Enemies with benefits

As Pakistan takes a few tentative steps against jihadi groups in its Punjab province, several India-centric militant groups have mounted a strong defence of jihad as an effective tool to achieve that country’s political objectives. And the Jaish-e-Muhammad, more than Lashkar-e-Toiba, is at the forefront of this contestation.

In a three-part series, carried by Jaish on its website Alqalamonline, Talha Saif, a close aide of the outfit’s chief Masood Azhar, outlines the many geopolitical benefits that have accrued to Pakistan from jihadis over the past few decades. He does this by dividing the post-1989 Kashmir movement into two phases: pre-Musharraf (1989-2001), when jihad reigned supreme; and post-Musharraf (2002 onwards), when it was allegedly deprived of State support, leading to a drastic decline.

“In the first phase, jihad continued at full throttle. It echoed from Kashmir’s lanes, jungles and Valleys to India’s Parliament. And along the way, it also reminded the world leaders, countries and international institutions of the existence of Kashmir problem,” the article reads. “This forced India to call for dialogue with Pakistan on Kashmir. The country also accepted disputed nature of Kashmir. Pakistan position became stronger. It even talked tough with India and India was forced to listen. And Kashmiris who were about to reconcile with India felt empowered to raise Azadi slogan with such force that the world took notice.”

Saif then contrasts this with the period following Musharraf’s 2002 “U-turn” on jihad, in a clear reference to the General’s pledge to India that Pakistan will not allow its soil to be used for terror activities against India — a promise that he largely kept during his term.

“As soon as India felt that Jihad was dying in Kashmir, it moved fast to imprison Kashmiri (separatist) leadership, banned their entry into India, even forbade their visits to Pakistan embassy. It has also begun organised return of Kashmiri Pandits to Valley and also started the settlement of non-Kashmiri Hindus in the state along Israeli lines,” Saif argues. “The lack of jihad has also paved the way for the increase in political representation of Hindus in Kashmir and given fillip to the activities of the rightwing Hindu elements in the state. Soon, Muslims in Kashmir will face what the Muslims of Burma and Gujarat have gone through.”

The article stoutly contests the statements of some “Kashmir University students” and other secular leaders supported by liberal columnists in Pakistani newspapers that eliminating militancy will lead to the global validation of the Kashmir struggle, and invokes the State’s long troubled history since 1947 to buttress its claims.

“Let us put the record straight. Today if a part of Jammu and Kashmir is with us, we owe it to this very reviled armed struggle. This jihad was fought by tribal lashkers besides people of Kashmir. If at that time this Lashker hadn’t been called back after our armed forces were beguiled by the false assurance of the self-determination for Kashmiris offered by global powers, entire J&K would be part of Pakistan,” the article reads.

“Is there even one sane person who can say that the part of Kashmir under our control was liberated or could have been liberated through a political struggle. If instead of sending in tribal lashkers we had adopted a political course of action in line with the thinking of our intellectuals, would a part of J&K have been ours?”

The piece then mocks the zero achievement of the Kashmiri political struggle from 1948 to 1989. “The period saw Kashmiris pursue a completely peaceful political struggle. But devoid of a militant dimension, this movement was never taken seriously. India never came forward for the dialogue, nor recognised Kashmir as a core issue. What is more, Kashmir issue didn’t echo in any global forum... Along the way, many towering political personalities became the dust of history but Kashmir and Kashmiris could achieve nothing.”

Jihad as bulwark

However, beyond wresting Kashmir from India, the Jaish’s case for jihad is also about the strategic advantages for Pakistan, especially its value in the containment of India. And to support this claim, the Jaish invokes history, right from the Bangladesh War to the trouble in Balochistan.

“Recall the tragedy of 1971. India hacked away a part of Pakistan through aggression. Assume for a minute if at that time the movement in Kashmir would have been militant rather than political in nature. Assume if like the nineties, India’s Army had been bogged down in Kashmir, would it have been possible for India to march into Bangladesh without withdrawing troops from Kashmir. It couldn’t do so, as it couldn’t leave its borders in Kashmir undefended. Besides, if India would still have gone ahead with its Bangladesh adventure, Pakistan would have done the same in Kashmir, thereby confronting New Delhi with a far bigger challenge.”

Similarly, the group sees the Kashmir jihad as a defence against “India’s intervention in Pakistan including Balochistan”.

“Remember eighties. Indian agents and the trained saboteurs freely came to Pakistan and carried out bomb blasts. Then came the heyday of Kashmir jihad and during this period was any Sarabjit (Singh) found laying bombs in Pakistan? What was the reason? The reason was that the Kashmir jihad had every area of India within its reach. This had tied India’s hands. The country was afraid to carry out operations inside Pakistan lest it invite retaliation from within India,” Saif argues.

He then traces the resurgent insurgency in Balochistan and the renewed turmoil in Karachi to the decline of Kashmir jihad. “Why is it that the worsening situation in Balochistan and Karachi coincided with the weakening of Kashmir jihad? Why is it that the balloon of Karachi’s linguistic movement which had been quelled following 1992 operation is becoming inflated again? Why is it that India has been able to build the fence along the border and cut the supply line of Mujahideen. And see the result. India is now not ready to acknowledge even the existence of the Kashmiri freedom movement,” he writes. “If Pakistan agrees with India to put an end to Kashmir militancy and takes steps in this direction, India after fulfilling its aim will junk Kashmir in cold storage and would no more listen to Pakistan and Kashmiris.”

This state of affairs, the article argues, has forced the militants to strike on their own. “It is then that the faithful rose and overran the fence on their way to Kashmir. It is now a tougher fight: the (Pakistan) Government is against us. The institutions have changed their (jihad) policy. Where once thirty outfits fought (in Kashmir), one now struggles to remember the names of more than three,” Saif writes. “Kashmir jihad is very difficult, complicated and severe. Abandoning it can entitle you to all the riches and pleasures of the world. But we won’t do it.”

The series was written in response to the “newly-grown crop of (Pakistani) intellectuals and journalists” who are preaching otherwise, cautioning the Pakistan government and mobilising public opinion against the use of jihadis in Kashmir.

“These days not only the secular and liberal political analysts but also some rightist columnists have become active and are propagating the idea that the armed movement is hurting rather than helping the Kashmir freedom struggle. They always do it, when they find that the government under outside pressure has started acting against mujahideen. Or it could be because the government uses them to support its new policy and make it acceptable to the people. But it is also possible that these are genuine viewpoints. But the question is whether these are based on reality?”

The seeds of detention

The Jaish response comes against the backdrop of the Pakistan government’s recent action against its chief, Maulana Masood Azhar, who is said to be under preventive detention. Similarly, Jamaat-ud-Dawa chief Hafiz Saeed has been placed under house arrest and four of his associates detained.

These are extraordinary steps, believed to have been taken in anticipation of pressure from the new US administration under Donald Trump. In response to the crackdown, the Dawa has rebranded itself as the Tehreek Azadi Jammu and Kashmir.

New Delhi has always sought credible action against Saeed, whom it holds responsible for the 2008 Mumbai attacks that killed 169. In a statement, India has termed the latest action against the Dawa chief as a test of Pakistan’s seriousness in eradicating India-centric militant outfits from its soil.

Pakistan, on the other hand, has flaunted its anti-terror steps in its dealings with the Trump administration. In his April 27 meeting with the US national security advisor HR McMaster, Pakistan finance minister Ishaq Dar stressed his country’s commitment to fighting terrorism “nationwide”.

“Pakistan’s commitment to fight terrorism from its soil was manifested by the successful conclusion of the operation Zarb-e-Azb, which was now being followed by a nationwide combing operation Rad-ul-Fisad,” the Pakistani embassy in Washington said in a statement.

Anti-jihadist pitch

What seems to have immediately provoked the Jaish article are the write-ups in Pakistan and Kashmir media that justify Pakistan’s actions against jihadi leaders and which see the sponsorship of Kashmir militancy as detrimental to the Kashmir cause.

Daily Times editor Raza Rumi wrote: “...since 9/11, jihadism is globally considered as terrorism. Every violent act of resistance is terrorism. India has successfully tapped into this new global discourse.” He also warned that by framing the issue of self-determination for Kashmiris in black-and-white jihadist discourse, there’s been an opening for the radicalisation of society. “Young people are influenced by this narrative. It has long-term implications. Pakistan has heavily suffered because of this over the last decade. Around 80000 Pakistanis have died... if you use faith to glorify and legitimise jihad for Kashmir, you also sanction it for Tehreek Taliban Pakistan.”

Writing in Greater Kashmir, a leading J&K regional daily, the Karachi-based nuclear physicist and columnist Pervez Hoodbhoy ironically quotes the late JKLF founder Ammanullah Khan as telling him in 2003 that the “so-called mujahideen” have damaged the Kashmir cause.

“Khan had concluded after a long history of struggle that the linkage of terrorism with Kashmiri nationalism had both hardened Delhi’s attitude and reduced international sympathy. He now advocated people’s struggle,” Hoodbhoy wrote on Khan’s death anniversary on April 25, adding that jihad has become an ugly word in the world’s political lexicon.

“Waging covert war has led to the disappearance of international support for Pakistan on Kashmir. This fact is well known to Pakistani diplomats who represent Pakistan’s position in the world’s capitals, including those of Muslim countries.”

In the same paper, the noted Pakistani political commentator and author of Military Inc, Ayesha Siddiqa makes the case that the armed struggle has no place in today’s world. “When you no longer live in the age of Che Guevara, Leila Khaled, or even Salvador Allende, the hills suddenly become steeper to climb... “ [militant] groups themselves are part of some state — if not the one you live in then some other — and equally brutal.”

In The News last October, Pakistani columnist Ayaz Amir blamed the support to jihad for weakening Pakistan’s Kashmir case. “Where we talk of Indian repression India raises the flag of ‘cross-border terrorism’. We may shout that this is a canard but the jihadis associated rightly or wrongly with Pakistan steal the thunder from our shouting... one Hafiz Saeed and one Maulana Masood Azhar are enough to give a different spin to our distress.”

However, Jaish doesn’t buy into this logic.

“The impression is being created that Kashmiri people are fed up of the armed struggle. That they consider mujahideen an impediment in their freedom struggle... But from borders to Srinagar, one encounter or even one funeral of a mujahid turns this propaganda on its head,” Saif writes in an obvious reference to the disruptions of the encounter sites by Kashmiri protesters and the massive funeral processions for slain militants.

Riyaz Wani is a journalist based in Srinagar

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