Water games are a murky business

For the first time in its 56-year history, the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) between India and Pakistan, often upheld around the world as a sterling example of cooperation in trans-boundary rivers, finds itself under unprecedented threat.

Bristling after the terror attack in Uri on September 18, India has initiated steps to use the IWT as a weapon to “punish” a recalcitrant Pakistan. “Blood and water cannot flow simultaneously,” Prime Minister Narendra Modi has proclaimed. Pakistan, in turn, declared that the treaty’s revocation would be an “act of war”. Amid this war of words between New Delhi and Islamabad, India announced it was pulling out of the Saarc summit in Islamabad in November, with Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Bhutan following suit.

Using the Saarc lever to hit back at Pakistan is a step in the right direction. But India should not use the 1960 Indus waters sharing pact involving six trans-boundary rivers — Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Sutlej, Beas and Ravi — as a “strategic” weapon against Pakistan. It must press ahead with other options, including diplomatic ones, to convey to Islamabad that it cannot be business as usual until it puts a stop to terror attacks emanating from its soil.

Under the IWT, India as the upper riparian state was allowed “unrestricted use” of the eastern rivers (Sutlej, Ravi, Beas). Pakistan, the lower riparian state, was allowed “unrestricted use” of the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab).

While water can be a potent weapon, and it is often said that future wars will be fought over this scarce resource, it needs to be borne in mind that the IWT has survived not only the subcontinent’s fractious politics and three wars but also provocations graver than Uri, such as the attack on India’s Parliament in 2001 and the Mumbai terror strikes in 2008.

During the 1965 Indo-Pak war, India did not disrupt water supply to Pakistan even as Indian forces were taking on Pakistani Patton tanks during the famous battle of Assal Uttar in Punjab where canals carrying the water crisscrossed the State.

Hawkish elements have once again begun to demand abrogation of the IWT, which is considered to be “over-generous” to Pakistan, or its revision at the very least. But this does not seem to be on the cards as of now.

Under the IWT, India gets to use merely 20 per cent of the water from the Indus basin despite contributing 90 per cent of the water to the system; Pakistan, on the other hand, makes use of 80 per cent of the water while contributing a mere 10 per cent.

The decision by India to suspend meetings of the Permanent Indus Commission — it meets twice a year and oversees the implementation of the treaty besides serving as a dispute redress mechanism — until the atmosphere is terror-free, is fraught with consequences not just for Pakistan but India, too.

In the immediate future, this step will have a debilitating impact on the treaty since it means the Indus water commissioners — one each from India and Pakistan — will no longer meet to exchange vital information, data or resolve disputes. Further, India risks internationalising the issue, with Pakistan certain to knock on the doors of the International Court of Arbitration at The Hague accusing India of violating the treaty.

Previous governments too explored the options available to use the World Bank-brokered Treaty to hit back at Pakistan when bilateral ties soured. These have included the possibility of abrogating the IWT or diverting the waters of the Indus basin rivers, on which Pakistan as a lower riparian state is heavily dependent to meet its needs for drinking water, irrigation and power.

Yet, the IWT was considered sacrosanct and managed to ride out the bitterness. Indeed, in the past India has not even sought its revision nor used it as a tool to arm-twist Pakistan. Unlike Pakistan, India has never dragged disputes for international arbitration.

Under the rubric the Government is now exploring to “squeeze” Pakistan’s water supply is to maximise the use and storage of waters of the western rivers for irrigation in Jammu and Kashmir. Until now, India which was permitted to construct storage of up to 3.6 MAF on the western rivers, had not made use of this proviso.

The revival of the Tulbul navigation project on the Jhelum, suspended unilaterally by India in 1987 after Pakistan objected that it would impede the flow of water from the Jhelum into its territory, is also under consideration.

Turning off the tap for Pakistan will not only mean making the ordinary Pakistani pay for the sins of its government but also diminish India’s standing as a responsible nation fit to sit at the global high table. It will, of course, also give a handle to extremist elements in Pakistan to fan anti-India sentiments, and carry out more terror attacks on Indian territory.

Furthermore, much as the diversion of river waters may seem like an appropriate tit-for-tat, these steps are easier said than taken. For, to effectively block or divert waters upstream in the western rivers would require a network of dams, barrages and canals which could take years to construct.

Blocking or diverting water meant for Pakistan will also mean flooding in J&K and Punjab in the absence of adequate infrastructure there to direct the excess water flow elsewhere. Moreover, in the event of a conflict, Pakistani jets could well bomb the Bhakra Nangal dam in retaliation.

It will not help India’s case in the neighbourhood as countries such as China and Nepal could well see it as a precedent and indulge in some muscle-flexing of their own by virtue of being the upper riparian states for rivers flowing into India. The Brahmaputra flows into India from China, while the Kosi and Ghagra flow in from Nepal.

Seeking the international isolation of Pakistan is the most effective card for India. Apart from Saarc, New Delhi has also been leveraging two other regional groupings, Bimstec (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation) and BBIN (Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal), to isolate its western neighbour. As India battles a country that is “host to the Ivy League of terrorism”, it would do well to stick to the stratagem of seeking Pakistan’s diplomatic isolation. Remember that unlike its neighbour, it has a reputation to uphold in the international arena. And violating the IWT, which oversees an emotive issue like water, could leave it severely bruised.

The writer is a senior journalist

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