The Hindu Business Line : N-weapons in emerging world order

The differences between the signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the absence of any consensus on nuclear disarmament have created a new situation in the global nuclear architecture for India. It is important for India to work together with key countries in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, such as the US, France, the UK and Russia, to see how its energy needs can be met. With the passage of time, it is clear that India will be accommodated on its own terms in the global nuclear architecture, says G. Parthasarathy.

THE Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signed in 1968 had three essential facets. The Treaty envisaged that only those powers that possessed nuclear weapons before the signing of the NPT could hold nuclear weapons. All other countries were required to foreswear the acquisition of such weapons and accept international safeguards on all fissile materials. In return, these countries were promised access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, including power generation.

The nuclear weapons powers were required to "cease the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the liquidation of all existing stockpiles and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, pursuant to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control".

China initially denounced the Treaty as an instrument of hegemony and then opportunistically joined it in 1992, after the Cold War ended. The United States and its NATO allies asserted in 1999 that "the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the alliance". The NATO document added that the "fundamental purpose" of its nuclear forces was to ensure "uncertainty" in the minds of any adversary. Nuclear blackmail thus constitutes the central theme of NATO nuclear doctrine.

The NPT also requires its signatories not to "transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive device" to any other state. China has blatantly violated this provision by transferring designs of nuclear weapons to Pakistan — designs that Pakistan, in turn, passed on to Libya and others.

China also continues to provide Pakistan assistance in nuclear reprocessing and has actively participated in keeping Pakistan's uranium enrichment facilities functioning. China has worded its pledge on "no first use" of nuclear weapons in a manner that would not be applicable to India. Despite the provisions of the NPT, Sino-Pakistan nuclear and missile cooperation constitute the most serious threat and challenge to India's national security.

Further, the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement between the US and the UK permits exchange of classified documents on "atomic weapons design, development and fabrication capability". The UK currently deploys the US nuclear weapons system "Trident" using "Trident II" missiles manufactured in the US. The British Trident nuclear warhead is based on the American W76 warhead. This is also a blatant violation of NPT provisions. It is evident from these developments that "recognised" nuclear weapons powers such as the US, the UK and China have quite routinely violated provisions of the NPT.

When the Cold War ended, the Clinton Administration attempted to freeze the global nuclear environment. Under American pressure and with Chinese support, the NPT was extended in perpetuity and efforts made to pressure India to "curb, roll back and eliminate" its nuclear programme. This effort failed when India tested nuclear weapons in May 1998.

Even though it possessed Chinese designed and pre-tested nuclear weapons, Pakistan followed suit. After direct pressure failed to deter India, the US proceeded to "engage" us to limit and cap our nuclear and missile capabilities. This effort to constantly pressure India on its missile and nuclear programmes ended with the advent of the Bush Administration, which decided that the real danger to American security flowed from nuclear weapons in the hands of terrorists or "rogue states" like North Korea, Libya, Iraq and Iran.

The period after the 1998 nuclear tests also saw the emergence of such groups as the "New Agenda Coalition" comprising South Africa, Egypt, Brazil, Mexico, Ireland and New Zealand that called on India, Pakistan and Israel to give up their weapons programme and accede to the NPT.

It is in this background that the Second Review Conference of the NPT was held last month in New York. The Americans made their priorities clear. They noted that since the last review in 2000, North Korea had walked out of the NPT and declared that it had nuclear weapons. Iran had developed a clandestine nuclear weapons programme. The infamous "A.Q. Khan network" that sold nuclear weapons technology and designs had been discovered.

The US wanted a more effective and intrusive system of inspections by the IAEA. More important, it urged that other than countries that already possessed "full cycle" nuclear enrichment and reprocessing facilities, all others, like Iran, should be barred from acquiring such capabilities.

The US also brushed aside calls for disarmament and claimed that it had reduced its strategic nuclear arsenal, submarine-based missiles and tactical nuclear warheads significantly. It also placed importance on counter proliferation measures such as the Proliferation Security Initiative that provides for interdicting suspected shipments of materials for weapons of mass destruction in international waters.

What the nuclear weapons powers avoid acknowledging is that the NPT requires them to disarm and not merely limit their nuclear arsenals. Further, the nuclear powers have refused to agree to demands that they will not use nuclear weapons against countries that do not possess such weapons.

The US found that it just could not get its way at the NPT Review Conference. The New Agenda Coalition drew attention to the call of the 2000 Review Conference for the "total elimination of nuclear weapons as the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons."

The Coalition also called on India and Pakistan to "pull back from their nuclear weapons programmes and accede unconditionally to the NPT". Japan took a similar position. A number of countries led by Egypt and Iran demanded that the nuclear weapons powers led by the US should give categorical assurances that that they would never use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapons state. They also rejected US demands that they should not develop enrichment and reprocessing facilities.

The US also faced widespread demands that it should sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. American espousal of a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty without inspections evoked little enthusiasm. The US also faced Chinese opposition to its plans for militarising outer space.

The differences between the signatories of the NPT and the absence of any consensus on nuclear disarmament have created a new situation in the global nuclear architecture for India. At the Review Conference, the US Assistant Secretary of State, Mr Stephen Rademaker, made a passing reference to states that have not signed the NPT. His Deputy, Mr Andrew Semmel, also acknowledged that the US remains committed to the "universality" of the NPT. Mr Semmel added: "We recognise, however, that India and Pakistan may not join the (Non-Proliferation) Treaty for the foreseeable future".

France took a positive approach on the needs of countries for nuclear power. It is thus important for India to work together with key countries in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, such as the US, France, the UK and Russia, to see how its energy needs can be met. Despite the demand of some of its so-called "non-aligned friends", like South Africa and Egypt, that India sign the NPT, it is evident that with the passage of time, India will be accommodated on terms it finds acceptable in the global nuclear architecture — perhaps under a separate Protocol for the NPT that will be applicable to India, Pakistan and Israel.

The passage of the "Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems Act" by Parliament in May is a good first step in this direction. Events since 1968 have established that our initial decision to reject the NPT was basically sound. It was a decision that has served our national security interests well.

(The author is a former High Commissioner to Pakistan.)

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