Afghanistan, a simmering cauldron

On December 6, Asadullah Khalid, Head of Afghanistan’s Intelligence set up — the National Directorate of Security — was seriously injured in a bomb attack by a Taliban suicide bomber posing as a peace envoy. Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzai announced the next day that the suicide bomber was from Pakistan. While not directly naming the Inter-Services Intelligence, Karzai described the suicide bombing as a “very sophisticated and complicated act by a professional intelligence service”.

Khalid is one of President Karzai’s closest aides. He has held crucial gubernatorial appointments in Ghazni and Kandahar and had escaped Taliban assassination attempts in 2007 and 2011.

He has been playing a crucial role in trying to wean away Pashtun tribal support from the Taliban, as the American “end game” in Afghanistan picks up momentum. Asadullah Khalid is seen as a dangerous adversary in Pakistan.

In its quest for “strategic depth,” the Pakistan military establishment has based its entire political strategy in pretending to champion the cause of Pashtuns, who constitute 40 per cent of the country’s population, with the Tajiks constituting 33 per cent and the Shia Hazaras and Uzbeks 11 per cent and 9 per cent, respectively.

Gaining dominance

Pakistan’s strategy is to pretend that it supports an “Afghan-led” process of national reconciliation, while ensuring that the Quetta Shura and the Haqqani Network, which have strong ties with the al Qaeda and international Islamist causes, negotiate from a position of strength, so that southern Afghanistan initially, and thereafter the entire Pashtun belt, come under the control of its “strategic assets”.

This would be a prelude to obtaining a dominant role across the entire country. It is primarily in pursuit of this objective that the senior-most Taliban leader from the Durrani tribe, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, has been incarcerated and kept incommunicado in Pakistan.

Pakistan has its own Achilles heel. Firstly, no Pashtun worth his salt recognises the Durand Line.

Moreover, after the Pakistan army’s assault of the Lal Masjid in 2007, the Tehriq-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has made common cause with other Jihadi outfits in Pakistan, to challenge the writ of the Pakistan army and the Pakistan State.

Unable to directly take on the TTP, the Pakistan army is fomenting tribal animosities between the Mehsud and Waziri tribes in South Waziristan.

It is also clear that should a Government-led Imran Khan’s Tehriq-e-Insaf or Nawaz Sharif’s PML (N) assume office after the 2013 elections in Pakistan, one can write off any prospect of the Pakistan army taking any action whatsoever, against the Haqqani network or other al Qaeda-affiliated groups, as the American drawdown in Afghanistan proceeds.

The one country which can remain unaffected by a Taliban takeover of Southern Afghanistan is Pakistan’s “all weather friend” China, which is known to have maintained links with the Mullah Omar-led Quetta Shura, even as it professes to be a strategic partner of the Karzai dispensation.

In these circumstances, there are now concerns that if not properly equipped, motivated and backed, the Afghan National Army (ANA) could well lose control of the entire Pashtun belt in the country. This could have serious consequences for the very unity of Afghanistan.

It is significant that influential Afghan leaders like Mohammed Atta and Ismail Khan are preparing the ground to be able to defend areas they control, in the event of the ANA being unable to effectively deal with the Taliban challenge.

Preparing the ground

There should also be no doubt that the primary objective of the Taliban would be to seize control of Kandahar, because of its importance in Pashtun minds as the traditional and spiritual capital of the country.

There would also be efforts by the Taliban to cut off the line of communication from Khyber to Jalalabad. India would have to work closely with foreign partners, including the US, its NATO allies, Russia Iran and Saudi Arabia, to ensure that the international community remains on course to back the elected Government in Afghanistan, economically and militarily.

India has already provided Afghanistan with substantial economic assistance and is preparing the ground for large-scale investments in such areas as iron ore, coal, steel, copper and gold.

Indian military analysts, with expertise in Afghanistan’s armed forces, note that to ensure that the ANA can stand up to challenges from across the Durand Line, India should readily supply mountain artillery, armoured personnel carriers, apart from transportation and communications equipment.

It remains to seen whether an establishment wedded to its pacifist illusions, will pick up the courage to act decisively on major emerging security challenges in our neighbourhood.

Equally importantly, India and its partner States need to recognise that, given Pashtun sentiments and historic realities, it should be agreed upon that the Durand Line is a “dispute boundary” between Pakistan and Afghanistan, while expressing the hope that the dispute will be resolved peacefully, keeping in view Pashtun sentiments.

COMMENT NOW