Financial Daily from THE HINDU group of publications Friday, May 05, 2006 |
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Opinion
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Foreign Relations Government - Security Dangers of Saltoro pull-back G. Parthasarathy
There has been significant progress in recent months in expanding cooperation and reducing tensions between India and Pakistan, despite continuing incidents of ISI-sponsored terrorism. The composite dialogue process, back channel and other contacts have led to an unprecedented increase in people-to-people contacts. Common ground is even being found in efforts to resolve the Kashmir issue through greater interaction and dialogue, recognising the reality that "borders cannot be redrawn". It would, however, be a Himalayan blunder if we are lulled into a sense of complacency and jeopardise national security by presuming that the military establishment in Pakistan has become so benign that it would give up its efforts to "bleed India," or seek parity with India, because of a sudden change of heart. Remarks by the National Security Adviser, Mr M. K. Narayanan, and calculated leaks to the press suggest that the Government is considering a precipitate withdrawal of forces from the Siachen Region as part of a deal with Pakistan for "demilitarisation" of the Region. Such withdrawal would ignore the factors that led to such distinguished Prime Ministers as Rajiv Gandhi, Narasimha Rao and Mr Atal Bihari Vajpayee exercising caution and circumspection in approving proposals for demilitarisation in the Region.
Defending the Saltoro Range
The Siachen Region lies on the Indian side of the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir. This territory has been defended by the Indian Army, which has displayed immense courage and an unparalleled capacity for sacrifice and hardship for over two decades. Military commanders of India and Pakistan met in Karachi in 1949 and agreed on the precise location of the Cease Fire Line (CFL) in J&K. The CFL was demarcated up to a point in the Kargil sector near the Shyok River, defined as NJ 9842. The commanders agreed that beyond NJ 9842, the CFL would lie "thence north to the glaciers." The CFL was, therefore, to move northwards along the Saltoro Range, to the west of the Siachen Glacier, beyond NJ 9842. The CFL, which was replaced by the Line of Control (LOC) in 1972, was strangely never formally delineated beyond Point NJ 9842. It was only after Pakistan tried to establish control over this area and sought to extend the LOC eastwards, to link up with China at the Karakoram Pass that the then Prime Minster, Indira Gandhi, approved plans in 1984 for the Army to take firm control of the passes on the Saltoro Range. Despite the difficult conditions and losses of life, the Army has held these positions for the past 22 years in the face of relentless Pakistani attacks that ended only when the ceasefire across the entire LOC came into effect in November 2003. Pakistan eventually recognised that it could not overrun the Indian military positions in the Saltoro Range. Several rounds of negotiations have been held with Pakistan to end tensions in the Siachen sector. The talks failed primarily because Pakistan refused to authenticate the Actual Ground Positions Line (AGPL) now held by the two countries.
Issues related to ceasefire
The seventh round of discussions on the Siachen issue in 1998 enabled the Indian side make it clear for the first time that the main issue was not the Siachen Glacier that was well within areas under Indian control, but Pakistani attempts to dislodge Indian forces from the Saltoro Range, which was on the Line of Control, overlooking Pakistan Occupied Kashmir. The Government reached the conclusion in 1998 that, given Pakistan's sponsorship of cross-border terrorism and its propensity to seize Kashmir by coercive force, the only issues to be discussed on tensions along the Saltoro Range were: A comprehensive cease-fire along the AGPL A bilateral mechanism to ensure the ceasefire was respected, and Authentication of existing ground positions. The then Defence Secretary, Mr Ajit Kumar, refused to consider the issue of pulling back Indian forces from the strategic heights of the Saltoro range. Prime Ministers Rajiv Gandhi and Narasimha Rao eventually concluded that by supporting cross-border terrorism Pakistan had violated the provisions of the Simla Agreement. Pakistan could not, therefore, be trusted to keep its word on respecting the sanctity of a zone of demilitarisation in the Siachen Region.
Demilitarisation risks
No one with even a rudimentary knowledge of the propensities of the Pakistani military would have backed any scheme for demilitarisation that placed India at a strategic disadvantage. And the Kargil conflict engineered by Gen Pervez Musharraf only confirms that what the Pakistan army cannot take by resort to war from India, it will try to acquire by subterfuge, stealth and low-intensity conflict. There are now indications that New Delhi is having negotiations with Pakistan that will involve a pull-back of Indian forces from the strategic heights of the Saltoro Range and the establishment of an extensive demilitarised zone. There is also talk of a "peace park" in the demilitarised area. The Government appears to be even willing to pull back without Pakistan formally and irrevocably agreeing to specify the location of the Actual Ground Position Line along the Saltoro Range, in the text of a main agreement and in appended maps. Such "compromises" are said to be necessary to bail out an embattled Gen Musharraf, who acknowledges that his personal popularity in Pakistan is waning. It would be virtually impossible, after any such withdrawal, to retake these areas, if the Pakistan army chooses to intrude and capture the heights in the Saltoro Range, as it did in Kargil. Is it prudent or wise to trust a dispensation that harbours and assists those who beheaded an Indian engineer in Afghanistan and refuses to honour its commitment of January 6, 2004 to end support for terrorism on its soil, on an issue involving India's territorial integrity?
Widespread debate needed
The Saltoro issue needs widespread Parliamentary and public debate. It should not be dealt with behind a veil of secrecy. There should be no question of any pull-back from positions of strategic advantage in the Saltoro Range, unless Pakistan agrees to authenticate existing ground positions and foolproof mechanisms are devised to ensure verification and prevention of a Kargil-type intrusion. As the Defence Minister, Mr Pranab Mukherjee, stated: "If we vacate the posts and they occupy them tomorrow, how do we establish before the international community that this was what we had?" In any case the pull-back from the Saltoro Range should take place only when agreement on a framework for a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir is reached and inked. Pakistan's then Foreign Secretary, Mr Shahryar Khan, had, after all, proclaimed in November 1993 that the Kashmir and Siachen disputes were linked and could not be discussed and negotiated separately. (The author is a former High Commissioner to Pakistan.)
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