The Hindu Business Line : India-US nuclear deal

In their anxiety to secure the country's energy security, India's leaders seem to have convinced themselves that the nuclear deal is in the best interest of the country. Yet, the impression is unavoidable that the Government has been taking too many things for granted or on trust at the highest levels, says B. S. RAGHAVAN.

The civil nuclear energy deal has been approved by the US House of Representatives by a thumping three-fourth majority, and will no doubt sail through the Senate in a like manner. For as long as it has been the focus of public discourse, it had drawn flak from specialists and analysts on technical, technological and political grounds. In stark contrast to the unremitting and passionate denunciation of the sell-out that it appears in the eyes of many, the expositions of its merits by official spokespersons, including the Prime Minister, Dr Manmohan Singh, have been fumbling and unconvincing.

Indeed, the constituents of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA), including the Congress, give the impression of not being turned on by it, leaving it mostly to Dr Singh to defend it in Parliament and outside. Even the leading lights of the scientific establishment, and the current chief and members of the Atomic Energy Commission, have not come out to bat for him by frontally taking on the opponents.

The alarm caused by the many unanswered questions has brought together even parties poles apart, such as the Left and the BJP, in demanding that Parliament should have a say on the terms and conditions of the deal and that, in future, all international accords should be placed before Parliament for ratification, if not prior approval.

Unanswered questions

The Government has clouded the whole situation by being more forthcoming with detailed information on its policies and course of action in the sensitive field of atomic energy in its dealings with a foreign government like the US than it has been with its Parliament and sovereign masters, the people.

It is not known, for instance, whether India had conveyed in advance to the US Congressional Committees examining the provisions of the respective Bills its reaction to the contentious clauses as also the "Sense of the House" resolution and the Senate conditionalities tagged on to them.

Was the US Congress made aware at the Committee stage itself that India regarded as particularly pernicious the provisions to the following effect: (a) binding India to forswear all future tests even when China or Pakistan, for example, posed a threat to its security by carrying out further tests of their own, in collusion or independently; (b) barring India from enriching and reprocessing the spent fuel without the prior consent of the US; (c) forbidding it from participating in any collaborative project on imports of fuel or reactors or on developing fuel cycle technologies without the US approval or participation; and (d) prescribing a cap on fissile material?

Has the Government drawn up a medium- and long-term perspective plan for civil nuclear energy and secured a guarantee from the US Administration of unhindered supply, without subjecting it to the stop-go tactics for political reasons as it did in the case of foodgrains shipments in earlier times, of requirements of nuclear fuel, reactors and equipment and associated technology in line with it?

New Delhi, for good reasons, does not want to commit itself to any India-specific safeguards to be negotiated with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) until after the Congressional enactment and the modification of the Nuclear Suppliers Group ground rules in keeping with it become a settled fact.

Even such a peripheral matter as sequencing the various actions has got enmeshed in controversy. Is this because the Government did not make clear to the US Administration and the Congress its views well before the legislative process began?

Bad taste

Parliament and the people have a right to be assured that there has been no dereliction in squarely addressing these issues having a vital bearing on the national interest. There is much unease in the public mind because in none of his statements to Parliament or the media has the Prime Minister spelt out explicitly the exact concerns he expressed over the deal to the US President at the recent G-8 conclave and the nature of the assurance he got from Mr Bush.

In his intervention in the Rajya Sabha on July 27, Dr Singh said that if the US legislative process leads to "an end product" which is not consistent with the July 18, 2005 joint statement on civil nuclear cooperation, that "would be a determining factor on what we can do with it.... I will come before the House if there is any departure from what I have said. Then, the country as a whole will have the full opportunity to make up its mind."

It is strange that Dr Singh should talk of making up of the mind after allowing everything to go past the stage of redemption.

Is the Prime Minister implying that in case the "end product" is not to its liking, India may even go back on the Bush-Singh agreement?

The possibility of India, Samson-like, tearing down at one stroke the elaborate diplomatic and legislative edifice that had been erected with such fanfare and trumpet these last 13 months is simply too calamitous to contemplate. It will leave India-US relations in a shambles for as long as one can foresee, with the additional danger of India being blackballed by the international community as an irresponsible and unreliable entity to deal with.

The impression is unavoidable that the Government has been taking too many things for granted or on trust at the highest levels.

The net result is that the nuclear deal has left a bad taste in everybody's mouth.

Here is a classic example of the road to Hell being paved with good intentions. For, it will be absurd to impute dishonourable motives to the UPA Government, in general, and Dr Singh, and his advisers on energy security, in particular, for entering into, and persisting with, the deal.

It may well be that in their genuine anxiety about the country's energy scenario, they convinced themselves in all good faith that the deal, viewed as an integral part of the strategic partnership with the US, is in the best interest of the country.

Poor execution

Nuclear energy certainly is the cleanest, next to hydro-power, and the most viable alternative when the world is facing the menacing prospect of uncontrollably soaring oil prices and the exhaustion of fossil fuels by the end of the century.

In locations not close to fossil fuel resources, it is also competitive despite its undoubtedly high capital costs, and the need for adherence to stringent safeguards in operation, waste disposal and decommissioning. Its choice becomes all the more compelling in the light of its being free from the social, health and environmental costs of fossil fuels.

This is what has impelled countries such as the US and China to go for nuclear power in a big way, after a lull.

Only last year did the US President, Mr George Bush, sign into law a Bill that would add substantially to new nuclear power plant capacity. Pursuant to that, NRG Energy Inc. has already planned to purchase nuclear reactors from Hitachi capable of generating 10,500 megawatts (MW).

China, too, has decided to build 30 new atomic power stations, over and above the existing nine, by investing the largest ever amount of $50 billion in one sector, to increase nuclear power generation capacity from 8,700 MW today to 40,000 MW by 2020.

Tenders for the first contract of $8 billion have already been floated and Westinghouse (US), Areva and Alstom (France), Mitsubishi (Japan), Siemens (Germany) and Atomstroyexport (Russia) are all in a rush to grab as large a slice of the cake as possible.

In this background, Dr Singh cannot be faulted if he thought that India should not face the double jeopardy of banking on depleting reserves of coal, oil and natural gas and falling behind in its efforts to develop the full potential of nuclear energy at a pace rapid enough to take India on a growth trajectory of 10 per cent or more.

The reason why the nuclear deal threatens to end up as a bad bargain is not because of bad intention but because of poor execution.

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