A Pashtun-dominated, internationally-ostracised regime in Afghanistan, suits Pakistan, because it would be unable to resurrect Pashtun nationalism.
Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan's military strategists and ISI justified their efforts to install a radical Islamic Government in Kabul, saying it would provide “strategic depth” against India — Pakistan's armed forces would have additional territory available to them in the event of an Indian attack.
However, the reality turned out to be different once the ISI, with the acquiescence of the Clinton Administration, installed its protégé, “Ghilzai” Pashtun leader, Mullah Omar, in Kandahar, with a so-called Taliban “President”, Mullah Rabbani, in Kabul.
NON-PASHTUNS ALIENATED
Afghanistan soon became the hub of global terrorism, once Mullah Omar was installed in Kandahar. Osama bin Laden was welcomed as an honoured guest by the Taliban.
Given that the Taliban was made up exclusively of Pashtuns, who constitute just around 40 per cent of Afghanistan's population, the ISI had to provide massive military support for the Taliban to control the entire north of the country where non-Pashtuns reside.
When the Americans moved into Afghanistan in October 2001, it was the non-Pashtun Northern Alliance supported by India, Russia and Iran which routed the Taliban. The Taliban cadres across the Durand Line into Pakistan, and were welcomed there by the ISI. Even though the new Government in Kabul was headed by a blue-blooded Durrani Pashtun, Hamid Karzai, Pakistan calculated that its best bet was to act as the champion of Pashtun rights in Afghanistan.
A sustained effort has been made by Pakistan to persuade the Pashtuns in Afghanistan that Pakistan alone is their well-wisher. Dislike bordering on animosity towards Pakistan, is, however, a widespread feature of thinking of Afghans across the political spectrum, transcending ethnic considerations.
But a significant, though diminishing section of the Taliban realises that they are regarded as international outcasts, and have no choice but to seek power through the barrel of a gun, with Pakistani support.
Pakistan's professions of being the genuine supporters of Pashtun rights are, however, not altruistic. A Pashtun-dominated, but internationally-ostracised regime in Afghanistan, suits Pakistan, because such a regime would be so weak politically and economically that it would be in no position to resurrect sentiments of Pashtun nationalism. . Using religious extremism as a tool to subsume Pashtun nationalism is the centrepiece of Pakistan's strategies in Afghanistan.
FARHAT'S INSIGHT
In her book Taliban and Anti-Taliban, the Oslo-based Pakistani writer, Farhat Taj, details how the Pakistan army used the Taliban in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) as a tool to influence events in Afghanistan.
She also outlines the heroic resistance of tribal Pashtun leaders to defend their traditional, consensual tribal structures against Taliban depredations. This was a struggle in which hundreds of Pashtun tribals in FATA laid down their lives, resisting ISI machinations to promote the alien culture of the Taliban.
In her recent writings, Farhat Taj notes: “The Taliban in both Pakistan and Afghanistan are mere proxies of the Pakistan State, to wipe out forces of ethno-nationalism among the Pashtun cultural identity, on both sides of the Durand Line, in the pursuit of foreign and domestic goals set and controlled by the military establishment of Pakistan”.
Recalling how efforts were made by Mughal Emperors like Babar and Aurangzeb to crush Pashtun nationalism, she alludes to a statement of a Pashtun leader who suffered Aurangzeb's depredations: “Aurangzeb derives pleasure from the massacre of Pashtuns. Such is Aurangzeb's Islam”.
US NEGOTIATIONS
As the Americans commence their drawdown of forces in Afghanistan, they are tying themselves in knots on their negotiations with the Taliban. Pakistan is demanding a high price for restoring transit facilities for American supplies to Afghanistan.
These include an end to nuclear sanctions, a public apology for the action in which 26 Pakistani soldiers were killed, and an end to drone strikes. In the meantime, the Taliban are showing no inclination to meet American conditions for talks.
Both the Pakistan military and their Taliban allies now appear to believe that with the Americans set to end combat operations by mid-2013, they would be able to seize control of southern Afghanistan soon. Relief has come for the Americans from an unexpected source. The Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, agreed to make the Ulyanovsk airbase available for American logistical supplies.
Pakistan could well be miscalculating on its perceived opportunities in Afghanistan, as the drawdown in American forces commences. But the international community and President Karzai will have to devise political strategies to expose Pakistan's pro-Pashtun pretensions.
(The author is a former High Commissioner to Pakistan.)
Keywords: Soviet withdrawal, Afghanistan, Pakistan, military strategists, ISI, Islamic Government, Kabul, global terrorism, Taliban
Comments:
It is nice of Paks to share their top-secret game plan with you GP.
Immediately after inauguration Putin is coming to Pakistan; perhaps to tell them how badly they have miscalculated...or to join in their plan to extract maximum mutual leverage against US/NATO/Europe.
So while this three-way game of geo-strategic poker between Pakistan-Russia-USA ensues all you can do is hold on tight and watch from the sidelines, eh?
You, Karzai and the international community can cheer while the "boys" play in the big ring.
Ghilzais though of Turkic-Persian stock, are now taken to be part of the broader Pashtoon confederacy. The Lodi dynasty,Nur Md Taraki, Hafizullah Amin, Najibullah and even Gulbuddin Hekmatyar all from Ghilzai stock. Their rivalry with the less nomadic Abdali-Durrani group has been well-established in the article, and is a factor against a common Pashtoon block to counter other ethnic groups like Tajiks, Uzbegs, Hazaras etc.
The main blocks against a revived Pashtoonistan demand are two, and not just the ISI machinations alone as mentioned in the article. The non-Pashtoon groups won't want incorporation of trans-Durand areas and Pashtoons into Afghanistan since that would make the latter too strong. The second is that the Pashtoon elite of Pakistan (Pathans) are too well-linked up in Pakistan- be it armed forces, business including transport, drugs, Karachi port, Quetta - to give a lucrative position for a turbulent time in an impoverished Afghanistan.
"Pakistan could well be miscalculating on its perceived opportunities in Afghanistan, as the draw down in American forces commences." How so,could you please explain, Mr Parthasarathy ?
Whilst there is a quotient of Ghilzai-Durrani animus,it is currently not sufficiently a major factor. Similarly, whilst there is sentiment for the idea of a'Pashtoonistan',the Pathans on the Pakistan side of the Durand Line are disinclined to sever from Pakistan to join Pashtuns on the Afghanistan side of the Durand Line to constitute a country even lesser developed than Pakistan and landlocked to boot.It would be a very different matter if Baluchistan were also included to form the Pashtoonistan that Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan dreamed of:his aspiration of,quote:"an independent Pashtoonistan extending from Baluchistan to Chitral."The sooner the international community appreciates the political justification and strategic value of such an entity,the better.Here India must contribute its mite.But will it?
The article somehow hints at the possible division of Afghanistan,
wherein Taliban with support from US and Pakistan establishes its base
in southern areas while most other ethnic groups, forming part of
Northern Alliance, allowed to form their "democratic rule" in the
north.This is a win-win situation for both US and Pakistan as US gets
its bases in Afghanistan to look upon India, China, Iran and Russia,
and Pakistan gets its Taliban regime in the south, thus diffusing
problems of pashtun nationalism. India should take the lead with the
fellow regional powers to wage a strong protest against any division
of Afghanistan.
So what is the endgame here? Is there one even? And how can India play it or rather
shape it to its advantage? If Afg fails there is a high possibility that things could
return back to the late 90s which would be disastrous for India.
It is a bit simplistic to think that Pakistan only wants a Pashtun Islamist dominated
Afghanistan.... They want a permanently weak Afghanistan that is in chaos...that is
what will make it amenable to their will...so they think. Pashtun nationalism being
a threat to Pakistan is largely a myth - since the Pakistani Pashtuns are largely very
integrated into Pakistan. This whole story of a massive conspiracy against
Pashtuns is a bit Pashtun centric...a view that is born out of a false impression that
Pashtuns are central to everything that goes on in Afghanistan. It is largely a false
and self serving story by ethno-nationalists whom do not have the courage to face
the simple fact that the story they are telling is one created for them largely by
British Colonial officers.
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