Russia’s revenge

The confidence with which Russian President Vladimir Putin took full control of a part of another nation, amid strong opposition from the West, must have taken many by surprise. All that Putin had to do was wisely resort to non-military tactics to take control of the Crimean peninsula that hosts Russia’s Black Sea fleet.

Ukraine has long been a major geopolitical theatre between great powers. It’s hardly a secret that the West has been trying over the years to lure Ukraine into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). When Viktor Yanukovych was removed from power by Ukraine’s Parliament and various rightwing political factions were cobbled together to install a pro-Western government in Kiev, there were apprehensions that it would not go down well with Moscow.

It did not. In no time, what began as a domestic political crisis in Ukraine snowballed into a major geopolitical conflict, which can have far-reaching implications in the Russia’s ties with the West.

To be sure, what Russia did in Crimea has violated the sovereignty of Ukraine. But powerful nations violating the sovereignty of smaller countries is not something new in international politics. What’s new is the growing confidence and determination of Russia to deter the eastward expansion of the Atlantic powers to its border nations.

When Soviet Union collapsed, Russia agreed to dissolve the Warsaw Pact and let its allies go of the bind on assurance from US President George HW Bush that the NATO would not outreach to its borders. But President Bill Clinton broke this promise and pushed to expand the NATO alliance to the very borders of Russia. Though a weak Russia under Boris Yetsin was not in a position to oppose the NATO’s expansionary moves, including the ‘humanitarian’ bombing on Yugoslavia in 1998, this had left deep wounds in the Russo-American cooperation touted by Gorbachev and Bush in early 1990s.

Great powers do not retreat forever. The same goes true with Russia as well. When Russia emerged out of its own strategic retreat under Putin in early 2000s, riding on a gas-pedalled economic boom and fissures in the US-centric world order, it made one thing clear: The West should stand clear of the areas of its traditional influence. Even as the economic cooperation between Russia and the West grew in strength, strategic uncertainties remained. President George W Bush’s attempt to place elements of the anti-ballistic missile system in Poland and the Czech Republic strengthened Russia’s apprehensions. When NATO tried to expand to Georgia, Putin decided it was time to act. He sent troops to Georgia in August 2008.

Ukraine is more important a country for Russia than Georgia. It has a substantial Russian speaking population. Moreover, if the new pro-Western government in Kiev decides to join NATO, Russia would risk losing its access to the Black Sea ports. Americans would like to see that happening, and Putin would do everything practically possible to prevent that happening. So, he asked his troops based in the Black Sea Fleet to move to seize Crimea.

Perhaps because Putin’s move was unexpected, most Western leaders responded almost hysterically to Russia’s seizure of Crimea. John Kerry, the State Secretary of the US, told Russia: “You just don’t in the 21st century behave in 19th century fashion by invading another country on completely trumped up pre-text.” All seven partners of Moscow in the powerful G8 grouping suspended preparatory talks for the next summit of the group, to be held in Sochi in June. The US threatened to oust Russia from G8 and warned of “economic and political isolation”. European capitals have also threatened to impose economic sanctions.

Will these pressure tactics work? It’s unlikely. Putin knows that Europe cannot walk beyond a point in imposing trade curbs on Russia as 30 per cent of its gas needs are met by Russian supplies. It would not risk its economies being hit in the name of a Ukrainian Peninsula at a time when the Euro Zone is still not recovered from the economic crisis. The US’ options are also limited. Without European cooperation, tough sanctions cannot be imposed on Russia. A military move is not even in the picture.

What remains are some token steps, such as the ones taken by George Bush in 2008 when Moscow attacked Georgia. Bush had ordered American ships to the region and sent humanitarian aid on a military aircraft to Tbilisi, the Georgian capital. He had also suspended a pending civilian nuclear agreement, and NATO suspended military contacts. Not only that these tactics didn’t work in stopping Russia, a year later, the Obama White House was busy undoing the damage the steps caused to better bilateral ties with Moscow.

It’s a dangerous geopolitical game. The balance of power in Ukraine had tilted in favour of the West when Yanukovych fell from power last month. By taking control of Crimea, Russia has stormed back. Its vital interests in Ukraine — including the Black Sea Fleet — are now safe. On Tuesday, Putin said a war with Ukraine was the “last option” – a euphemism for his willingness to talk. Kiev should pick the cues, instead of walking into the trap set by the West. A further provocation would only prompt Russia to expand its reach to more areas in Eastern Ukraine. What needs to be done is taking the Russians into confidence and assure them of security — both for the Russian speaking people in Ukraine and its strategic interests in the region. Unless that happens, Russia is unlikely to step back. And the crisis will be far from over.

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