The Hindu Business Line : Defence spending and related issues — II: Stale paradigm, straddling structure

Defence management, should involve all organs of public opinion and all stakeholders in the polity, including the academia, media, civil society and representative bodies. And given the ground realities vis-à-vis threats, both external and from within, it is time to move away from the traditional security paradigm in resolving outstanding issues with our neighbours.

DEFENCE management is made up of strategic vision, prioritisation of tasks and targets, planning and coordination, and operational readiness. A right mix of these ingredients alone will not help unless it is also attuned to the prevailing security environment of the country and supported by an architecture suited to the needs arising from it.

Determining the security environment is not an academic exercise to be undertaken on the Olympian heights of the government by a select few. It is not also something to be entrusted to persons who had left active duty quite some years ago and are apt to be subjective or stuck in a groove.

Spotty formulation

The essential pre-requisite to a clear and correct delineation of the cardinal features of the security environment is a deep knowledge in all its implications and ramifications of the current world developments, advances in technology, methods of modern warfare and the daunting demands of low-intensity conflicts, proxy wars and terrorism.

To import contemporary perspectives into the analysis as also to acquaint the people with the dimensions and directions of the risks and responsibilities they face, it should be given the character of a combined effort of all organs of public opinion and all stakeholders in the polity, inclusive of the academia, media, civil society and representative bodies.

An additional reason for the extensive consultative process is the role they will all be called upon to play as the second line of defence when danger strikes. Viewed against these considerations, the formulation of India's security environment as at the beginning of 2004 could only be said to be a top-down say-so of a cloistered group.

Its summary checklist of the factors contributing to the disturbed and volatile nature of India's contiguous regions of West and South-East Asia — the terror tactics of Islamic jehadi groups, Pakistan's state-sponsored terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir, the use of Nepal and Bangladesh by its intelligence agencies as havens for anti-India insurgent groups and the uncertainties attendant on the tentative cease-fire in Sri Lanka — runs along expected lines. Pakistan has been depicted as being "prone to military adventurism" as it is yet to emerge from its `failed-state' syndrome despite all US' political, military and economic resuscitation.

The exact meaning of the peremptory remark in the document about South Asia being in a "conflictual state" is unclear, but let it pass.

There is more of substance in the description of China as a continuing threat due to its military deployment on India's borders on the same scale as before. Also, "... China, consequent to NATO's east-ward expansion and US military presence in Central Asian Republics, has deployed additional forces in its Western regions. These need to be counted as additional deployments against India due to their easy-relocation to the Indian border if found necessary."

The purport of this clumsy verbiage is no doubt to underline the importance of being wary about China constituting a source of trouble for India.

The spotty formulation of the security environment mostly on the beaten track leads to certain apparently apodeictic but not necessarily acceptable postulates. Briefly, they are:

There can be no let-up of the vigilance by Defence forces along the entire land and sea borders of the country.

There should also be no hesitation to go in for the purchase and stockpiling of the best and the latest in military hardware and associated technologies at whatever cost and from whichever source.

India should not make a fetish of keeping aloof from whatever quarters it can find support for meeting threats to its security as the alternative of developing a stand-alone traditional or nuclear deterrent capability will be infinitely costly and senseless. Hence, there is no sin in forging tacit alliances and carrying joint military exercises with possible allies.

Further, in view of the police becoming less and less dependable and effective in safeguarding internal security and containing and countering acts of sabotage, subversion and insurrection and in view of the civil administration increasingly failing to measure up to its responsibilities in times of natural calamities, the role of the Defence forces is changing from that of a stand-by and back-up in emergencies to being the mainstay and helper of first resort.

All put together, far from any reduction in the forces and their firepower and ploughing of the corresponding saving into development, the country has to live with the burden of ever higher allocations for Defence for as long as one can foresee.

Are these propositions ineluctable? If only India's policy-makers proactively work towards the resolution of outstanding issues impinging on relations with Pakistan and China in a spirit of understanding, goodwill and mutual cooperation, there can be considerable scaling down of outlays and significant application of people's energies and the nation's resources to constructive and productive purposes.

No doubt, this will involve careful preparation and nurturing of public opinion, but that is what leadership is all about. To quote Mahatma Gandhi: "In matters of vital importance, leaders must boldly act contrary to mass opinion, whenever it does not commend itself to their opinion."

Indeed, the time has come to think outside the box and move away from the traditional security paradigm, as persuasively argued in this extract from Insights published by the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, UK: "No longer does most insecurity stem from traditional threats across national borders created by identifiable enemy states.

"The predominant threats today are increasingly those to human security — from urban crime, HIV/AIDS, population displacement and gender violence — making the lives of large numbers of people in many countries less secure and more vulnerable."

Role of Supreme Commander

Skewed policy apart, the so-called reforms and restructuring being carried out at the higher reaches are unthinkingly imitative of Defence set-ups in the UK and the US whose evolution, work ethic and geo-political imperatives are entirely different.

It is no doubt true that defence forces as vast as India's can certainly do with lot more inter- and intra-Services coordination in respect of intelligence gathering and assessment, planning, procurement, management of strategic assets and technology application so as to avoid duplication of efforts and wastage of resources.

But there is plenty to worry about if the reform replaces the existing sprawling and cumbersome structure with something more sprawling and cumbersome, calling for more posts and manpower, since it is bound to make coordination more difficult.

For instance, as a consequence of restructuring, there will be a Chief of Defence Staff, a Chief of Integrated Staff to Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee, a Defence Crisis Management Group, a Defence Intelligence Agency, a Defence Acquisition Council assisted by a Defence Procurement Board serviced by a Defence Acquisition Wing, a Defence Production Board, a Defence R&D Board, a Defence Technology Council, a Strategic Forces Command and a mechanism to manage strategic assets.

The very mention being so tongue-twisting, how are they all going to think, act and march in unison?

To one's best recollection, the rationale of these decisions on threat perception and restructuring have not been referred to the relevant Parliamentary Committee for advice nor debated in Parliament.

Were they at least placed for specific approval before the President? This question immediately brings to the fore one of the most intriguing but (in terms of its implications) the least discussed provision of the Constitution which unambiguously vests in the President the supreme command of the Defence Forces of the Union and stipulates that there should be a law to regulate his exercise of that authority.

No such law has been passed in all the 54 years the Constitution has been in force. None of the extant commentaries by Constitutional experts (D. D. Basu, H. M. Seervai, Arvind Datar) has gone into a critical analysis of the precise connotation of the function and role of the Supreme Commander.

In common with all his other powers, it is presumed that in the exercise of his supreme command also, the President is bound to act on the Cabinet's advice.

However, since the Constitution talks of a separate law laying down the nature and scope of the authority of the Supreme Commander, it stands to reason that the founding fathers did not view it as just one among the many functions of the President, but as an important role to be played by him in his own right.

Otherwise, all substance is knocked out of the requirement of a special legislation defining the responsibilities of a Supreme Commander who is neither supreme nor a commander.

Since damage to the morale and effectiveness of the Defence forces can cause far more havoc, even imperilling the safety of the nation, than in the case of civilian establishments, the intention of the framers of the Constitution conceivably was that the President should be kept in the picture in regard to the postings, promotions, transfers and punishments of officers of at least the rank of corps commanders (or their equivalent) and above.

By the same logic, adoption, acquisition, purchase and other transactions pertaining to means of warfare and weapons systems and their merits and demerits should also be within the purview of the President.

It is only through measures such as these will it be possible to instil in the defence forces the confidence that their Supreme Commander is not a cipher but has the real authority to redress wrongs by exercising independent judgment and calling the political executive to account.

Arguably, in vital matters endangering national security that may come to his notice — such as when favouritism and venality, and not stringent professional criteria are believed to be behind sensitive defence decisions and the allegations from persons of irreproachable public standing are passed on to him — he cannot be said to do justice to the Supreme Commander's role by routinely passing them on to the Ministry concerned with no effort on his own part to fix responsibility and set matters right.

On him, as the Supreme Commander, rests the Constitutional responsibility to guard against any future contingency of a calamitous nature in the areas of defence and security.

Hence, to avoid any imputation of abdication of that responsibility, it will be advisable on his part to insist on Parliament passing a law detailing the Supreme Commander's role and functions as mandated by the Constitution.

(Concluded)