It’s an image straight out of a John le Carré novel — two retired spooks from opposing sides swapping stories. The pair are former ISI chief Lt Gen Asad Durrani and ex-R&AW chief AS Dulat. They got to know and trust each other over many sessions of what’s called Track-II diplomacy aimed at bringing peace between India and Pakistan involving former intelligence officers, diplomats, military men and also journalists. Says Dulat: “Somehow, we seemed to understand each other though we are very different types of people. He’s a typical fauji but there is a certain honesty and straightforwardness that comes out of the man.”

The two ex-spymasters teamed up in an unprecedented cross-border book collaboration Spy Chronicles, RAW, ISI and the Illusion of Peace recording their reflections and reminiscences. Their talks, held in exotic locales such as Bangkok and Istanbul, are candid. But possibly because of the fact that the pair’s discussions were lubricated by many glasses of Scotch, the book meanders. Still, there are observations that may intrigue readers and also give them a glimpse of the exchanges constantly taking place behind the scenes between the hostile neighbours.

“It (Kargil) was Musharraf’s obsession for a long time,” recounts Durrani in one of the conversations that were moderated by journalist Aditya Singh, adding the Pakistan president had tried to push Benazir Bhutto for a green light to take the Kargil Heights but she rejected the idea. Durrani says: “When I found his (Musharraf’s) policies to be disastrous, I started publicly criticising them.”

Surprisingly, Dulat has a much warmer take on Musharraf: “I find no other Pakistani leader was as reasonable as this man (Musharraf) was. He repeatedly said, ‘Whatever is acceptable to the Kashmiris will be acceptable to Pakistan.’ I thought it was brave of him to say that. He also came out with the four-point formula which actually accepted the Line of Control.” The differing views on Musharraf, who was first the aggressor of Kargil and then the dogged peacemaker, are among the unexpected elements that emerge in the book.

Frank and file

A large part of the conversations between the spooks who haven’t been able to peer into official files for more than a decade (in Durrani’s case around 25 years) tread over familiar territory but there are moments of illuminating frankness. On Osama Bin Laden, Durrani accepts the theory — first recounted in detail by American journalist Seymour Hersh — that the Pakistanis had been forewarned and told to lie low when the Abbottabad helicopter raid took place.

Durrani says the initial tip-off probably came from a senior ISI officer. “I have no doubt that a retired Pakistani officer who was in intelligence walked in and told the Americans. How much of the $50 million (reward) he got, who knows? But he’s missing from Pakistan,” he says.

Just before the American raid on Abbottabad, Gen Ashfaq Kayani Pakistan’s army chief at the time is said to have met David Petraeus, who commanded the US forces in the region. According to Durrani, the meeting took place aboard a ship though Dulat believes it took place at an unnamed airbase. Says Dulat: “It seemed like too much of a coincidence because two days later, Osama was bumped off.” Durrani insists Kayani struck a deal with the Americans and pretended to know nothing about the raid but the US then reneged on their side of the deal.

Cut to Baluchistan where Pakistan has always accused India of mischief-making and stirring up the local population. Durrani, who seems to dislike the Americans, plays down the Indian factor in the restive state. He reckons the mineral wealth of Central Asia, Afghanistan and possibly also Baluchistan is what attracts global players and says: “Regarding Baluchistan, I’ve always felt we are overplaying India’s involvement. The Americans are more involved. There are others who have more reason to be involved.”

One lesser known story recounted in the book is about how Durrani’s son Osman, who lived in Germany and who had come to Kochi on work, was held up at Mumbai airport by immigration officials. Durrani, who was worried they might find out they were holding the son of an ex-ISI chief and decide not to let him go immediately, at once called Dulat for help. Dulat did a considerable amount of wire-pulling to have Osman released quickly.

Hope in bad times

Reflecting the current chilly aspect to India-Pakistan relations, Durrani wasn’t given a visa to India for the book’s gala launch attended by political luminaries such as former prime minister Manmohan Singh, Vice President Hamid Ansari, Farooq Abdullah, Yashwant Sinha and Kapil Sibal. In a recorded video message played to the launch, Durrani offered “a very special thanks to the Indian deep state. By denying me the visa, they have saved me from the wrath of our hawks.” But his gratitude proved premature. Even though there are no big revelations in the book, Durrani’s remarks have caused ripples in Pakistan where a court of inquiry has been ordered into his observations. Nothing’s expected to come of the inquiry but the Army’s been forced to take action by former PM Nawaz Sharif who was hauled over the coals last month for a statement he made about the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai.

What’s different when spies meet and talk? Dulat clearly has greater faith in intelligence professionals and insists they’re more hard-headed than their counterparts in the world of diplomacy. Dulat travelled to Pakistan for the first time in 2012 when he was brought on board by former foreign secretary Salman Haidar, for what was called the Balusa Group talks.

Dulat readily admits that he and Durrani are “guys who are now out of business. We know our limitations.” That is essentially the key limitation of this book. The fact that the pair no longer toiling at the cliff face means the book is a collection of meandering reminiscences and really doesn’t shed any new light. It’s more a book to dip into rather than read cover to cover.

Dulat spent most of his career in IB where he spent a large part of his career dealing with Kashmir. He moved to R&AW in 1999 as its chief and headed it for 17 months. After that he spent another three-and-a-half years in the Prime Minister’s Office, during Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s time. He’s been out of active service since 2004. Durrani headed the ISI between 1990 and 1992, after which he moved to other army commands and later became an ambassador to Germany and Saudi Arabia.

Says Dulat: “I am an intelligence relic and am totally out (of the picture). I wouldn’t know nor should I know. That is the nature of the beast.” Still Dulat’s acknowledged as a leading expert on Kashmir. After he retired, he continued to play host to a constant stream of Kashmiri visitors. He recounts: “My wife would say ‘what are you doing with these guys now’? And I said I like to talk to them. I like to listen to them and I like to learn from them.” He adds: “I became whatever I am because of Kashmir. I served in Vajpayee’s PMO only because of Kashmir.”

Dulat’s also an unyielding optimist and insists there’s no point in sitting back and saying nothing can be done. “You’ve got to believe, you’ve got to hope even at the worst of times,” he says. That has to be a better credo than hopelessness and saying nothing can be done.

 

MEET THE AUTHOR

 

AS Dulat was Secretary of the Research and Analysis Wing, 1999-2000. Asad Durrani was Director General, Inter-Services Intelligence directorate, 1990-91. Aditya Sinha is a journalist.

Related Topics
comment COMMENT NOW