The Hindu Business Line : Facts and fiction on the nuclear deal

Nuclear sanctions will end only after India concludes a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, the NSG ends global sanctions on India and the US Congress approves the “123 Agreement”. It is at that stage that Parliament has to exercise maximum vigilance.

G. Parthasarathy

Never in independent India’s history has a foreign policy issue been so heatedly and comprehensively debated as the July 2005 Indo-US Agreement that seeks to end not just American, but global, nuclear sanctions against India.

The acrimonious exchanges between supporters and detractors of the July 2005 Agreement precipitated a political crisis with the Left Parties voicing concern over the Hyde Act passed by US Congress that legislates an end to sanctions against India and about what the Left refers to as a growing “strategic alliance” with the US.

Why is it important to sign an agreement with the US on nuclear cooperation, given the manner in which the US unilaterally abrogated a solemn agreement with us to supply nuclear fuel for the Tarapur Power Plant, because we were unwilling to give up our nuclear option?

The answer to this question lies in the fact that, since the Pokhran nuclear test of 1974, successive US Administrations undertook a concerted effort to coerce us to “cap, roll back and eliminate” our nuclear weapons programme.

This effort included putting together a cartel of 45 countries in the “Nuclear Suppliers Group” (NSG) to join the US in denying us access to nuclear technology for power generation.

Despite this, we have built our own nuclear reactors and are on the way to developing the capabilities to build indigenous fast breeder reactors using indigenous resources of thorium ore. This process will be facilitated and made self-sustaining if we have large resources of plutonium from power reactors.

Unfortunately, our capabilities to develop nuclear energy are seriously constrained by the shortage of indigenous resources of uranium ore.

This necessarily means that, if we are to significantly develop nuclear power production we will have to import considerable amounts of uranium ore — an option we cannot exercise now because of NSG sanctions.

Moreover, is it desirable for a country like India to face the international odium of being subject to sanctions by 45 countries?

Ending sanctions

What India is attempting is not merely an end to American, but global sanctions, which partners like Russia and France would like to end. Over the past few years it has been evident that international sanctions against us will not end, unless, in the first instance, the US ends these sanctions. This has been conveyed to us by good friends like Russia and France. Hence, when President George Bush took the decision to move to end US sanctions, following consultations with countries like France, it was only natural for us to grab the opportunity.

Opposition to the July 18, 2005 Agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy is as strong in the US as it is in India. But, even if there are shortcomings in the so called “123 Agreement” that has been agreed upon, this agreement is the only key to ending nuclear sanctions against India now imposed by 45 countries.

NSG members are not bound by US law on their nuclear policies and will not adopt every measure the Americans have adopted under the Hyde Act. India has held extensive consultations with NSG members. It is evident that the country most actively lobbying against the end of NSG sanctions on India is China, with its faithful partner in nuclear proliferation, Pakistan, echoing Chinese objections.

There are three issues that need to be considered in any Agreement we sign on nuclear energy cooperation.

Does the Agreement contain guarantees for uninterrupted supply of fuel for the lifetime of imported reactors?

Can we reprocess the spent fuel for use in future fast breeder reactors?

Does the Agreement, in any way, constrain our strategic nuclear weapons programme, including our right and freedom to test nuclear weapons, should the need arise? The State Department spokesman asserted: “The proposed agreement h as provisions in it that in the event of a nuclear test by India then all cooperation is terminated”.

The Prime Minister, Dr Manmohan Singh, asserted: “The Agreement does not in any way affect India’s right to undertake future nuclear tests if necessary”. The US Spokesman soon had to backtrack, as his assertion was not entirely correct.

Under Article 14 of the 123 Agreement the US could seek termination of the Agreement and return of nuclear fuel in the event of a nuclear test by India. But the entire process would involve detailed consultations, with the US giving due consideration to India’s security imperatives.

Thus, if India was to carry out a nuclear test in response to actions by nuclear armed neighbours, the US would find it difficult to justify or implement sanctions. Further, India will not be able to internationally justify any nuclear test and avoid worldwide condemnation and sanctions with or without the 123 Agreement, if it unilaterally and suddenly conducts a nuclear test at a time when every other country is observing a moratorium on testing.

Nuclear sanctions will end only after India concludes a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, the NSG ends global sanctions on India and the US Congress approves the “123 Agreement”.

It is at that stage that Parliament has to exercise maximum vigilance on how future imports for nuclear energy are undertaken. Section 5.6 of the “123 Agreement” provides for India to maintain stockpiles of nuclear fuel that can meet the lifetime requirements of imported reactors in the event of termination of US Supplies.

Safeguards

An action plan for maintenance of reserve stockpiles needs to be drawn up. Any Agreement for import of reactors from the US should contain specific provisions that we reserve the right to import fuel for US supplied reactors from countries other than the US.

As a further safeguard, the Atomic Energy Act could be amended to provide for foreign equity participation in any imported nuclear power plant.

No reactors should be imported from the US till procedures for reprocessing spent fuel are approved by the US Congress. Contrary to claims by some Government functionaries, we do not have an unfettered “right” to reprocessing under the “123 Agreement”.

The end of sanctions should not be construed as an open licence for excessive imports. Parliament will have to ensure that a substantial proportion of our reactors are indigenous, even though they may be run on imported uranium ore.

Indigenous reactors are more const efficient than imported ones. Energy security will be enhanced only when we serialise production of indigenous Fast Breeder, Thorium fuelled reactors. But, at the same time we have to realise that any future Administration in the US will not be as forthcoming as that of President George Bush in ending nuclear sanctions.

International sanctions will end only after we negotiate an India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA and the NSG decides to end sanctions, overcoming China’s opposition. Parliament should finally accept or reject the terms set by the US and the NSG only after the entire process for ending sanctions is completed. It makes little sense to halt or delay the process at this stage.

(The author is a former High Commissioner to Pakistan.)

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