The Hindu Business Line : Pak Army’s boomerang

The Pakistani Army is caught in a multiple bind this time. Its own civilian government, Pakistani civil society, the international community, the US, and worst of all, the jehadis: all are squeezing its space.

T.C.A. Srinivasa-Raghavan

It is now more than two weeks after Mumbai was attacked by terrorists. Since then I have been wondering why, given that terrorism, through the ages, has not achieved its objectives, do the sponsors of terrorism persist with their sponsorship of it?

It doesn’t matter where you look and in which century. Terrorism simply has not worked. Yet it does not stop, except for short periods.

In fact, when you examine the consequences of terrorism for the terrorists and their sponsors, they are always left worse off. So it is not just that they gain nothing, they actually lose something, whether their lives, as in the case of the actual terrorists, or their liberty, as in the case of their sponsors. And what must really hurt, the victim of terror emerges stronger in several ways.

Revenge, the motive

Consider, because it concerns us the most, the case of Pakistan. Ever since India dismembered it in 1971, the Pakistan Army has been guided by just over-arching objective: revenge, which is actually a very irrational motive.

So even though it is overwhelmingly Punjabi in its composition and should, therefore, be realistic, when it comes to India it has behaved in a way that is very similar to the tribes of the NWFP. For these tribes, revenge to restore honour takes precedence over everything else.

The commonest explanation for this behaviour is that there is no other way in which it can perpetuate itself in power. Yet, this strategy has led to its losing power on at least two occasions in the past — 1972 and 1989 — and has now brought it very close to losing it once again.

In fact, it is caught in a multiple bind this time. Its own civilian government, the Pakistani civil society, the international community, the US, and worst of all, the jehadis: all are squeezing its space. It may, for overall geo-political reasons, not to mention the nuclear aspect, manage to retain its pre-eminent role in the country. But unlike in the past, now there is a bigger question mark over this outcome.

Self-destructive behaviour

An examination of the literature on self-destructive group behaviour is instructive in this regard. But it turns out that all of it is focussed on individuals who come together in groups and who have a death-wish.

There is nothing to explain the self-destructive behaviour of institutions such as the Pakistani Army (or the French aristocracy in the late 18th century, Nazis, the Soviet Communists, the Taliban government, and so on).

All these institutions have a lot in common, such as a clear worldview, discipline, money, a clear identity, status, authority, etc.

Invariably, they are also in control of the government. Yet, they end up in the dustbins of history. Why?

The reluctance to let go of power is, of course, a major reason for the behaviour that eventually devours them. But that does not answer the question: if with a different strategy they could retain power forever, why don’t they change their strategy?

The best example of such a change in strategy prolonging a group’s hold on power can be found in Britain whose aristocracy started making incremental changes in the early 19th century and, as a result, held on to real power for almost 150 years after that. Much the same can be said of the moneybags of the US, as indeed of the Brahmins in India and a host of others all over the world.

One can reach only one conclusion. These institutions have everything except the basic intelligence to see the need for adopting different strategies. This is the Pakistan Army’s real tragedy.

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