The Hindu Business Line : India-US Nuclear Deal — The politics of proliferation

Challenging a 40-year US policy, President George Bush may have signed a nuclear deal with India, but New Delhi still has to reckon with the international sanctions for not acceding to the NPT, and deal with the Nuclear Suppliers Group. Considering these issues, India must proceed cautiously before signing contracts for the import of large power reactors, says G. PARTHASARATHY.

Alarm bells rang in Moscow and Washington when China conducted its first nuclear weapons test on October 16, 1964. India also woke up to the capabilities of a nuclear-armed China that had less than two years earlier invaded it, crossing the once impregnable Himalayas.

In 1965, US President Lyndon Johnson appointed a high- power commission to suggest new directions to American policy. The Commission that included then CIA Director Allen Dulles rejected the suggestion that China should be countered by assisting India and Japan to go nuclear. It proposed that dialogue with China and the Soviet Union should be intensified to prevent new entrants to the nuclear club. It concluded that possession of nuclear weapons by others would erode American global influence and would "eventually constitute direct military threats to the USA".

The NPT is born

Working hand-in-glove with its principal adversary, the Soviet Union, the US won widespread approval for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that sought to effectively block new entrants to the nuclear club. China denounced the NPT as a symbol of "hegemony", but had no hesitation in joining the Treaty in 1992, when it decided the time was ripe to gain international respectability as a "responsible power" by doing so.

After initially pressuring India to accede to the NPT, Moscow soon changed its tune on Indian nuclear imperatives, after its border conflict with China in 1969. No objection was voiced to India's nuclear test in 1974. When American pressure on India mounted on fuel supplies for the Tarapur Power Plant built with US assistance, Moscow offered to help India.

In the meantime, US President Jimmy Carter had moved with Evangelical zeal to force India to sign the NPT by threatening to cut off supplies for the Tarapur Plant (which the US was treaty bound to provide), unless India placed all its nuclear facilities under international safeguards and became a de facto member of the NPT. The Janata Party Government dithered on this issue, but the Americans found in 1980 that Indira Gandhi would not yield and proposed an "amicable disengagement" on the Tarapur issue, with India getting nuclear fuel supplies from France.

Requiring Islamabad's assistance to defeating the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, the Americans looked the other way for a decade as Pakistan developed nuclear weapons through a network of clandestine imports and Chinese assistance.

Free hand for Pakistan

The Americans "discovered" that Pakistan had a nuclear weapons programme only after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan. China, however, continued nuclear assistance to Pakistan even after it acceded to the NPT in 1992. The Clinton Administration turned a blind eye to the Chinese proliferation and the US and China actively colluded and collaborated to "cap, roll back and eliminate" India's nuclear programme, for the first six years of the Clinton Presidency.

In the meantime, 188 countries had acceded to the NPT, which was indefinitely extended by consensus in 1995. India, however, continued to face sanctions in nuclear and dual use high-tech cooperation not only from the US but also from the US-led 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). While France and Russia showed some understanding in the immediate aftermath of the 1998 nuclear tests, others led by the US and China spared no effort, albeit with little success, to isolate and strengthen sanctions against India.

The Latest Deal

It is in this background that one has to evaluate the significance of the July 18, 2005 "Nuclear Deal" with the US. Despite strong domestic opposition by entrenched lobbies that considered India's nuclear weapons programme either directly or indirectly a threat to US security, Mr George Bush became the first American President to challenge this "conventional wisdom," thereby changing a US policy that had been in vogue for four decades. More important, the Agreement — whose basic requirement was that India places its peaceful nuclear facilities under safeguards in return for an end to global sanctions — was first proposed by one of India's most distinguished nuclear scientists, Dr Raja Ramanna.

Not surprisingly, opponents to the deal sought to introduce provisions that would be "deal breakers," such as a mandatory cut off of fuel supplies in the event of India being compelled to conduct further nuclear tests and demanding that India adopt a foreign policy congruent to that of the US. Moreover, the legislation seeks to cap India's nuclear weapons programme by calling for measures to ensure an early cut off of fissile material production for weapons by India.

On December 18, 2006 Mr Bush made it clear in writing that as Sections 103 and 104 (d) (2) of the legislation passed by US Congress sought to restrict his constitutional authority as President to execute foreign policy, he was not bound by these provisions, which India could under no circumstances accept, as they ran counter to US guarantees of continued fuel supplies during the working life of nuclear reactors imported by India.

While India now finds no need for further nuclear tests, its position could change if China decided to resume nuclear tests following a US decision to test a new generation of nuclear weapons. The President's action also annuls objectionable provisions in the legislation seeking to compel India to adopt US policies on Iran and other proliferation-related issues.

Long way to go still

While these are positive developments, there is still a long way to go before a full-stop is put to the international sanctions against India for not acceding to the NPT. We still have to conclude a bilateral agreement with the US that has to conform to Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act. India's nuclear envoy, Mr Shyam Saran, who has shown immense skill in negotiations, will have to craft an agreement that not only ensures the reliability of fuel supplies but also deals with the issue of reprocessing of spent fuel.

While negotiating a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency should be relatively straightforward, securing the consent of the NSG, which includes such countries as Ireland, New Zealand and Sweden that are members of the "New Agenda Coalition," is not going to be easy.

These countries have demanded after the 1998 nuclear tests that India should accede to the NPT and place all its nuclear facilities under international safeguards. Will a President from the Democratic Party who could well assume office in 2009 interpret the US legislation ending nuclear sanctions on India in the same manner as President Bush? What would India do if he/she chooses to abide by the explicit provisions of the legislation? It would, therefore, be prudent to proceed cautiously before signing contracts for the import of large power reactors.

New Delhi should also consider amending the Atomic Energy Act to permit foreign and private sector investment in imported nuclear power plants in India to limit the adverse impact of any cut off of nuclear fuel supplies, as has happened in the past.

Further, even if sanctions do end, it is imperative for India to retain the moral high ground by urging the international community at every appropriate forum about the fact that a truly just and secure world order has to be based on a time bound commitment to universal nuclear disarmament. Article VI of the NPT, after all, calls for a "move towards general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control".

(The author is a former High Commissioner to Pakistan.)

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