Israel’s 50-day attack on Gaza that killed at least 2,100 Palestinians (mostly civilians) and 70 Israelis (including 4 civilians) was an unequal conflict between the most powerful conventional army in West Asia and a 10,000-strong non-state guerrilla force. And when a long-term ceasefire was finally announced on August 26, the question left hanging in the air was: Which side won?

If victory is judged in terms of killing civilians and destroying public infrastructure, Israel surely was the victor. But judged in terms of political and strategic advantages or meeting stated objectives, the Jewish state lost miserably.

Let’s look at the stated goals of Israel’s attack. Soon after the Gaza bombing started on July 8, Israeli leaders said the primary aim was to stop Hamas from firing rockets across the border.

During the attack, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu kept saying there wouldn’t be a long-term ceasefire until Hamas stopped its rocket-fire. When Israel launched its ground offensive on July 18, government leaders said troops were sent to Gaza to destroy Hamas’ cross border tunnels.

On the last day of the conflict, Hamas fired at least 50 rockets into Israel, telling the world that the latter’s offensive had little impact on Hamas’ rocket infrastructure. This was not unexpected. Using tunnels and mobile launchers to fire rockets gives Hamas the flexibility to evade Israel’s air strikes, and move around Gaza with its weapons.

Destroying the tunnels

In early August, Israel claimed it had destroyed Hamas’ “infiltration” tunnels, and, thereby, achieved the main goal of the operation. This claim is yet to be verified independently. Hamas says not all its tunnels were destroyed. Even if one accepts the Israeli claim, the unanswered question is: Could the Israeli attack prevent Hamas from building more tunnels in the future?

In reality, tunnelling is one of few functioning industries in Gaza. Even if the Israeli troops claim to have destroyed the tunnels on the Gaza-Israel border, there are at least 500 operational tunnels across the Gaza-Sinai (Egypt) border that still give Hamas operational leeway.

To be sure, Hamas has lost hundreds of its fighters and weapons. Israeli analysts point out that Hamas has been set back militarily as it lost around one-third of its rockets. But the most important achievement of Hamas is that it withstood 50 days of attack by one of the most powerful military machines in the world. It emerged politically stronger out of the conflict, as the “victory” demonstrations in Gaza show. This is a strategic setback for Israel because the political weakening of Hamas has long been high on the Israeli-American agenda.

On the other side, the Israeli public was becoming increasingly critical of the way the war was fought. The inability of the IDF to stop the Hamas rockets, disruption of life along the southern border, relatively high casualties (70 Israelis killed compared with 13 deaths during Operation Cast Lead, 2008-09), economic damages and growing international condemnation all put the Israeli government under pressure. A Channel 2 poll released a day ahead of the ceasefire showed that 50 per cent of Israelis were dissatisfied with Netanyahu, while just 38 per cent were satisfied. As Israeli daily Haaretz’s Barak Ravid pointed out, “Netanyahu saw his chance to run away from Gaza, and he took it.”

Weakening deterrence

Barring the deaths and physical destruction of Gaza, the political and strategic balance-sheet of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict stays more or less intact. There’s no change in the power equations in Gaza, no immediate threat to the Hamas-Fatah reconciliation agreement, and chances of a Palestinian uprising cannot be ruled out. Like on previous occasions, it’s only a matter of time before Hamas regroups after the military setback, with weapons and men.

The former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger once said: “A conventional army loses if it does not win. The guerrilla wins if he does not lose.” Going by this logic, it’s not difficult to surmise that Israel lost the war because it failed to win it. It failed to win because it couldn't meet any of its stated goals even after pounding Gaza with lethal airpower and a prolonged ground attack.

This is not the first time Israel is suffering such a setback. It had to end its 18-year occupation of Southern Lebanon in 2000 in the face of Hezbollah’s persistent guerrilla resistance. Again in 2006, it failed to defeat the Hezbollah in a 30-day war. One of the reasons for Israel’s pullout from Gaza in 2005 was Hamas’ military resistance against the occupation of the Strip.

In other words, Israel’s hard power, which has successfully deterred conventional Arab armies for decades, is weak when it comes to fighting a guerrilla force. The sooner it realises this reality, the better it will be for itself and the rest of the region.

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