Financial Daily from THE HINDU group of publications Saturday, Jan 10, 2004 |
||
|
|
||
|
Opinion
-
Foreign Relations Columns - View Point The summit and after Ranabir Ray Choudhury
The obvious question to ask is: What happened at the meeting to have occasioned the "sea change" in proceedings between the two nations? Reports sourced to a "senior official" appearing in different newspapers say that, at the meeting, the Pakistani military strongman came to realise that unless he conceded some ground on the issue of terrorism, there was no way in which he could coax New Delhi to participate in Islamabad's effort to make the summit a success not in SAARC terms but in terms of India-Pakistani relations. The fact that Gen Musharraf finally made that concession as reflected in the Joint Statement which avoided trying to see the issue of terrorism through different prisms clearly implies that he was under tremendous pressure to produce some favourable result for reasons which have not been stated publicly but which can be surmised to some extent. The central point is whether such a concession made under pressure can be of any long-term value, the obvious inference being that Islamabad could alter its stance on the subject of terrorism if and when the need to do so arises in the future, thereby nullifying the "gains" of the Islamabad summit and taking the entire gamut of India-Pakistan relations back to square one. But what were the pressures on Gen Musharraf which made him inject the note of optimism in India-Pakistan ties following his meeting with Mr Vajpayee? The most important appears to be the realisation on his part that his personal security is in grave danger not least from equally ambitious military colleagues and that if he wants to strengthen the chances of his survival, he will have to get Washington's support to keep these elements at bay. And the most effective way of getting that support would be to respond favourably to New Delhi's demand on the subject of terrorism (to start with), a subject very close to the heart of Washington for very obvious reasons. However, history has shown that such methods of survival of people who have used the gun to come to power do not have a high rate of success and that, therefore, it could be sooner rather than later that Islamabad may seen a change in its leadership. If this happens, the so-called improvement in India-Pakistan relations could vanish into thin air, and the pre-summit thread of conflict and confrontation could be picked up by a new dispensation in Islamabad. Mr Vajpayee has of course done his bit, but, unfortunately, unless there is a sweeping change in the mindset of the majority of the Pakistani power elite (and not just one man), it does not look like India-Pakistan ties will change for the better even in a hundred years. There is no doubt whatever that New Delhi wants peace with Islamabad. Alternatively, the Indian power elite does not have a vested interest to keep alive the confrontation, which, however, is not the case with our neighbour. Without the Kashmir problem (with which the issue of terrorism is inextricably linked), Pakistan will lose its place in the sun, as it were, which clearly cannot be acceptable to the military establishment, among other constituents of the Pakistani power elite. To say all this is not to belittle the significance of the movement in India-Pakistan relations achieved in Islamabad but merely to set aright the perspective, so that the disappointment, when it comes, is not too severe.
More Stories on : Foreign Relations | View Point
Article E-Mail :: Comment :: Syndication :: Printer Friendly Page
|
Stories in this Section |
|
The Hindu Group: Home | About Us | Copyright | Archives | Contacts | Subscription Group Sites: The Hindu | Business Line | Sportstar | Frontline | The Hindu eBooks | The Hindu Images | Home |
Copyright © 2004, The
Hindu Business Line. Republication or redissemination of the contents of
this screen are expressly prohibited without the written consent of
The Hindu Business Line
|