The Hindu Business Line : Maritime security: Think beyond the box

India has joined the US-promoted Container Security Initiative (CSI) to pre-empt any terrorist attack on the sea. A pilot project is to begin at the Jawaharlal Nehru Port. About 35 leading international ports, including Colombo, Singapore and Hong Kong, have joined the CSI.

The hijack of a 35-member crew of an Indian vessel by gunmen off the Somali coast a few months ago underscores the imperative of maritime security. Half of world's containerised fleet, a third of its bulk cargo, and two-thirds of oil shipments pass through the Indian Ocean; it is thus a crucial waterway for global commerce.

Management and technical

Trade flows flourish on trust. But trust steadily diminishes in a world where death can arrive hidden in a metal box. A report of the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), an ocean crime watchdog, indicates that more vulnerable boats such as tugs and barges are targeted and crew abducted for ransom.

Implementing security is a management as well as a technical problem. Technology is necessary, but not sufficient. The goal, as noted by US Customs Commissioner, Mr Robert Bonner, is to "push the cargo screening process outward, to make our border or seaport the last line of defence, not the first".

For container inspection, it is generally agreed that, to minimise disruptions to cargo flow, non-intrusive examination rather than physical checks be resorted to. Non-intrusive examination can involve X-ray/Gamma ray systems.

New Jersey's Newark-Elizabeth Seaport has started using a $850,000 machine that scans a container truck in seconds. According to British Customs, procurement costs for a mobile scanner vary from $1.5 million to $3.3 million, depending on whether it is an isotopic (Gamma ray) or an X-ray system.

US initiatives

The main US initiatives relevant to maritime container security include the Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), and the Container Security Initiative (CSI). There is also the "24-hour Rule" besides recent regulations under the US Trade Act of 2002.

C-TPAT, operating on the basis of individual "non-contractual voluntary agreement," is a government-business initiative aimed at building "co-operative relations that strengthen supply chain and border security".

These recommendations include tasks such as controlling all access to vessel while in port, identifying all persons boarding the vessel, ensuring that all manifest/bill of lading submitted for cargo to be shipped are complete, participation in the Automated Manifest System (AMS), visual inspection of all empty containers at the foreign port of landing, and ensuring that high security seals are affixed on all loaded containers.

CSI, developed shortly after September 11, 2001, involves establishing security criteria to identify high-risk containers based on advance information, and pre-screening those containers identified as high-risk before they arrive at US ports.

The 24-hour Rule

Under the "24-Hour Advance Vessel Manifest Rule" or the "24-Hour Rule," US Customs regulations require detailed manifest information of US bound cargo to be provided 24 hours before loading at the foreign port. Transit containers (so-called FROB, Foreign Cargo Remaining On Board), bound for destinations outside the US, are also covered by the Rule.

The US Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) now receives detailed electronic information on all containers headed for the US before they are loaded on vessels at foreign seaports.

Every container that is identified as potentially high risk is inspected either overseas under the CSI or upon arrival. Generally, concerns continue to be expressed that the 24-hour pre-loading requirement could disrupt "Just-In-Time" delivery systems. So-called "late gate" practices, which allowed shippers to bring their containers to the port 12 or even 6-8 hours before sailing — mainly by dealers in perishable commodities, and shipments of emergency replacement parts and medical supplies — are no longer possible. The new rules also reduce liner operators' flexibility to switch a container from one ship to another.

Generic descriptions, such as "FAK" ("freight of all kinds"), "general cargo" and "STC" ("said-to-contain") are not acceptable. Section 343 of the Trade Act, 2002 (later amended by the Maritime Security Act of 2002) deals with "mandatory advanced electronic information for cargo and other improved Customs reporting procedures".

A complex business

The US Government is beginning to realise how vast and complex the container-transport industry is. The movement of each container is part of a transaction that can involve up to 25 different parties: Buyers, sellers, inland forwarders and shipping lines, middlemen, financiers and governments.

A single trade can generate 30-40 documents, and each container can carry cargo for several customers, multiplying the number of documents still further. A typical container ship can carry up to 8,000 TEU and generate 40,000 documents. The fact that containers are "intermodal", i.e., they can travel by sea and on land, by road or rail, means the system is difficult to regulate as it crosses jurisdictional boundaries.

In June 2002, the World Customs Organisation passed a resolution on Security and Facilitation of the International Trade Supply Chain to enable ports in all 161-member nations develop programmes similar to the CSI and consider adopting stricter security measures.

There is an erroneous implied assumption in the US marine security that liner cargoes mostly container cargoes — are the largest generator of the US annual ship calls. Container-carrying ships only account for 29 percentof the total annual ship calls. Dry and wet bulk carriers account for 53 per cent of all port calls in the US.

At first glance, it might seem logical for terrorists to use marine containers as Trojan Horses for their nuclear devices or dirty bombs. The situation in the bulk trades is different. A cargo of iron ore, for example, loaded in Brazil bound for a US port, could easily hide a potentially dangerous device.

It is crucial that the authorities focus on the whole spectrum of international maritime operations, and not become myopically concentrated on the liner shipping industry.

(The author is a former Managing Director, Concor.)

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