The Hindu Business Line : India-US relations — What will happen after Bush era?

Apart from his initial negative role in the Senate on the nuclear issue, Mr Obama also has strong reservations on reprocessing of spent fuel. New Delhi would, therefore, be well advised not to sign any binding contracts with American companies till the contentious issues on nuclear fuel are sorted out, says G. PARTHASARATHY.

Barely a decade ago, when Mr Atal Bihari Vajpayee decided to announce India’s entry into the nuclear club, with the Pokhran tests of May 11 and May 13, 1998, an enraged President Clinton launched a global campaign commencing with visiting and making common cause with China, to isolate India and force it to “roll back” its nuclear weapons programme.

Thanks to some subtle diplomacy that involved securing a measure of understanding from France and Russia, combined with firm resolve, it was not India that backed off, but the US. Sanctions soon ended and Clinton realised that his professions of love for democracy would be meaningless without a visit to India before his term ended.

A process of recasting India-US relations was soon initiated, though given the anti-Indian obsession of its non-proliferation warriors, American transfers for India’s space and nuclear programmes and its other high-tech needs remained severely curtailed. Gen Musharraf’s ill-fated cross-LOC Kargil adventure also resulted in Pakistan being forced to accept that established borders had to be respected.

After nearly eight years in office, the Bush Administration is preparing to leave Washington with, many Americans believe, their country’s foreign policies and economy in tatters. The country is facing its worst economic crisis in decades, it has paid a horrendous price for its ill-advised invasion of Iraq, and terrorist violence along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border appears to be spiralling out of control, with no sign of where Osama bin Laden is hiding. The Democrats appear set to re-enter the White House.

Pro-India stance

In this grim environment, the one major success that those close to President Bush are claiming is the remarkable turnaround in India-US relations during the Bush Presidency. Those like former Ambassador Robert Blackwill, who accompanied Bush during his first election campaign, claim that even before he assumed office Bush had a Messianic zeal to improve relations with a democratic and economically resurgent India.

As early as November 1999, as a Presidential candidate, Bush had noted: “The coming century will see democratic India’s arrival as a force in the world — a changing economy in which three of its five wealthiest citizens are software entrepreneurs”.

Just as Pakistan was fading away from American radar screens, the terror strikes of 9/11 led to Gen Musharraf being told in no uncertain terms that the US expected Pakistan to provide it basing, transit and intelligence facilities to wipe out the Taliban and Al Qaeda from Afghanistan. Pakistan was promised, in return, a resumption of military and economic assistance.

During his first four years Bush was prevented from doing anything significant for India by his pro-Pakistani Secretary of State, Gen Colin Powell, though some moves were made to ease high-tech sanctions against India. Nevertheless the most significant development of this period was that, despite Powell’s reservations, Pakistan-based terrorist groups, such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Jaish-e-Mohammed, were declared as international terrorist organisations, their assets seized and pressure mounted on Pakistan to rein in these groups.

Shortly thereafter, a decision was taken to make frontline American weapons systems including combat aircraft available to India. For the first time, it was decided to “decouple’ American relations with India, on the one hand, and its ties with Pakistan, on the other.

‘Different histories’

As strategic analyst Ashley Tellis, who was closely involved with the formulation of Bush Administration policies notes: “US relations with each state (India and Pakistan) would be governed by an objective assessment of the intrinsic value of each country to US interests rather than by fears of how US relations with one would affect relations with the other”.

Secondly, “while the US would recognise that India is a country on the way to becoming a major Asian power” it would also recognise Pakistan as “a country in serious crisis” that must be assisted to achieve a “soft landing”.

It was in pursuance of this policy that Bush bluntly told his Pakistani hosts in Islamabad who wanted a nuclear deal similar to that with India: “Pakistan and India are different countries with different histories. So as we move forward, our strategy will take into account these well-known differences”.

An important development in American policy during the second Bush term was that, whether it was the ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka, the role of the Maoists in Nepal, or the transition to democracy in Bangladesh, the Americans made it a point to consult closely to ascertain Indian perceptions.

Consultations with India became a regular feature on developments within Pakistan and Afghanistan, especially as the Taliban-led violence escalated. Moreover, the last few years have seen movement forward on co-operation in our space programme and on the acquisition of major weapons systems for our armed forces from the US.

Obama Policy

As it now appears that the US is headed for an Obama Presidency, can one expect similar movement forward in India-US Relations? It must be remembered that, unlike Bush, Obama has not shown any personal interest in relations with India, though the Democratic Party Platform (Manifesto) speaks of “deepening and widening our ties with democratic partners like India, in order to create a stable and prosperous Asia”.

Many from the Clinton camp, who were and remain ardent advocates of continuing nuclear sanctions against India, are today key Obama advisers. There is no mention of the Indo-US Nuclear deal in the Democratic Party Platform. Apart from his initial negative role in the Senate on the nuclear issue, Obama also has strong reservations on reprocessing of spent fuel.

New Delhi would, therefore, be well-advised not to sign any binding contracts with American companies till such time contentious issues like nuclear fuel reserves and reprocessing of spent fuel are sorted out. The US is still to accord its concurrence to the reprocessing of spent fuel for the Tarapur Nuclear Power Plant.

Moreover, New Delhi should be prepared for American moves for early ratification of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and finalisation of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). Pressures on India to accede to the treaties will inevitably grow.

Obama’s advisers appear to favour excluding India from Asian and international co-operative endeavours. They are reportedly advocating the development of a “US, China, Japan,” grid for co-operation in nuclear energy. While China and India are presently “Outreach Partners” of the G-8, the Obama team reportedly favours granting full membership of the G-8 to China.

On economic issues, Obama has favoured an end to measures that serve as incentives for US corporations to outsource services. This could have negative consequences for outsourcing to India — a sector that is of immense importance to India. Any move to end incentives for outsourcing, is, however, likely to face strong opposition from Corporate America.

While one hopes that such thinking will change once a new Administration assumes office, New Delhi will have to undertake some deft diplomacy with partners like France and Russia, if an Obama Administration “tilts” towards China, as some apprehend.

(The author is a former High Commissioner to Pakistan. blfeedback@thehindu.co.in)