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Musharraf: Taliban's advocate?

M. Rama Rao

GENERAL Pervez Musharraf is a typical army man. Diplomatic niceties are not his forte. Down to earth idiom is his. Consider this advice to Russia, a nation he has been trying to cultivate: ``Recognise Taliban and buy peace''. It is very blunt and to the point. ``The only way to influence how the Taliban act is by recognising the regime,'' he told Izvestia, the Russian daily, in a recent interview. His argument is simple: ``No one but the Taliban are capable of guaranteeing peace in Afghanistan today. Wh ether anyone likes or not the Taliban are a reality.''

Russia accuses the Taliban of exporting Islam to, and supporting rebels in, Chechnya and of trying to destabilise the Central Asian Region where Moscow's writ held sway till glasnost and perestroika brought down the communist regime. As can be expected, Gen Musharraf does not buy the Russian contention. He holds forth that peace would never be restored in Afghanistan `unless Russia and other world powers recognise the Taliban'.

The General must be commended for his steadfast commitment to the Taliban cause in the face of worldwide condemnation for what the Taliban has come to symbolise. Neither the outcry against the destruction of the Buddhas at Bamiyan nor the angry denunciat ion of the dress code the Taliban ordered that Hindus and the Sikhs wear -- stirring memories of the yellow star the Jews had to wear to distinguish them in Nazi Germany -- has made the General flinch.

This is not to deny that Gen Musharraf's regime has completely turned its face against world opinion. It has occasionally offered concessions to please the `Taliban baiters'. In April, it denied permission to four Taliban ministers to attend a Jamaat-spo nsored Islamists conclave in Peshawar. And in May, a Minister was turned back from Torkham, the main crossing between the two countries. Maulvi Mohammad Qasim, Deputy Minister for Construction, was coming to Pakistan on a private visit. The refusal is in line with the new UN sanctions `to flush out' Osama bin Laden, the patriarch of the global Islamist network, from Afghanistan. The Taliban is unlikely to desert Osama, notwithstanding the occasional flutter caused by demands from Washington for Osama's trial for various crimes.

Restrictions on foreign travel by Taliban ministers and officials are a key component of the sanctions regime. The ban on the supply of arms is the main plank. The Security Council Resolution 1333, the magna carta of the sanctions regime, also prohibits material and advisory support. Given the suffering of the Afghans and the famine conditions created by a drought, humanitarian aid is being allowed into the country. Interestingly, despite the humanitarian efforts, the militia has been giving relief agen cies a tough time by demanding trade-offs.

That Pakistan is Taliban's lifeline is well known. Also widely acknowledged is the direct involvement of Pakistan and its official agencies in the Taliban's successful military strikes, including the capture of Kabul. But there has been no conclusive evi dence of the continued material and advisory support after Resolution 1333 came into force in January. However, Russia recently accused Pakistan of violating the arms embargo. Moscow teamed up with Paris to force a showdown of sorts at the UN. Nothing mu ch came of the exercise except for a direction to the Secretary General to come up with an effective mechanism to monitor the sanctions, the arms embargo in particular.

Pakistan has a 2,500-km border with Afghanistan. Unless Islamabad willingly cooperates, the arms embargo cannot succeed. There is also no way of verifying its claims. All the aid need not necessarily be routed through official channels. The very creation of Taliban bears this out.

The Taliban needs weapons and ammunition. Where is it getting its supplies? The US, as a source, can be ruled out. Over the past decade, Washington's geopolitical and strategic interests have changed. It is now at the vanguard of the movement to clip the Taliban's wings, its protege in the proxy fight against Communism. Neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran has any reason to bankroll the Taliban's cause, Riyadh, because of the presence of Osama in Kandahar, and Teheran because of the age-old Sunni-Shia feud. Ch ina and Russia are keen to checkmate the militia's advance for their own interests.

Reports from various sources show that Pakistan remains the Taliban's godfather. Jane's Defence Weekly reports that two convoys of 15 trucks each were seen moving early this month at Torkham through Jalalabad to Kabul with munitions concealed under sacks of wheat. While not discounting the report, it should be remembered that this particular route is an open stretch. So much so, it is likely that the traditional smuggling routes are patronised when it is clear that the spy satellites are watching.

Some sources aver that Pakistan has entrusted the transportation of arms, ammunition, aviation fuel (for eight MIG-19s, three Boeing 727s and several helicopters) and lubricants for armoured vehicles to the Jamaat-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI). Maulana Samiul Haq of the Jamaat is incharge of Operation Amir under the close supervision of the army and the ISI. This offers the military ruler a perfect alibi as it is known that many madrasas (of Pakistan), particularly in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), are the prime recruiting centres of the Taliban.

Abandoned chemical, fertiliser and textile factories at Lakki, Nowshera and other places in the border region have become makeshift storage areas just before transportation. The Peshawar-Jalalabad road is avoided at night. The Bannu-Miram Shah-Narezi is preferred to reach Khosht, which is a short distance from Narezi. Often goods are sent directly to Khosht from Parachinar (in NWFP) and some lesser-known routes are patronised by smugglers and drug lords.

In recent months, the general impression is that the Taliban has been cracking down on poppy cultivation. The US contributed no less to creating a drug-free image of Afghanistan, and sanctioned $43 million in aid to Kabul.

A close nexus between the Mullahs and the drug mafia is suspected, and under the Taliban patronage, the drug (and timber) mafia has been flourishing. In fact, this trade has provided the regime a steady source of revenue. There is a ready market across i n Pakistan where heroin factories are closed and poppy cultivation banned under international pressure. According to UN agencies, the number of heroin users has grown to 1.5 million and there are another two million hashish and opium addicts in Pakistan since Zia-ul-Haq banned alcohol consumption under his Islamisation programme.

There is no doubt that drug money has financed the Taliban war effort, a view confirmed by a UN report. Five experts put together the report after examining how the sanctions were working against Afghanistan. Mullah Omar, the supreme leader of the Taliba n, was apparently not sincere when he banned poppy cultivation last July. He had only ordered a regulated production to `keep opium and heroin prices from plummeting'. Chote, Saleh Katez and Rabat, small towns close to Pakistan's and Iran's borders, are the main markets for 59 per cent of the total production. From here the contraband is smuggled through the unguarded coastline of Balochistan and Iran to Europe, and West Asia.

How effective the Vienna's proposed mechanism to monitor the sanctions regime is a moot point. According to a blueprint, experts in illegal arms, drugs trafficking, money-laundering and counter terrorism will work to keep tabs on Kabul. Unless they get a bsolute cooperation from Pakistan's Chief Executive, Gen Musharraf, and the Taliban's supreme leader, Mullah Omar, success will not come their way, considering that both have their compulsions in maintaining the status quo.

Gen Musharraf cannot afford to annoy the Taliban. In his own interests and the territorial integrity of Pakistan, he has to keep it in good humour. The Taliban is responsible for the Sunni adventurism and consequent targeting of the country's minority Sh ias. Not a day passes without sectarian violence. Social vigilantes, often described as Taliban clones, have become a law unto themselves in Afghanistan's cities, towns and villages. The Taliban is a predominantly Pashto speaking militia. Their growth ha s given a fresh lease of life to the demand for a homeland for the Pushtoons, who live on either side of the Durand Line that divides Pakistan and Afghanistan. Neither the Taliban nor any Kabul ruler has accepted the sanctity of the Line, cartographed by the British a hundred years ago. Certainly, Gen Musharraf would not like to be remembered as another Yahya Khan who presided over the second bifurcation of Pakistan.

(The author is a New Delhi-based journalist.)