The Hindu Business Line : Inequity reigns at the UN

At one level, the putting off of the insistence on being given full veto powers may appear to an act of sacrifice in the interests of reforming the present shape of the UN Security Council. At another, it really means a big zero because the actual "power content" of the Security Council would remain the same.

THE WRITING was there on the wall for everyone to see, and that is exactly how things have finally turned out. When the Group of Four nations — Japan, Brazil, Germany and India — began their campaign for a permanent status in the UN Security Council, they included in their agenda full veto powers. Today, when the UN General Assembly is in the midst of debating the shape of a new Security Council, the declared agenda of the G-4 does not include immediate veto powers although (probably as a face-saving device) the point has been made that the demand has merely been held in abeyance for 15 years. In other words, come 2020, if these four countries are by then permanent members of the Security Council, the demand for full veto powers will once again be put on the table.

At one level, the putting off of the insistence on being given full veto powers may appear to be an act of compromise and even magnanimity on the part of the four nations involved — an act of sacrifice in the interests of reforming the present shape of the Security Council. At another, it really means a big zero because the actual "power content" of the Security Council would remain the same both before and after the "veto-less enlargement". That is, as before, there would be two classes of Council members, one with the power of the veto and the other without it.

True, the numbers would change but, essentially, five (the US, the UK, France, Russia and China) would still have the last word, jointly or severally, which would not mark much progress vis-à-vis the existing system.

The basic issue, however, is: What led to the dilution of the veto-demand of the G-4 and what does it tell us about the structure of international relations, as it is today?

To take the first part of the question, it is abundantly clear that pressure from a host of UN members forced the scaling down of the veto demand. Thus, Pakistan is opposing the Indian bid for permanent membership and veto power for reasons that are well known. China is opposing Japan; Argentina Brazil, and Italy Germany. The point is that support for the group of nations (which has come to be described as the Coffee Club or Uniting for Consensus) opposed to the G-4's claims has been perceived to be increasing, which is what persuaded the G-4 to back down on the veto issue.

What this essentially means is that intra-regional rivalry among nations has once again left its mark on multilateral negotiations. Of interest is the irony involved here, namely, that the objective of these negotiations is to inject a strong dose of fairness and equity in the balance of power within the UN which, among other things, would promote the interests of most of those nations squabbling among themselves on the subject of composition of the Security Council. This, of course, does not negate the importance of the UN or the Security Council as such. On the contrary, it can be argued that the raison d'etre of these bodies is strengthened further because of the need to provide a platform where disputes among nations can be debated and tension defused. Indeed, this was the original justification for setting up the UN after the Second World War, the objective being to provide an arena where nations could spar with each other before having recourse to arms.

In such a milieu, it is perhaps sensible to accomplish some small measure of reform than to risk sticking to a much larger project and losing everything in the bargain. The point is that this should be recognized as such and no effort should be made to play up the development to such a crescendo that one would tend to miss the wood for the trees. In fact, it should be underscored that while some progressive reform has been effected (by inducting more permanent members in the Security Council in the mid-1960s), nothing substantial has been achieved.

This is because the veto still remain the exclusive preserve of the five permanent members, a weapon which could be used to muzzle the voice of the non-veto permanent members, thus taking back the entire Security Council scenario to status quo ante.

The argument here is not for equality among nations at the UN but for equity. What this means is that, by virtue of a number of parameters (themselves a highly debatable subject), some nations are more important than others when it comes to settling international disputes. In fact, the UN High-Level Panel's Report on Threats, Challenges and Change (December 2004) itself suggests that nations which should be given preference for permanent or longer-term membership of the Security Council should be "those States that are among the top three financial contributors in their relevant regional area to the regular budget, or the top three voluntary contributors from their regional area, or the top three troop contributors from their regional area to United Nations peacekeeping missions".

Indeed, it is on the basis of the principle of equity that there is the General Assembly and the Security Council, and within the latter veto-wielding permanent members and those without the veto.

Equity (not equality) in international relations demands that the structure of the Security Council — right down to the use of the veto — should reflect the power balance extant today. And the power balance today, as is readily acknowledged widely, has shifted decisively away from that prevailing in the aftermath of the Second World War.

Other things remaining the same, there should therefore be an expansion of the veto-wielding power within the Security Council.

It is of interest to note that the 2004 UN High-Level Panel strikes a contrary note on the veto-power of permanent members.

Among other things, it says: "We recognise that the veto had an important function in reassuring the United Nations' most powerful members that their interests would be safeguarded. We see no practical way of changing the existing members' veto powers. Yet, as a whole the institution of the veto has an anachronistic character that is unsuitable for the institution in an increasingly democratic age and we would urge that its use be limited to matters where vital interests are genuinely at stake. We also ask the permanent members, in their individual capacities, to pledge themselves to refrain from the use of the veto in cases of genocide and large-scale human rights abuses. We recommend that under any reform proposal, there should be no expansion of the veto."

There is much sense in this line of argument, but it will also be unrealistic to expect that those wielding the power of the veto today will give up the facility easily.

What they will do as a matter of strategy is to retain that power for as long as possible despite the realisation that they will have to give it up at some point of time.

The willingness, under pressure, of the G-4 to wait till 2020 suggests that the Big Five have succeeded in their strategy of pushing back the inevitable.

Incidentally, the selection of 2020 has not been arbitrary. The High-Level Panel has asked for a review of the "composition" of the Security Council in that year on the sensible premise that "no change to the composition of the Council should itself be regarded as permanent or unchallengeable in the future".

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