The Hindu Business Line : Quest for ‘Big Power’ status

One of the tasks before the committee that will be set up between the Left and the Manmohan Singh Government to examine the 123 Agreement drawn up between Indian and the US is to study the implications of the accord for foreign policy and security cooperation. Briefly, the focus will be to find out whether the accord will tie New Delhi to the apron strings of Washington as far as the conduct of foreign policy is concerned and whether it will impinge on New Delhi’s in dependence in forging its own national security policy, especially in the nuclear field.

Having the upper hand

There is little doubt that, as far as the security aspect is concerned — meaning the flow of fuel, technology, etc, for civilian nuclear installations — Washington will clearly have the upper hand for more than one reason. The first is, of course, the specific terms of the accord which will bind New Delhi to Washington in, among other things, the matter of transfer of “information” and “nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components related technology”. While the information flow from New Delhi will be particularly useful to Washington in keeping a tab on the state of nuclear-technology knowledge in India and other nuclear-related spheres, the reverse flow of material to the sub-continent would institutionalise to a large extent the dependence of the civilian nuclear effort on the US.

It is true that, under Article 5(6) of the draft accord, the US has committed itself “to seeking agreement from the US Congress to amend its domestic laws and to work with friends and allies to adjust the practices of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to create the necessary conditions for India to obtain full access to the international fuel market, including reliable, uninterrupted and continual access to fuel supplies from firms in several nations,” thus in effect putting in place an arrangement that would widen the sphere of India’s dependence on foreign sources for nuclear supplies.

This apart, Washington has also agreed to take a number of measures “against any disruption of fuel supplies”, which includes supporting an Indian effort to “develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India’s reactors”. If despite this there is a disruption in fuel supplies to India, the US has specifically stated that “the United States and India would jointly convene a group of friendly supplier countries, to include countries such as Russia, France and the UK, to pursue such measures as would restore fuel supply to India”.

On the face of it, this is a guarantee of sorts, namely, that the security of nuclear fuel supplies will be safeguarded in the event of a breakdown of the agreement. But the fact remains that the “post-agreement” security level will in all probability be different from the security-level enjoyed under the accord, thus affecting India’s security interests.

As far as “foreign policy” is concerned, the subject is a bit more complex because, as opposed to the concrete flow of “information” and nuclear supplies, perceptions matter in this sphere with the result that while some may feel that the very signing of a 123 Agreement with the US will enhance the position of New Delhi on the world-stage, there are others who will argue that going through the process would align India to the US in such a way that it would affect adversely New Delhi’s independence in taking positions on international events.

The ‘special’ status

Both sides have a point to make but it is also true that, in the final analysis, it will depend solely on the Government of India to act independently or otherwise on foreign policy issues, the inference being that the 123 Agreement itself determines nothing as far as the conduct of foreign policy is concerned.

One point that could well be made is that India, not having signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the very act on the part of Washington to engage New Delhi in a 123 Agreement (and to go through the entire process of working out special accords with the IAEA and the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group) would imply India being given “special” status by the US. This clearly cannot be to the disadvantage of New Delhi because such a status cannot be confined to Indo-US relations alone but will necessarily colour ties with all other countries. Indeed, this is how Beijing has chosen to see India’s interest in the nuclear deal. China’s official mouthpiece, The People’s Daily, wrote on August 30 that an important r eason why India would press on with the deal was its “strong symbolic significance” for it in achieving “its dream of (becoming) a powerful nation”.

To quote the paper: “Since India declared independence in 1947, it has always been determined to become a big power. Although there are still people questioning the possibility, India did make good achievement in the following 60 years. At present, India maintains a 9 per cent economic growth annually. As a big country with rapid economic growth, India is keen on gaining greater influence in international affairs and playing a decisive role in the international arena. At this point, may be it is not exaggerating to say that the India-US civilian nuclear energy agreement actually demonstrates its dream to become a big power. In addition, the US has explicitly proposed in the agreement that it would not hamper or intervene in the development of India’ s military nuclear plan, which will also help the country achieve its goals to be a nuclear power”.

In good stead

If Beijing feels that the nuclear deal does indeed provide some fulfilment of the Indian “dream” of becoming a Big Power, it is beyond doubt that, as far as foreign policy is concerned, the 123 Agreement will bolster India’s stature abroad. When all this is coupled with the fact that the national economy is growing at around 9 per cent annually, and that — as Dr Manmohan Singh hinted at Tarapore on Friday — the huge resultant requirement of power can be adequately met by nuclear generation (which the accord with Washington will facilitate in the years ahead), it would seem on balance that, in the long run, the nuclear agreement with Washington would stand India in good stead.

After all, in the years ahead, New Delhi would be free to terminate the agreement in the national interest whenever it felt like doing so, the important thing being that, in the meanwhile, it would have derived all the advantages the deal can generate for the republic which, as far as can be gauged, will not be insubstantial.

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