of 22 to1 with 11 abstentions (including Russia and China) to refer Iran to the UN Security Council as required by the Statute of the IAEA, after further discussions, now scheduled for November. India voted in favour of this resolution. After making some noises that it would consider reviewing its energy ties with India, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani said: "I believe friends should not be judged by a single action. Iran enjoys friendly relations with India". While India has signed a long-term contract with Iran for the supply of LNG, it also has similar arrangements with countries such as Qatar. Iranian threats of curtailing energy cooperation with India are thus a double-edged weapon. Further, given the frequent bomb blasts in Baluchistan that disrupt Pakistan's own gas supplies and the propensity of both Iran and Pakistan to link economic ties to political developments, is it prudent to rush into constructing an Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline? Despite denials by New Delhi, an important factor underlying the position that India took on Iranian nuclear proliferation was its natural desire to see international sanctions that it has endured for nearly three decades on the supply of nuclear power reactors by members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) end as soon as possible. Following the agreement that the Prime Minister, Dr Manmohan Singh, signed with the US President, Mr George Bush, during his visit to Washington in July, important nuclear suppliers such as Russia, France, Britain and Canada indicated their readiness to work together with the United States to end NSG sanctions on India.
Not in India's interest
It would, therefore, not have been in India's national interest to abstain on an EU-3-sponsored resolution that sought compliance with the Statute of the IAEA and reported Iranian violations of IAEA safeguards obligations to the Security Council. It would have been inconsistent for India to claim that it is opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and then condone clandestine Iranian actions violating the Statute of the IAEA. Dr Manmohan Singh has stated that India would support the EU-3 initiative on securing Iranian compliance with the provisions of the NPT. The Pakistani Prime Minister, Mr Shaukat Aziz, indicated that his country would take a similar position on the issue while visiting South Korea and Malaysia. New Delhi should assist in trying to bridge differences between the EU-3 and Iran, but not budge on its support for reporting IAEA Statute violations to the Security Council and the General Assembly.
Untenable position
India should also make it clear at the IAEA that it is inconsistent for an international organisation to focus only on Iran for receiving P1 and P2 uranium enrichment centrifuges from Pakistan (the P2 centrifuges are reportedly of Chinese origin.). Dr A. Q. Khan supplied not only centrifuge data to Libya but also the design of a nuclear weapon that Pakistan had received from China. The IAEA and the Security Council will have to carry out a comprehensive investigation on whether the "Khan Network" provided Iran also with nuclear weapons designs. India should propose a detailed investigation into the role of Dr A.Q. Khan and Gen Mirza Aslam Beg in nuclear transfers to Iran and a similar investigation into the role of Gen Jehangir Karamat in nuclear transfers to Pyongyang. The IAEA undermines its credibility when it adopts double standards and avoids investigation of those who are "non-NATO allies" of the US, or are permanent members of the Security Council. But can we accuse the IAEA alone of double standards? We are yet to hear forthright condemnation by the Left parties of nuclear and missile proliferation by China and Pakistan proliferation that undermines and endangers our national security. (The author is a former High Commissioner to Pakistan.)
Article E-Mail :: Comment :: Syndication :: Printer Friendly Page
|
Stories in this Section |
|
The Hindu Group: Home | About Us | Copyright | Archives | Contacts | Subscription Group Sites: The Hindu | Business Line | The Sportstar | Frontline | The Hindu eBooks | The Hindu Images | Home |
Copyright © 2005, The
Hindu Business Line. Republication or redissemination of the contents of
this screen are expressly prohibited without the written consent of
The Hindu Business Line
|