India’s nuclear diplomacy must change

Last month’s final Nuclear Security Summit in Washington appeared to be another successful attempt by India to present itself as a responsible global player. But President Obama’s unscripted comments at the concluding press conference altered the situation.

South Block reacted with some anger to Obama’s mentioning as a challenge developments in India and Pakistan’s military doctrines; he went on to state his hope not to see them ‘continually moving in the wrong direction’.

India was back to being tied to its difficult neighbour: South Block’s efforts to present India on its own merits appeared to have foundered yet again on other countries’ proclivities to tie it to Pakistan in their nuclear dealings with South Asia.

This is a familiar theme, and one that will recur as India moves towards a place at the top table of global nuclear governance in the coming months. At stake is inclusion in the regimes that control trade in nuclear and dual use materials and weapons delivery systems.

India’s membership of these regimes has been a work-in-progress since Obama stated American support for India’s joining these collectives during his visit to India in 2010.

The Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (NSG), a 49-member grouping, was set up in 1975 to control the export and re-transfer of materials that can be used to make nuclear weapons.

The 34 countries in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) work to prevent the proliferation of missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles capable of carrying a payload of 500 kg beyond 300 km.

The Wassenaar Arrangement brings together 41 states that have agreed to monitor and restrict the transfer of dual-use technology and conventional arms. The 42 members of the Australia Group collaborate to inhibit the spread of chemical and biological weapons. All four functions by consensus and membership require the agreement of all members. New Delhi is currently focussing its energy on joining the NSG and MTCR.

An interim progress report makes for sober reading. Indian membership of the MTCR was considered during the group’s October 2015 plenary in Rotterdam, but without success.

According to leaked reports (the proceedings of these meetings are confidential), consensus was impeded by Italy, who asked for more time. In effect, membership was denied not over concerns relating to technical requirements but because of a current bilateral dispute between the two countries involving two Italian marines. Politics had intruded into what should have been a technical discussion.

Clearly, whatever support India had mustered was not enough to overcome this stalling tactic. The obstruction also underscored the weakness of working by consensus; it plays into the misgivings of some members about inviting India into a group that might then be held hostage in any future dealings with Pakistan by the state of relations between the two neighbours.

India’s membership of the NSG will probably be discussed in the group’s plenary session in June 2016. On the credit side of the ledger, New Delhi has apparently pulled out all stops in assiduously courting all it members.

India hosted Chairperson Rafael Grossi, in early November. Additionally, President Mukherjee, Prime Minister Modi, and Foreign Secretary Jaishankar have all raised this issue during their visits to Sweden, Ireland and Switzerland, some of the known non-proliferation ‘hardliners’. Norway (which incidentally held the chair in the recently-concluded MTCR meeting) has also signalled a softening of its earlier stance.

On the debit side, however, Pakistan has made known its unhappiness over India being accorded any exceptional treatment and China (an NSG member) has promised its all-weather friend that it will seek the same privileges for Islamabad.

There is also the deep-seated non-proliferation hostility towards India — the sense amongst some that membership would amount to rewarding India for its bad behaviour in testing nuclear devices in 1998.

This is an emotional argument and New Delhi’s rebuttals based on India’s track record, the fact it was not legally bound to remain a non-nuclear weapons state, and its responsible nuclear stewardship have received a selective hearing at best. In the absence of stronger reasons to exclude India, the state of relations with Pakistan tends to become a convenient proxy. To counter this, India needs truly creative diplomacy, which goes beyond focusing on Pakistan’s bad behaviour.

New Delhi could let it be known that India as a member of the NSG and other satellite regimes will not block Pakistani membership of these regimes if the other members of the regimes so desire and if Pakistan is able to meet the conditions and obligations that go with such membership.

There are three reasons for India to appear reasonable on Pakistan.

First, it would expose those countries (and China comes to mind) who demur over Indian membership of these groups because it operates by consensus. It will also break the hyphenation with Pakistan and push outsiders to engage with India on its own terms and not in connection with Pakistan. And finally, should Pakistan make it into these regimes, it is in India’s interest to have its neighbour signed up to as stringent a set of nuclear security provisions as possible.

In short, it is time for India to break free of its image as a difficult negotiator. Historically, India’s nuclear negotiations have not always been easy, and have not always won it friends — the rejection of the NPT and the CTBT come to mind.

Some might say India’s nuclear diplomacy has been characterised by being vigorously disagreeable. But the India of 2016 is politically, economically and strategically strong enough to make concessions if necessary. Now is the time for New Delhi to be vigorously agreeable. Let’s talk.

The writer is a researcher on security and the author of 'India's Nuclear Debate: Exceptionalism and the Bomb (War and International Politics in South Asia) '

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