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India and Bush Administration -- Beyond assumptions

Giridhar Srinivasan

SOON after Mr George W. Bush Jr. won the US elections, Indian observers proclaimed quickly that a Republican administration bodes good for India. A Republican administration was expected to not pester India about human rights violations in Kashmir, not f orce it to sign the CTBT, and get tougher with China.

Mr George Bush's decision to ``drop by'' the External Affairs Minister, Mr Jaswant Singh's meeting with the American National Security Advisor, Ms Condoleezza Rice, seemed to somehow confirm this false sense of euphoria. This narrow thinking fails to und erstand the drivers of Republican ideology. The reality is the Republicans care about a range of issues that will force the BJP Government to make some difficult decisions.

Take the first issue of human rights violations in Kashmir. It is true there are many isolationists in the Republican Party who, probably, do not care about human rights violation in Kashmir so long as it does not affect them, and is not happening in the ir backyard. But there is another powerful force in Republican politics -- the religious wing. This includes powerful members of the US Cabinet such as The Attorney-General, Mr John Ashcroft, who are Christian fundamentalists. Mr Bush himself claim s to be a `born again Christian'.

The religious right is rarely interested in foreign policy; it mostly concerns itself with moral and social issues such as abortion and teenage pregnancy. But the few times it does intervene, it is when it feels a country is ``persecuting Christians''. A nd when it does intervene, no Republican administration dares cross it.

For instance, China is periodically identified as a country that persecutes Christians. Christian missionaries and ministers are routinely harassed and imprisoned because they are trying to spread their religion. Because of this issue, Republican members of the Christian right in Congress have all but declared a religious war on China, routinely opposing any attempt to improve relations -- including trade relations -- with that country.

India, as an emerging power, is more carefully watched, and frequently mentioned in the American press. Stories of Christian missionaries being burnt alive and nuns raped are attributed to ``elements associated with the Hindu fundamentalist ruling party' '. In its latest human rights report, the US State Department noted these acts with concern. The Pope's mention of these issues to the Prime Minister, Mr Atal Bihari Vajpayee, was also noted in the American press. India is, perhaps, half a step away from being branded as a country that ``persecutes Christians''.

A self-professed born-again Christian like Mr George Bush would quickly take up the Christian right's cause, trumping all other bilateral issues. Human rights may not matter to the isolationists, but Christian, and to a lesser extent Jewish, religious fr eedom matters tremendously to a Republican administration.

The second fallacy was that since the Republicans in Congress did not pass the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, they would not force other countries to pass the CTBT either. But why are the Republicans are opposed to the CTBT. The opponents of the CTBT fee l that it fails to safeguard American security. They frankly care little about Indian security. They would love to be able to restrict India's ability to test and use its weapons. To them, nuclear weapons not in American hands translates into an unsafe w orld. Unless India manages to convince the Republicans otherwise, the Republican administration is likely to tighten the anti-proliferation screws on India.

The third fallacy relates to a tough, long-term strategic re-alignment the Bush Administration will demand of India. Mr Bush's foreign policy-makers are unreconstructed `Cold Warriors'. In the post-Cold War era, they are desperately ``searching for an en emy''. They appear to have settled on China as ``the next enemy''. Their next step is to search for ``allies'' who rarely challenge their views. Thinkers in Washington and New Delhi believe that India and the US are ``natural allies''. But such a decisio n has an enormous range of long-term consequences for India.

To discuss just a few: Most of the Indian military's equipment comes from Russia and the former Soviet Union. Allying with the US will be seen by the Russians as abandoning them, and this could have an enormous impact on the legacy military equipment. Re cent noises from the Foreign Ministry suggest India is also eager about Mr George Bush's proposed missile defence programme. But this technology is far from proven, and during the decade over which it may be developed (if it gets past Congress), China wi ll most certainly develop many nuclear weapons. These may, primarily, be a deterrent against the US, but it will force India into an arms buildup it can barely afford.

The Americans are reserving their missile defence system for their ``closest allies''. India today is neither fish nor fowl -- not quite a threat, but not quite an ally either. It is unlikely that India will be able to convince the Americans to give i t the defence system. Even if the Americans agree to sell it to India, it could never afford the sticker price. So, before it rejoices at the notion of anti-China hawks in the White House, let India ponder over the unexamined consequences.

The final issue is one that may precipitate in the very near term. Enron and Maharashtra find themselves in a dispute that neither wants to lose, and that appears to be rapidly getting shriller. Mr George Bush's background is as a Texas oilman -- and he is widely accused in the US of being beholden to the interests of the energy industry. In fact, they were among the biggest ``contributors to his campaign''.

The Enron Chairman, Mr Kenneth Lay, is a friend of Mr Bush's, and was seriously considered for a job in his Cabinet. He is so well connected that he was recently accused of influencing who is appointed by the White House to regulate the energy industry. In the near term, Mr Bush could quite possibly lean heavily on New Delhi to ``make sure that Enron's interests are not neglected''. If New Delhi does not respond to his satisfaction, his opinion of India, and consequently, his administration's dealings w ith the country, are likely to be coloured far more than we think.