The Hindu Business Line : Nuclear deal and non-proliferation issues

India should not, in principle, accede to any Treaty that is discriminatory or not internationally verifiable. Also, it should forcefully reiterate its abiding commitment to the establishment of a nuclear weapons-free world, says G. PARTHASARATHY.

As the debate rages in India on the Indo-US nuclear deal, one got a rather interesting perspective of how the outside world views contemporary nuclear issues, disarmament and the Indo-US nuclear deal, at the Annual Conference of the Nobel Prize Wining Pugwash organisation in Italy last week. The Conference was attended by eminent scientists and experts from over 40 countries and focussed attention on nuclear and other issues affecting peace and security.

The main focus of attention was on the Iranian nuclear impasse, the forthcoming Review Conference of the NPT scheduled for 2010, the breakdown in conventional and nuclear Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) in Europe, new non-proliferation measures such as ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the conclusion of a Fissile Material Control Treaty (FMCT) and, finally, the impact of the Indo-US Nuclear Deal on the global non-proliferation regime.

Call for nuclear disarmament

One of the noteworthy features of the deliberations was the recognition that following the failure of the NPT Review Conference in 2005, there were, for the first time, calls for nuclear disarmament, as constituting the only sustainable basis for enduring peace and stability. Even such arch advocates of nuclear deterrence and realpolitik such as Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, Senator Sam Nunn and William Perry had, in January 2007, called for disarmament and advocated the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free world.

When the NPT was signed in 1968, there were two clear understandings. First, that in return for renouncing nuclear weapons, non-nuclear weapons states would be assisted to develop nuclear power. Second, the nuclear weapons states agreed to undertake serious efforts to eliminate their nuclear arsenals.

By 2005, it became obvious that not only were the nuclear weapons states unwilling to eliminate their nuclear arsenals, they had also developed strategies, both nationally and multilaterally, through military alliances such as NATO to attack non-nuclear weapons states with nuclear weapons, should they deem it necessary to do, so in order to promote their security interests. The US Nuclear Posture Review was made public in 2002 and NATO strategy documents contain such provisions.

‘Cap, roll back and eliminate’

Discussions in Italy and earlier discussions I had in Washington indicated that efforts to force India to cap, and subsequently roll back, its nuclear weapons programme will undoubtedly pick up momentum if, as seems increasingly probable, Americans elect Hillary Clinton or another Democratic Party nominee as President.

A Hillary Clinton dispensation will not hesitate to co-opt China in such an effort. Her husband as president had after all not hesitated to join hands with China to “cap, roll back and eliminate” India’s nuclear weapons programme. It will endeavour to make an end to nuclear sanctions contingent on India acceding to the CTBT and ending production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.

At the Pugwash conference, American non-proliferation Ayatollahs were joined by experts and scientists from European countries (who ironically depend on American nuclear weapons on their soil for their security) and representatives from Arab countries and Iran to claim that the US-India nuclear deal was a violation of the NPT and should not be brought into force till India acceded to the CTBT and ended production of fissile materials for making nuclear weapons.

What one could not help noting in discussions on disarmament and non-proliferation is the bewilderment of our friends from countries such as Russia, France, Canada and the UK as to why India is rejecting an opportunity to end its nuclear isolation and avail of the benefit of nuclear cooperation from reliable partners, by refusing to move ahead on the agreement reached with the US.

Experts from these countries note that the Indo-US Agreement is only the first step in a process through which leading industrial powers, which have been reliable partners of India in the past, will end their sanctions and assist us in accelerating the pace of our nuclear power programme, which will inevitably remain severely curtailed by shortage of indigenous uranium ore.

While it has been argued in India that the nuclear agreement with the US will circumscribe our nuclear weapons programme, Pakistani representatives argued that the Indo-US nuclear deal will actually enable India to enhance its nuclear stockpile, as it would enable it to use imported material for power production and divert its indigenous uranium ore for its weapons programme. While Chinese representatives remained mum on the issue, China is known to have urged several nuclear supplier countries to reject the Indo-US nuclear agreement.

The growing tensions between Iran and the US over the Iranian nuclear programme remain the primary focus of attention today. It emerged in discussions in Italy that there was universal opposition to any American military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities.

Queries about whether A.Q. Khan transferred merely uranium enrichment technology and equipment to Iran, or whether he transferred weapons designs also, as he had done in Libya, remain unanswered. Moreover, Iran disclosed its clandestine nuclear enrichment programme in 2003 only after it became clear that the Americans knew about its exchanges with A.Q. Khan.

The Iranians, however, claim that the compulsive hostility of the Americans was such that any early disclosure of their enrichment programme would have inevitably led to American pressures to end the programme.

The Iranians are also justified in claiming that there is nothing in the NPT that debars them from developing enrichment capabilities. But their virulent rhetoric on Israel causes revulsion and vitiates the climate for meaningful dialogue.

Viable solution

The IAEA recently certified that there has been no diversion of nuclear materials for weapons use by Iran. Further, the Agency has announced that Iran has agreed to a time-bound framework for resolving all “remaining safeguards and implementing issues, including long outstanding issues”. IAEA officials also appear to have concluded that it will take around five years for Iran to be able to put together a nuclear weapon.

With Russia, China and Iran’s regional neighbours pressing for a negotiated settlement, it appears that the only viable solution would be to link levels and quantities of uranium enrichment by Iran strictly to its needs for nuclear fuel, with international safeguards under the Additional Protocol of the IAEA.

This can only come about with serious diplomacy involving talks between all interested parties and not by threats, coercion, or sanctions.

Discussions with experts at the Pugwash Conference indicate that while the Manmohan Singh Government has been claiming that it will accede to a FMCT only if the Treaty is non-discriminatory and internationally verifiable, its representatives at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva have evidently been instructed not to press this point within the Conference, for fear of offending American sensitivities.

This would be a serious mistake and can undermine national security, as India evidently requires some more years of fissile material production for building a credible nuclear deterrent.

Further, we should not, in principle, accede to any Treaty that is discriminatory, or not internationally verifiable. India should forcefully reiterate its abiding commitment to the establishment of a nuclear weapons free world.

A clear and comprehensive enunciation of a policy on the lines of the 1988 Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan for nuclear disarmament is essential, if we are to credibly deal with pressures we are likely to face in coming years on our nuclear independence.

(The author is a former High Commissioner to Pakistan.)

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