• PAGE ONE
• INDEX
• HOME

India-Pakistan dialogue -- The Hurriyat loses out

Aravind Sitaraman

MOST reasonable people would agree that India must discuss its differences with Pakistan. Historically, India has talked to the Pakistani military and civilian rulers only to be voided by the party not in control. As was witnessed after the Tashkent and Shimla Agreements, Pakistan's civilian leaders did not want any part of the agreements its military had conjured. Conversely, as witnessed with the UN resolutions of 1948 and the Lahore Agreement, the Pakistani military did not want any part of the agree ments its civilian administrations created.

This internal stalemate is primarily due to the presence of a small, but powerful and disruptive, constituency that works incessantly to stop bilateral understanding between the two nations. Zia ul-Haq's patronage successfully morphed this group into jeh adi outfits. They court the faction not in power, while continuously subverting the one in power.

Since the internal power compulsions of Pakistan have precluded any form of bilateral bonding, India has attempted an alternative path. Departing from its traditional posture that the dialogue with its people is through elections, India initiated several measures to reach out to all the secessionist constituencies in Kashmir. It wanted to talk to the Hurriyat Conference, the Jammu and Kashmir Democratic Front, and even the Hizbul Mujahideen. Even with India's position, militarily and diplomatically, eme rging dominant immediately after the Kargil victory, the expectation was that these groups would wake up to the geopolitics of the day.

Despite the war and its internal travails, India had a strong and growing economy: It developed close ties with the US, the European Union and Central Asian Republics; and its democracy and plurality were reaffirmed by the elections that followed the Kar gil war. Compared to this, Pakistan has been an economic and social basket case and continues to live off International Monetary Fund tranches. Its major political parties have been expelled from the nation, making political and civilian rehabilitation a n impossibility. A number of dissenting movements are in vogue in Paktoon, Sindh, the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), and it is having difficulty controlling the Taliban, a monster of its own making in Afghanistan, and is facing a crippling refugee crisis and law and order situation in the NWFP.

One would imagine that the Kashmiri secessionist groups would accept these realities and make their peace with India. However, the Kashmir issue is neither a logical nor a simple issue. The Kashmir issue has a historical context that is very different fr om the other States.

The Hurriyat maintains that Kashmir was never acceded to India and its people were never consulted on the matter. However, it was the Indian National Congress' wish to consult the people, but was violently opposed by the Muslim League and the British Gov ernment. Hence, it was decided that when the supremacy of the British control ended, the control of the princely states would be transferred to the rulers. The founding fathers of India then ratified this accession through respective Constituent Assembli es. The same process was followed with Kashmir. Faced with invading Afghanis led by a service Pakistani Major, violating the Jammu and Kashmir-Pakistan Standstill Agreement, Maharaja Hari Singh acceded to India to save his country.

The Hurriyat says that it is the only `true' representative of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. J&K has three provinces. Jammu (overwhelmingly Hindu) and Ladakh (overwhelmingly Buddhist) want no part of the secessionist movement in Kashmir (overwhelmingl y Muslim). Even in Kashmir, there are many factions that do not want to be a part of this movement. The Gujjars, nomads mostly living in the hills, suffered most under the Pakistani-sponsored tribal invasion in 1947 and hence want no part of that state.

The Shia population, mostly farmers, traders, and craftsmen, is aware of the suffering meted to the Shias by the Wahabi Sunni majority in Pakistan. In India, they can aspire to a living, but in Pakistan they would not only face economic degradation but a lso social persecution. So it would seem that the Hurriyat is representing a narrow section of the Sunni population, and not the J&K mainstream political makeup.

The Hurriyat asserts that bilateralism between India and Pakistan has failed because they did not include the Kashmiris. Several accords between India and various Kashmiri leaders like Sheikh Abdullah, Mr G. M. Shah, Mr Ghulam Mohammed and Mr Farooq Abdu llah have failed. Is there a guarantee that any accord between India and the Hurriyat will work? Agreements between parties are as strong as the motivations of those who sign them. The problem is not in the agreement, but the commitment and persuasion of the parties involved those agreements.

The Hurriyat also asserts that India denied Kashmiris a right to self-determination as required by the UN resolutions. The UN Resolutions of 1948, initiated by India, required Pakistan to withdraw from its occupied areas, India to maintain administrative law and order and organise plebiscite. Given that Pakistan has consistently violated the UN resolutions requiring it not to materially change the ground situation by adding more troops and vacate the occupied areas, the UN resolutions of 1948 were a non -starter. The 1972 Shimla Agreement between India and Pakistan required them to resolve the Kashmir dispute bilaterally thus superceding the UN Resolutions and rendering irrelevant the plebiscite question.

The Hurriyat refuses to parley with the Indian interlocutor, saying that India wants to talk about peace while it wants to talk about a resolution. Is not peace the final objective of a resolution? Or, does the Hurriyat wants to support Pakistan in conti nuing a ``low-intensity conflict'' in India even if the Kashmir issue is resolved?

Despite continued goodwill gestures demonstrated by India, the Hurriyat continues to argue these baseless arguments and stall dialogue with India. It continues to place inconsequential pre-conditions even to start the process of dialogue. The Shah-Pant d ialogue and the initiation of dialogue with Pakistan has made the Hurriyat irrelevant. The fundamental elements within that body have successfully won the secular, moderate, and pluralistic voices of Farooq, Malik, Lone, and Bhat. In this case, they are the biggest losers.

(The author is a hi-tech worker.)