The Hindu Business Line : Alliance without much content

Trade apart, there is hardly any other aspect of India-China relations where there has been substantive progress, let alone a "qualititative and quantum improvement."

The Chinese President, Mr Hu Jintao, has come and gone, and it is perhaps time to take stock of his visit, specifically what it has achieved from New Delhi's point of view in terms of the new strategic partnership between the two countries, which official pronouncements made by the two sides have sought to underscore.

First, what is the specific claim that has been made by the two sides with regard to the Chinese President's visit? Paragraph 47 of the Joint Declaration adopted by the two sides on November 21 states: "The two sides believe that the highly successful visit of President Hu Jintao to India marks the high point of the India-China Friendship Year in 2006, promotes mutual understanding and trust, helps in substantiating the Strategic and Cooperative Partnership between the two countries and leads to a qualitative and quantum improvement in bilateral relations. They also agree that this Joint Statement provides a valuable blueprint for enduring development and diversification of the relations between India and China and sustained enrichment of their strategic partnership."

What quantum?

What is this "qualitative and quantum improvement in bilateral relations" that the declaration is talking about? To cut a long story short, the only concrete development that has occurred in bilateral relations between the two countries relates to the sharp increase in trade over the past couple of years. In fact, it is this rapid growth that has led to the turnover target being pitched at $40 billion in 2010 against an actual performance of around $20 billion today. As an Assocham study says, trade between the two economies reached $13.65 billion in the first half of the current year representing a 26.8 per cent increase over the corresponding period in 2005-06.

Interestingly, the study draws attention to the fact that while the annualised rate of growth of Chinese exports was 59.47 per cent, Indian exports crept up by just 1.81 per cent. What this means from the Indian point of view is that the "quantum improvement" in economic ties between the two countries till now has been dominated by Chinese exports, which really constitutes a feather in Beijing's cap instead of the other way round. In fact, one wonders as to what extent these benefits for Chinese exporters will further increase once the 2010 bilateral trade target is attained.

FTA, Not RTA

Perhaps this explains why Beijing has been harping on a free-trade agreement with New Delhi instead of the regional trading arrangement preferred by the Indian side. As the nomenclature suggests, an RTA will include within its ambit subjects such as financial services and investment, among a host of other non-trade items, spheres where India could make some headway as opposed to the trade front where, as it appears now, very few nations can at the moment halt the progress of the Chinese juggernaut. Admittedly, the Chinese have agreed to an RTA, but the fear is that since trade in goods and services will form a part of the wider arrangement (no doubt on terms that will be different from a free-trade set-up) Beijing can be expected to focus more on that segment because of the comparative advantage it currently enjoys.

The trade aspect apart (which includes preparatory work on the RTA) — where the Chinese have scored more than their Indian partners — there is hardly any other aspect of India-China relations where there has been a substantive improvement let alone a "qualititative and quantum improvement".

As regards the "quality" of the bilateral relationship, this correspondent would have been elated had the 2006 Declaration been silent on the traditional customary reference to New Delhi's stand on the Tibet Autonomous Region and its treatment of Tibetan refugees in India, which in fact has not been the case.

Thus, in the 2003 "Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation" between the two countries, the point was made that "The Indian side recognises that the Tibet Autonomous Region is part of the territory of the People's Republic of China and reiterates that it does not allow Tibetans to engage in anti-China political activities in India. The Chinese side expresses its appreciation for the Indian position and reiterates that it is firmly opposed to any attempt and action aimed at splitting China and bringing about `independence of Tibet'. The Indian side recalled that India was among the first countries to recognize that there is one China and its one China policy remains unaltered. The Chinese side expressed its appreciation of the Indian position."

In the 2005 joint statement, Paragraph 12 read: "The Indian side reiterated that it recognised the Tibet Autonomous Region as part of the territory of the People's Republic of China and that it did not allow Tibetans to engage in anti-China political activities in India. The Indian side recalled that India was among the first countries to recognize that there is one China and its one China policy remains unaltered. The Indian side stated it would continue to abide by its one China policy. The Chinese side expressed its appreciation for the Indian positions."

In 2006, the Declaration (Paragraphs 44 and 45) reads: "The Indian side recalls that India was among the first countries to recognise that there is one China and that its one China policy has remained unaltered. The Indian side states that it would continue to abide by its one China policy. The Chinese side expresses its appreciation for the Indian position. The Indian side reiterates that it has recognised the Tibet Autonomous Region as part of the territory of the People's Republic of China, and that it does not allow Tibetans to engage in anti-China political activities in India. The Chinese side expresses its appreciation for the Indian position."

As is evident, there has been no qualitative shift on this specific issue over the three years in question, and, considering its importance in India-China relations, one may be justified in saying that, on substantive grounds, Beijing has had its way vis-à-vis New Delhi on the issue. The element of `trust' that President Hu talked about during his India visit would have been underscored boldly if the reference to Tibet and Tibetans was excluded from the 2006 Declaration, the inference being that Beijing had innate confidence in New Delhi sticking to the accepted line on the subject even if it was directly mentioned in the declaration. But this has not been the case.

Advantage Pakistan

Using the same yardstick applied to the Tibet issue, it is disturbing that New Delhi was not able to get Beijing to make a reference to Sikkim being a part of the Indian Republic in the 2006 declaration, as was made (for the first time) in the 2005 joint statement.

Further, Beijing has talked about a strategic partnership and yet there has been no direct or veiled support for India finding a place in the UN Security Council, a subject touched upon in the 2006 Declaration.

Similarly, on the issue of international civilian nuclear cooperation, generalities figure in the document, which is not something one would expect if the "strategic partnership" with Beijing had any real, tangible content.

On the other hand, it is of interest that Pakistan has gained substantially in material terms from its ongoing `strategic' relationship with China.

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