Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to France has resulted in an inter-governmental agreement to buy 36 Rafale fighters off the shelf. This brings down the curtains on a painfully long-drawn defence acquisition deal. Clearly, the Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) case demonstrates the ills of India’s defence acquisition process. In this context, Defence Minister Manohar Parikkar stated that “we kept going in circles”, with no end in sight.

The requirement to replace ageing Indian Air Force (IAF) fighter aircraft began to be projected in the early 1990s. While the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) was meant to replace the Ajeets and MiG-21s, the MMRCA was to plug the void created by other ageing fighter aircraft namely Mig-23s and MiG-27s. True to our style, two decades later neither the LCA nor the MMRCA has materialised. As a result, the IAF has undergone an alarming reduction in fighter aircraft force levels.

Caught in a web The revised MMRCA acquisition process began in 2004, with the stated intention to induct the first squadron by 2008-09. Touted as the biggest fighter acquisition tender, the procurement got stuck in the self-created intricate cobwebs of the acquisition process. What now stands out glaringly is the ineffectiveness of our process. It appears New Delhi was keener to demonstrate to the international community the fairness and professionalism of its acquisition system than to respond to the interests of national security.

Evidently a major procurement like the MMRCA has strategic implications that deal with technology acquisition (not just licence production), joint ventures, and exports as part of a global supply chain and collaboration in R&D, which together nurture the fledgling defence industrial ecosystem. The user requirement of operational performance and life-cycle costs is just the first step.

Unfortunately, as it often happens, the user requirements take centrestage and national strategic requirements take backstage. As a result, the MMRCA tender process has got stuck in a conflict between the narrow tactical focus of user requirement and the larger national economic interests.

All-round impact So what exactly is the impact of the Prime Minister’s announcement to procure 36 Rafale aircraft through an inter-governmental agreement?

The most important result is the liberating impact on the two governments. It frees the Indian government from a prison of its own making — the long delayed acquisition process that outlived its cost control, operational, and strategic utility. The decision has enabled the government to support the IAF in strengthening itself quickly.

This agreement will enable the IAF to have two fully operational Rafale squadrons in less than three years. Besides, the possibility of increasing this strength by another squadron is a distinct possibility at a later date, much like the Mirage 2000 procurement in the past. Moreover, it soothes the French government’s sensitivities by putting our strategic partnership on an even keel, as there are bigger economic cooperation programmes to deal with. Having addressed the immediate issues through an inter-governmental procurement, the government now has time on its side to address larger strategic issues in a more carefully thought out manner.

What happens to the on-going MMRCA negotiations? The joint statement has made it clear that it will continue as a separate issue and that the 36 aircraft deal is not linked to it. To understand this one needs to read between the lines. By delaying it endlessly, the 126 aircraft deal has become a question mark on its financial viability. Besides, there have been serious questions on Dassault’s willingness to comply with technology requirements and cost control. In the current context of ‘Make in India’, it may need to be dealt with outside the limits imposed by the Request for Proposal (RfP). In effect, this will mean scrapping the MMRCA RfP process so that the government is free to make a decision in light of larger national interests. Effectively, this inter-governmental agreement has sealed the fate of the RfP process.

Manufacturing possibility Is there a case for MMRCA manufacture? Certainly! And this needs to be addressed in a manner that will meet the larger strategic interests of the country. By selecting an aircraft through an inter-governmental decision, the country could achieve its larger objective of ‘Make in India’ by ensuring the requisite technology acquisition, develop the aerospace industrial ecosystem to become part of the global supply chain, create collaborative joint ventures for future developmental projects, and build a strong defence export industry. This could be Rafale or any other aircraft as long as the government is able to address the core issues of technology transfer, joint production, and design collaboration in future projects.

That raises an important question with respect to our acquisition system. Is it wise to go for a competitive RfP process for high value defence procurements?

The MMRCA experience clearly indicates a big ‘No’. It is better that such procurements are done through an inter-governmental process where strategic interests are unambiguously stated, negotiated without compromise, and rapidly set in motion without the threat of the Damocles swords of CVC and CAG that hang above the heads of decision-makers.

More importantly in such a decision-making process, professionals and technocrats rather than a generalist bureaucracy should aid the political leadership to integrate military and economic interests better.

The writer, a retired air marshal, was deputy chief of Integrated Defence Staff, and a test pilot. He is an advisor to HAL and the aerospace taskforce of Ficci

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