The Hindu Business Line : Delayed acquisitions weaken Air-Force

The media carried the news of the Defence Acquisition Council, under the chairmanship of the Defence Minister, Mr A. K. Anthony, clearing the biggest global Defence deal for the purchase of 126 fighter aircraft for the Indian Air Force (IAF). The Request for Proposal was issued last month. The IAF, it was argued, must increase its potential reach so as to cater to the changing needs of the country which aims to become a growing Asian super-power. For example, in the west, the IAF’s strategic reach should cover from Persian Gulf right up to Malacca Straits. Unfortunately, just the reverse has happened.

The Air headquarters had issued Air Staff Requirements for medium multi-role combat aircraft about six years ago. This requirement was urgent. Currently, the time that will be still needed between the Defence Ministry approving the purchase and the arrival of the requested number of aircraft into the squadron service of the air force and providing teeth could be 10-12 years. This period consists of:

The Government formulating a Request for Proposals from potential manufacturers — 3-4 months.

Technical and commercial bids being received from the potential vendors — six months.

Paper evaluation of the proposals — six months.

Field trials — at least 18-24 months.

Preparation of the report and price negotiations — 12 months.

Contract preparation and signing — 12 months.

Supply commencement — 18-24 months.

Completion of supplies — 5-6 years.

The above figures of time are conservative. These, however, show that the deliveries against a Request for Proposals being issued now will commence around the beginning of 2014 and the receipt of all the purchased aircraft could easily go to 2020. The IAF, in the mean time, would have been forced to phase out old aircraft.

The position would have been critical but for the recent order of 230 Sukhoi 30 MK I aircraft from Russia. It is, nevertheless, likely that the IAF may be reduced to 29-30 combat squadrons by the time the ordered aircraft start arriving. It is important to note that the authorised strength of the IAF is 39.5 combat squadrons.

Actually, a rational assessment would lead to the conclusion that this strength is rather low. This figure was a compromise arrived at because of the financial constraints placed owing to the state of the economy some years ago. These constraints are, no doubt, very real, but it is a criminal neglect to let the squadron strength fall to such low levels. The Defence Acquisition Council should investigate the lapse to avoid its repetition in future.

A real big deal!

The recently-approved purchase consists of acquiring 126 fighter aircraft, of which, 18 will be obtained off the shelf and the rest manufactured under licence at Hindustan Aeronautics with suitable transfer of technology.

The additional cost of purchasing these fully-assembled aircraft could have been reduced if these aircraft were also produced in the country. But these expenses have become necessary to partially mitigate the hardship caused due to late ordering of the aircraft.

This deal is expected to cost the national exchequer Rs 42,000 crore, or around $10.4 billion. The proposed transaction also stipulates that India would have the option to order additional 60-70 aircraft later, on the original terms. Exercising this option could spiral the present deal to over $15 billion. Tender conditions stipulate that the vendor would provide life-time maintenance support for these aircraft and the expected life of the aircraft has been fixed at 40 years.

The Request for Proposal lays down that the winner of the contract will have to invest an amount equal to half the cost of the contract value in Defence industry in India. It is envisaged that the direct offset of this amount will help boost Defence equipment manufacture in the country.

The manufacturers short-listed for sending the Request for Proposals are American giants Boeing and Lockheed Martin for their fighters FA-18 Super Hornets and F-16 Falcons respectively. Russian MIG-35s have also been invited besides the European Consortium’s Euro-fighter Typhoons, Swedish Gripen and French Rafale.

These companies would give their technical and commercial quotations (including offset plans) in six months. This will initiate the complex and lengthy process of evaluation, field trials, report finalisation, price negotiations and so on. Purchase order/contract should be in place by 2012, if the country is lucky and all goes well during these years. Deliveries of the off-the-shelf “fly away” 18 fighters and commencement of licence manufacture should be a couple of years away.

Role of LCA fighters

The Government, Hindustan Aeronautics and the IAF have maintained unusual quiet about the role of indigenously developed LCA fighters. These aircraft have a role to play in augmenting the fighter fleet of the country. All efforts should have been made to equip the IAF with these fighters expeditiously. Larger numbers could be produced in quicker time to overcome the shortage. It is hoped that the LCA will not meet the fate of an earlier indigenously developed fighter HF-24. The HF-24 development team was led by a non-Indian, but the development of LCA does not have that lacuna. It is hoped that Defence planners and decision-makers will accept this fighter and continuously seek further improvements till the aircraft reaches satisfactory status, rather than abandoning it like the HF-24.

The design and development in the country has not taken off at the rate it should have despite transfer of technology received over the years. The very meaning of the term ‘technology transfer’ is lost if that means giving technology for merely undertaking manufacture of selected aircraft. There needs to be a difference between licence manufacture and technology transfer.

Some explanation needs to be given about the outcome of technology received over the years from the manufacturers of Gnat, Hunters, Mysters, Jaguar, MIGs, Sukhois and so on, if HF-24s and LCAs are not fit to meet our requirement with concessions that should be given in initial stages to fighters developed in the country at huge cost. Let the Defence Minister form a small group to look at what should be done to avoid the position we are in. The twin factors being delays in acquisition and non-acceptance of indigenously developed aircraft.

(The author is a former Group Captain, IAF.)