The Hindu Business Line : Few positives from G-8 meet

Since the emissions of the five major developing economies, the Plus 5, are growing, the G-8 finds it necessary to make them take effective steps to bring down GHG emissions. The whole exercise at Hokkaido and what it promises for the negotiation process up to Copenhagen seem full of foreboding for the Plus 5, says N. R. KRISHNAN.

The Japanese have a genius for making the gift wrapping more attractive than the gift itself. Evidently, some of this genius had rubbed on to the statesmen who met in Toyako in the northern island province of Hokkaido in Japan from July 7-9 and came up with their “Declaration of Leaders Meeting of Major Economies on Energy Security and Climate Change.” The Hokkaido gift, ensconced in layers of verbose wrapping, leaves one with much to worry about.

It has become customary for the G-8 to invite the five ‘major developing economies’ (China, India, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa — Plus 5) to its annual meetings on issues such as trade, energy security and global warming, to air and share views so as to narrow the differences between the two groups, that often cause sharp polarisation between them in negotiations in other international fora.

The developed countries — whose historic releases of greenhouse gases (GHGs) such as carbon dioxide, following their industrial development, have been the cause of global warming observed so far — are under an obligation to effect quantified reductions in their GHG emissions under the Kyoto Protocol (the Protocol) of December, 1997 within the timeframe of 2008 to 2012.

Developing countries such as China, India and Brazil are outside the ambit of the Protocol and have no such restrictions. They are, however, parties to the parent treaty of the Protocol, namely, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change of June, 1992 (the Convention).

The US too, though the world’s largest economy and largest emitter of GHGs till 2007, does not suffer from any restrictions as it has steadfastly refused to become a party to the Convention and is, hence, out of the purview of the Protocol.

Outside the Protocol

Since the Plus 5, who are parties to the Convention but are out of the pale of the Protocol, are becoming strong economic powers and their emissions of GHGs are growing — China, in fact, leads the rest of the world in its emissions since last year with India in the fourth place — the G-8 finds it necessary to make them accept the need to adopt demonstrable measures to move away from ‘business as usual’, that is, take effective steps to bring about reductions in their GHG emissions.

Needless to say, the Plus 5, while appreciating the need to cut down emissions, are in no mood to have them quantified and locked into time-bound targets on the ground that emissions of GHGs being a necessary by-product of development.

At the 13th Conference of Parties to the Convention held in Bali, Indonesia, in December, 2007, it was decided “to launch a comprehensive process” to make the Convention a success “now, up to and beyond 2012” and for this purpose it was found necessary “to reach an agreed outcome” to be adopted as a decision at the 15th Conference of the Parties in Copenhagen, in December 2009.

Bali Action Plan

Emphasising the need for “quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives” by the developed countries, the Bali Action Plan called upon them to consider “measurable, reportable and verifiable nationally appropriate mitigation commitments or actions”.

The developing countries were asked to consider “Nationally appropriate mitigation measures in the context of sustainable development … in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner” without the need to quantify the emission reductions that may result.

It is crucial to note that while it was quite appropriate to use the phrase “measurable, reportable and verifiable” in the context of the developed countries as it was in keeping with the provisions of the Convention, its application to developing countries was quite unwarranted as the Convention neither implied nor contemplated to impose in future any such conditions qualifying their actions.

This development in Bali was clearly not in favour of India and other Plus 5 countries though after a valiant struggle they managed to have the blow softened by linking imposition of any such conditions to “be supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity-building”.

An interesting feature of the proceedings in Bali was the almost total isolation of the US for its staying away from the Convention and the Protocol and its efforts to stall consensus at the gathering.

Perhaps, it was this frostiness which the US had to face in Bali that explains the thawing, though slight, on the part of President Bush in the months that followed.

First, on April 16, President Bush announced a specific goal of putting an end to the US carbon emissions by 2025.

He had always held that the tightening up measures, already underway in the US, particularly by way of energy efficiency improvements and introduction of bio-ethanol, would reduce US emissions by a good 17 per cent by 2020 compared to the 1990 levels. On the point whether the halting of growth of emissions by 2025 would be followed by progressive reductions in the ensuing years, he was silent.

As for his dogged refusal to join the Convention, Mr Bush was categorical that so long as the world’s two big emitters, China and India, remained out of the regime of quantified reductions, there was little point in the US or other developed countries tightening their belts.

Given the change of heart, however slight, on the part of the US and the urgency for action expressed by the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to limit the build up of GHGs in the atmosphere and phase them down to acceptable levels definitely by the middle of this century, it was expected that the G-8 would come up with some significant next steps at Hokkaido to show its commitment to the targets laid down by the Protocol for the period 2008-2012 and indicate an approach to the regime that may prevail post 2012.

Red herrings

There were some red herrings to be seen in the waters around Hokkaido during the Summit. On the second day of the Summit, in a joint statement issued after deliberations among themselves, the G-8 leaders declared that their countries “will consider and adopt” reductions of at least 50 per cent at the Copenhagen Conference. The base year to which this 50 per cent will be related and the timeframe within which this target would be achieved, were left unspecified. Later, at his press conference, Mr Bush clarified the target year to be 2050 but left the base year of reference unstated.

The Japanese Prime Minister, Mr Fukuda seemed to prefer a shift from the present base year of 1990 set in the Protocol to a later year like, say, 2005 on the ground that since in 1990, vast changes in technology had taken place in Japan, resulting in reduced emissions per unit of industrial output and, hence, any reference to the GHG emission levels of 1990 as the base would compel his country to enforce unjustifiably high reductions.

In the ‘Declaration’ issued at the end of the Hokkaido Summit on July 9, the participants agreed that “… a long term global goal for reducing global emissions…” was necessary and that the developed major economies “… will implement, consistent with international obligations, economy-wide mid-term goals….” for doing so.

As for the developing major economies (China, India and others), they were expected to “…pursue… nationally appropriate mitigation actions…with a view to achieving a deviation from business as usual emissions.”

Having spoken of long and mid-term goals, the Declaration did not state what these goals were.

Instead, it narrowed down the next steps “To enable the full, effective and sustained implementation of the Convention between now and 2012” without any reference to the Kyoto Protocol. In fact, there is no mention of the Protocol in the entire Declaration though that has been the basis for laying down emission reduction targets to be achieved in the commitment period of 2008 to 2012.

Amendments to Protocol?

Does this mean the G-8 has started thinking of some amendments to the Protocol to favour the many who have failed to honour their commitments under it? The least of the apprehensions is that the Protocol may undergo changes in the targets for its parties.

This, in turn, has implications for the Clean Development Mechanism under which firms in developing countries have been securing carbon credits for being sold to firms in developed countries. Any altering of targets set by the Protocol for its country-parties would mean slackening the limits they prescribe for emissions by their firms and, hence, a fall in demand for carbon credits and their prices.

To confound the critics, the long-term target of 50 per cent announced for the G-8 on the second day of the Summit was omitted in the final declaration nor any mention made of the arrangements which the G-8 may like to see in place after 2012 and which would form a basis for negotiations in the process leading up to Copenhagen.

Questions arise as to why the Declaration was silent on the goals to be achieved in the long and mid-terms but remained insistent on Plus 5 moving away from “business as usual”.

The answers are not far to seek. The European Union is having a hard time persuading a good number of its members, with the notable exception of Germany and the UK, to honour their commitments under the Kyoto Protocol.

The EU has come to realise that adhering to the commitments would only hurt its members’ competitive edge in world markets which are increasingly being lost to China which does not have such commitments to honour.

The attitude of many OECD countries is no better than that of some members of the EU. For instance, Canada has no heart for the Convention or the Protocol. It has reneged on its Protocol targets.

It is more interested in developing its tar sands for extraction of oil at a time when global oil prices are rising and, quite perversely, it is eyeing the melting of the Arctic ice which would open up the north-western passage for shipping to and from Canadian ports. Canada may rather like to see the epitaph of the Protocol and the Convention being written.

In sum, the whole exercise at Hokkaido and what it promises for the negotiation process up to Copenhagen seem full of foreboding for the Plus 5. Global climate may be no gainer either.

(The author is former Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Environment and Forests.)

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