The Hindu Business Line : Centre-State relations

The Commission set up to review Centre-State relations should keep in mind that while power and purse are involved, these are not ends in themselves but means to satisfy the needs and aspirations of the citizens, the States, and the nation.

P. K. Doraiswamy

Yet another Commission has been constituted to review Centre-State relations. In the past, the Rajamannar Committee, the Sarkaria Commission and the National Commission for a Review of the Constitution have all had a look at this issue and made recommendations.

The answer to the question: ‘What has happened to all these recommendations?’ is the same as what has happened to the recommendations of most commissions (except, of course, the Finance Commissions whose recommendations involve transfer of resources to the States who, naturally, have seen to it that these are implemented).

Centre-State relations are not about the direct interactions between the Central and the State Ministries alone, they also cover interactions between the agencies of the Centre and the States, such as the relations between Governors and the State governments, or the oversight of State Universities by the University Grants Commission.

no conflict Then

The trauma of Partition, the resistance of some Princely States to integration with the Indian Union, the secessionist ideologies of some political groups, etc, made the preservation of the integrity of the new-born nation the topmost priority of the rulers after Independence and this got reflected in the new Constitution which, based as it was largely on the Government of India Act, 1935, acquired a distinct centrist orientation.

The above did not create any difficulties in governance because all the States were being ruled by the same party, namely the Congress. Its leaders, both national and State, were all mature, statesmen-like nationalists and former freedom-fighters.

The State leaders all had a strong political base and stature of their own and, therefore, did not feel the need for challenging the Centre just for the sake of building up their political stature. There were no local parties in power in any State which might have used Centre-State relations as an excuse for confrontation with the Centre for building up their local popularity.

In a situation like the above, even if the States felt they had any grievance or a point to make with the Central government, they never made it an issue of political confrontation with the latter but routed it through Constitutional or established formal channels, such as the Finance Commission, the Planning Commission, the Inter-State Council and National Development Council. It was only when States began to come under non-Congress rule, and especially under local political parties, that strains began to be felt in Centre-State relations. Apart from a natural desire to enjoy more powers, some of the local party-led governments also saw an opportunity to extract political mileage by raising Centre-State relations as a major issue.

Centre-State relations appear as a matter of clear-cut, open political confrontation only when a State and the Centre both have single party rule. With coalition governments at the State and the Centre, the issue has become somewhat complex and opaque, both conceptually and practically.

Since State parties have a significant, and in some cases apparently overwhelming, influence (as in the case of the DMK coalition) over the Centre’s decisions, Centre-State relations now work themselves out by a process of political dynamics rather than based on Constitutional norms or administrative logic.

Demands and adjustments are made not on merits but on what would enable the Central and the State governments to stay in power. It is only in the case of States ruled by a single party not forming part of the Central coalition (such as Gujarat) that open confrontation is possible.

‘No review needed’ arguments

Some arguments have been given for not having a review of Centre-State relations at this juncture:

There are no great disputes on Centre-State relations now and there are other more important problems needing attention. Moreover, creating a Commission when there is no real need would force such a commission to invent new, unnecessary issues.

(For example, the latest Commissions’ terms of reference include District Budgeting Systems, which should be left strictly to State governments). So, why rock the boat and create problems where none exists now? As the Americans say, if it ain’t broke, let’s don’t fix it!

The country is surging forward economically and growing at 8 to 9 per cent annually and getting integrated globally. National sovereignty is becoming less important than being globally competitive and even State governments are negotiating with multi-national companies for setting up their units here. In this ambience, local disputes would automatically recede into the background.

So, why get bogged down now in petty, local issues of the Centre versus the States? Whatever commissions and committees may recommend, we have a genius for bumbling and bungling through and carrying on. Why not leave the matter to this process when, in any case, most of such recommendations would remain unimplemented?

Look at it from two angles

However, now that we have a Commission, how should it operate?

Let it at least study the issue from two angles instead of taking up an unnecessarily detailed review and making numerous or impractical suggestions. First, all Centre-State relation is about power and the purse. These are not ends in themselves but means to the satisfaction of the needs and aspirations of the citizens, the States, and the nation.

Let the Commission, therefore, examine in which list each power or resource should be placed so that it, on balance, serves best to meet these ends.

Second, issues such as ‘law and order’ which are now in the State list, should be disaggregated into different levels. Level 1 should cover situations that have only an intra-State impact and be in the State list. Level 2 would cover situations having an impact on a few neighbouring States, which should be in the Concurrent list. Level 3 would cover situations that have a country-wide impact and should be in the Union list. If the Commission adopts this approach and makes recommendations, then hopefully, at some future date when conditions are conducive, at least some of them may get implemented.

It is good to remember what Dr Ambedkar said after drafting our Constitution: “This is a good Constitution. If it fails, it would be because man is vile.”

(The author is former Special Chief Secretary, Government of Andhra Pradesh.)