‘Over a decade after 26/11 attack, coastline still vulnerable’

Despite coming a long way, in terms of securing its coasts, in the last 11-odd years since the 26/11 terror attack, India continues to be vulnerable to similar attacks, says Group Captain (retd) AV Chandrasekaran, a counter-intelligence specialist with the Air Force.

“A lot of vulnerabilities still exist,” he said, while speaking on ‘Securing India’s Maritime Neighbourhood — Challenges and Opportunities’, organised by the Chennai Centre for China Studies, a think tank.

Chandrasekaran said following the recommendations of the Pradhan Committee set up by Maharashtra after the 26/11 attack, the country today has 46 coastal radars and 42 more are to come soon. An ‘automatic identification system’ to identify ships and large boats is in place. The Command Coordination Control Centre in New Delhi supervises all operations from one point. Steps have been taken in information management and analysis, and a data bank is run jointly by the Indian Navy and the Coast Guard. A Sagar Prahari Bal (Ocean Strike Force) has been set up under the Indian Navy, which has 40 boats and 2,000 personnel, capable of quick response to a situation. Moreover, there are radiation portal monitors in place which can detect weapons of mass destruction. And, the population-to-marine police ratio has considerably increased.

“Yet, are we in a position to tell our citizens that nothing (like 26/11) will happen again? No,” said Chandrasekaran, who is the author of a book titled Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency: A Dangerous War of Nerves .

Small, but big threat

The biggest threat, he said, is from small boats. There are around 20 lakh small fishing boats in the Indian waters and the automatic identification systems are designed to identify only the boats that are longer than 20 metres. He pointed to the case of the 2001 destruction of American battleship USS Cole, by an explosive-laden boat, in Yemen.

An attack can also come from shoulder-fired missiles by somebody in a small boat, or underwater unmanned vehicles. Furthermore, people and conventional weapons can be smuggled into the country through containers. While radiation monitors can prevent smuggling of nuclear material, they can’t detect conventional weapons.

Chandrasekaran also flagged the differences between the Coast Guard and the Central Industrial Security Force over the responsibility of protecting coastal assets, such as crude oil unloading points (single buoy moorings). While the CISF cannot protect these assets, the Coast Guard does not want to take the responsibility, he said.

As a solution, Chandrasekaran suggested strengthening intelligence gathering and better vigil. All boats and personnel need to be identified and security at ports should be strengthened, he said.

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