1700 hours, 1 January 2016, 7 Race Course Road

In New Delhi meanwhile, even as Deo (Air Marshal Shirish B Deo, Western Air Command Chief) was on his way to Pathankot, NSA Doval drove to the Prime Minister’s residence to brief him on the emerging threat. ‘I told the PM what had transpired so far and the measures that had been taken. I also remember telling him that our assessment may be completely off the mark, but we were not going to take any chances,’ Doval tells me while remembering the incidents of that crucial day.

I asked the NSA what the Prime Minister’s reaction was. Was he disappointed that soon after his attempt to reach out to Pakistan (the PM had made an unscheduled stopover at Lahore just a week prior, to meet his counterpart Nawaz Sharif), the Pakistanis had chosen to launch another terrorist attack? ‘Well, he was quite cool and composed. He knew a serious problem was at hand and his resolve to meet the threat squarely was quite visible. He gave specific directions and wanted us to ensure that our vital air assets and personnel were protected. The Prime Minister also wanted us to redouble our efforts to locate and neutralise the terrorists. Though he wanted us to clear the area of the terrorists at the earliest, the Prime Minister did not betray any anxiety. I thought it was his implicit faith and confidence in the ability of our forces. I do not remember him mentioning anything about his Lahore visit. He was focussed on nothing but the problem at hand,’ the NSA told me.

But why wasn’t the Cabinet Committee on Security — the highest decision-making body on security matters in the country— convened, I asked the NSA. The NSA’s answer reveals his practical side. ‘Assuming that CCS was called, what would have been the question in front of the CCS to decide? Whether to take immediate counter measures and neutralise the attack? Could it have said anything else except to issue instructions to counter the threat and neutralise it?

The process would have only delayed the whole process by several hours and if terrorists had fired one bullet, it would have been impossible to land an aircraft (at Pathankot). The NSG, Garuds, and army commandos would have potentially reached there hours after the terrorists had taken position. So the whole criticism is misdirected. There was no option but to take the decision right then and there. In an emergency, on-the-spot decisions need to be taken. The country has trained and positioned us to take the responsibility. If we do not take that responsibility when the country’s vital security interests are endangered, what is the justification for us to be there,’ he wondered.

Doval, who led the negotiating team in the infamous Kandahar hijack episode in December 1999, had clearly learnt his lessons. That time the Crisis Management Committee and the CCS took an inordinately long time to arrive at a decision. By the time it was convened, the plane had already taken off from Amritsar when it could easily have been neutralised in Amritsar.

Delay and dithering in decision-making at the highest level in Delhi and the bumbling security establishment on the ground had forced India to release Masood Azhar and others in exchange for passengers on the Indian Airlines plane. Doval still simmers with anger on the shameful handling of the hijack crisis because affected families, instead of showing patience and faith in their security agencies, virtually forced the Government to wilt under the pressure of the public mood. Many people in official positions insisted on following protocol when the need was to take urgent action. Doval was mortified to witness the release of Masood, the dreaded terrorist. The same Masood would then go on to form the Jaish-e-Mohammad, whose operatives were now about to launch an attack on a military installation in Pathankot.

Clearly, Doval was not about to repeat the mistakes of 1999, convention be damned.

2100 hours, 1 January 2016, Pathankot

Back at the base, Air Marshal Deo, having finished the tour and inspected the measures taken by the AOC, came to the officers’ mess to stay put. He had ordered that Mi-35 helicopters and Remotely Piloted Vehicles (RPA) be launched in the evening to enhance surveillance and detection in the dark. A C-130 flight was due to arrive later that night to further increase surveillance across the vast air base. The RPAs and C-130 were both equipped with night vision capability.

At Pathankot

Deo also knew that an NSG team was on its way to Pathankot on the dedicated IL-76 plane that is always on standby at Palam for them...The NSG’s counter-terrorism task force I (CTTF-I) or 51 Special Action Group (SAG) contingent consisted of 140 specially selected and trained soldiers on deputation from the Army. The NSG squad was capable of tackling both terror and hijack situations. The operational commander of the 51 SAG was Brig Gautam Ganguly.

The decision to send the NSG to Pathankot was to save the day. By the time the NSG team alighted with all their special equipment, it was past 2200 hours on January 1, 2016. They were supposed to have driven out of the Pathankot base and stayed at an accommodation arranged for them at the nearby Mamun Army cantonment.

‘Somehow, to me it didn’t seem right to leave Pathankot since I knew the base had valuable air assets and did not have enough protection,’ Brig Ganguly recalls thinking that night. On that pure hunch — call it gut feeling, describe it as instinct honed by years of experience — the NSG squad stayed back on the base and was assigned to secure the technical area where the aircrafts are parked. That one hunch was to prove decisive in the next few hours.

Excerpted with permission from Bloomsbury Publishing India

Nitin A Gokhale is a strategic analyst and founder of defence website BharatShakti.in. He is a visiting faculty at Indian defence training institutions such as the National Defence College and the Defence Services Staff College. His books include Beyond NJ 9842: The Siachen Saga, 1965 Turning the Tide: How India won the War and Sri Lanka: From War to Peace.

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