A clash of three narratives

Few outside Kashmir Valley know there are three narratives playing simultaneously in its political arena — national, an intrinsic Kashmiri discourse, and a Pakistan-backed separatist discourse. Any reading of the current turmoil in the State necessitates understanding of how these narratives play out against each other on a day-to-day basis.

Pakistani narrative

It is represented by a wide spectrum of separatist political and militant groups. The two major separatist conglomerates — Hurriyat G and Hurriyat M, led by Syed Ali Shah Geelani and Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, respectively — support Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan. The Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), which advocates an independent Kashmir, is led by Yasin Malik.

The United Jihad Council, headed by Syed Salahuddin, is an amalgam of militant groups. Salahuddin is also the supreme commander of the Council’s major constituent, the Hizbul Mujahideen, which is considered the largest indigenous Kashmiri militant group.

Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba are active in Kashmir through high-profile militant attacks.

With the lone exception of JKLF, all these separatist political and militant groups fight for Kashmir’s merger with Pakistan.

The political separatists boycott the electoral process, which they see as “endorsing New Delhi’s control over the State”. Their direction to people not to vote is generally observed in the breach. Over the years, the number of voters has only increased. In the 2014 Assembly polls, around 70 per cent of the people cast their ballot in the Valley.

The separatists, however, appear to be out of touch with this changing reality. Equally, they never engage with the day-to-day problems of the people. You never hear them comment, for instance, on the state of governance. Nor do they issue statements on the condition of roads or the disruptions in power supply. This is their way of showing their complete rejection of the existing political system in the State.

The separatists are also against any dialogue with the Centre unless Pakistan is also involved. This, they argue, is integral to any resolution — both internal and external — of the Kashmir imbroglio.

Though moderate separatists led by Farooq have engaged with New Delhi in the past, they have faced accusations of a sell-out from the hardliners. Now, both doves and hawks have united and returned to the original position of not talking to the Centre without the involvement of Pakistan. Hence the recent refusal to meet the visiting all-party delegation to the State. This narrative is thus in concurrence with the Pakistani narrative on Kashmir. A dominant shade of Kashmiri separatism both represents and supports Pakistan’s position on the Valley.

National narrative

Mainstream discourse on J&K hinges on the political parties at the state and national levels participating in the electoral process.

The Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and National Conference (NC) are the two major Kashmiri mainstream parties. They want Kashmir to remain with India but also seek an acceptable political resolution, preferably involving Pakistan. The regional parties represent but one end of the discourse, which has its shades.

The Congress, the Left and the Socialist parties understandably brook no challenge to India’s position on Kashmir but are open to a solution within the framework of the Constitution. However, they hardly articulate this position in as clear-cut terms as the BJP does, thereby giving themselves manoeuvring space to reach out across the red lines.

On the other hand, the BJP, which shares power in the State with the PDP, makes no bones about its nationalistic position. It wants the political discourse shifted from the resolution of festering issues to the complete integration of the State into the Indian Union. The party’s efforts towards this end over the past two years are seen as a major factor in the ongoing unrest.

Unlike the separatist outfits, the mainstream parties fight elections and get to rule the State. Over the past 14 years, a regional Kashmir-based party has shared power with a national party that has won the majority of seats in the State’s Jammu province.

Currently, the PDP — which won 28 seats, mostly from the Valley — is in coalition with the BJP, which won 25 of the 37 seats in Jammu. Earlier, the Valley-based NC had shared power with the Congress, which too had won a majority of seats from Jammu.

Invariably, however, the Kashmiri parties that aggressively champion a resolution of the Kashmir issue when in the Opposition, become pro-New Delhi when in power — a factor that has significantly dented their credibility in the State.

“We elect them, but they represent New Delhi in power,” goes the refrain in the Valley.

The transformation has been drastic in the case of the PDP. As the Opposition, Mehbooba Mufti had practised a brand of politics that came to be known as soft-separatism; now as chief minister, she has all but abandoned her long-standing resolution-centric agenda and is locally perceived to have become a willing partner to the BJP’s agenda in Kashmir.

Caught between the contradictory expectations in New Delhi and the Valley, the mainstream Kashmiri parties are rendered inherently incapable of responding adequately to an entire gamut of aspirations and grievances in the Valley.

Kashmiri narrative

Though it is obscured by the New Delhi and Pakistani narratives, it is still possible to disentangle the Kashmiri narrative from them and recognise it for its own worth. This narrative goes back to 1947, when the Maharaja of Kashmir Hari Singh acceded to India. It looks at the Kashmir problem as one that is related to the aspirations of the people.

Here is how it goes: “That Kashmir acceded to India against the logic of partition. That Sheikh Abdullah, who ratified the Maharaja’s accession, was overwhelmingly supported by the population in the Valley. The accession only covered three subjects — defence, communications and foreign relations. In all other aspects, J&K enjoyed autonomy guaranteed under Article 370. In 1948, Sheikh Abdullah became the prime minister of Kashmir. However, in 1953, he was summarily dismissed for allegedly conspiring with the US to make Kashmir an independent country. And ever since, the state’s autonomous position has been unilaterally whittled down by the successive central governments, and so on...”

This narrative underpins both the separatist and the mainstream politics. It is a common legacy of grievance, and an identification with this is a rite of passage for every Kashmir-centric political and ideological interest, which ranges between absolute separatism dominated by Pakistan and a mainstream politics that is perceived to be more accountable to New Delhi than to local sentiment.

This political space remains an orphan. It has only sporadically generated an autonomous local politics that is guided by the interests of Kashmiris, seeking a reconciliation unencumbered by the objectives of Pakistan. One such effort was helmed by the NC founder, Sheikh Abdullah. In his long phase of resistance against New Delhi, he was largely un-influenced by Pakistan, even while he sought a referendum in Kashmir. Eventually he settled for a place for Kashmir within the Indian Union, without Pakistan on board.

In his days as a separatist, People’s Conference leader Sajad Lone tried briefly to practise this kind of politics. His slogan, which for a while held some political resonance, was “Kashmir first”. His settlement formula for Kashmir Achievable Nationhood sprung from this narrative. It privileged Kashmiri interests and aspirations over those of Pakistan.

Until it built a coalition government with its ideologically antithetical BJP, the PDP plied a politics of middle ground, something that overlapped with the intrinsic Kashmiri discourse, devolving often into soft-separatism. The party aggressively batted for a Kashmir solution that encompassed both its internal and external dimensions. But in power, Mufti has struggled to straddle the contradictions and has instead sought refuge in the national narrative on Kashmir, at times getting too close for comfort to the BJP. This, in turn, has decimated her political stock in the Valley.

The play of discourses

The three narratives interact, overlap and clash in Kashmir on a daily basis. And it is the equation among them or the ratio of one relative to another in public discourse over a given period that determines the behaviour of the Kashmiri street.

The current upsurge in the Valley, though mainly triggered by the killing of the charismatic militant commander Burhan Wani, can be traced to the altered alchemy of the three narratives over the past several months: this time, it was an intrinsic Kashmiri narrative overpowering the generally vulnerable national narrative and finding support in the Pakistani discourse.

The process, though complex, can be traced to the failure of the PDP-BJP alliance to realise its promise and instead living up to its apprehensions. More so, with the BJP skimping on the development funds for the state — even inordinately delaying the meagre compensation for the flood-hit — and working overtime to enforce its ideological agenda on the State. This included setting up the Sainik colony, exclusive settlements for the rehabilitation of Kashmiri Pandits, moves to further erode Article 370, and reinforcing the beef ban, among others.

“This created a deep paranoia in Kashmir about the perceived attempts at a demographic change in the state,” says Naseer Ahmad, a local columnist.

“Burhan as a militant had created an illusion of standing up to this perceived onslaught. So when he died, it touched off mass mourning and the protest.”

Riyaz Waniis a journalist based in Srinagar

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