There are problematic implications of the efforts of the Supreme Court (SC) to inject the needed professionalism, objectivity and independence into the investigation of some of the high-profile cases.

The aim must be to ensure the proper and efficient discharge of the legitimate functions of existing institutions and mechanisms rather than some other organ of the state, not equipped or trained for supervising them, taking over those functions in the exercise of its inherent prerogative,. Such caution is especially pertinent where the nation's apex judicial forum directly begins monitoring selected cases under investigation by the CBI on a hearing-to-hearing basis.

Adoption of this practice may mean, over a period of time, making the agency unsure of itself, losing its drive and vigour, and waiting for the SC's directions for every move.

It will also, in the eyes of the people, make questionable any action taken by the CBI on its own, without getting the Court's approval, even if otherwise justified.

Direct judicial involvement should be only in the rarest of rare cases. It is like administration of corticosteroids: they are extremely potent, but their frequent use weakens the body, making it vulnerable to serious ailments.

More than everything else, it may affect the sanctity of the rule of law which has to be safeguarded in letter and spirit. It is advisable not to give the impression that the judiciary is combining in itself the roles of the investigator, prosecutor and judge.

Taking upon itself the scrutiny of the investigative procedures and processes such as submission of reports on the course of the investigation, the examination of witnesses and case diaries and vetting of charge-sheets being filed may detract from the judicial detachment it must maintain in adjudicating cases.

Worthwhile suggestions

How can the Court be at one remove so as to retain its impartiality and, at the same time, keep the heat on the CBI?

This is where a lot of good can come out of the former Director of CBI, Mr R.K.Raghavan's idea of the Court entrusting the task of detailed monitoring to a team, headed by a former Supreme/High Court judge, and comprising a distinguished lawyer who is knowledgeable in criminal matters, and a former CBI officer of the rank of Inspector General of Police. The inclusion of an eminent figure from public life will be an added advantage.

There are also other worthwhile suggestions that have been made from time to time to strengthen the CBI.

Deserving of strong support are what Mr Raghavan himself, in an interview to The Hindu (February 15), has urged: Doing away with prior government approval for even a preliminary enquiry against officers of and above the rank of Joint Secretary; vesting the authority for appealing against acquittal in the CBI instead of solely in the government as at present; giving statutory recognition to the CBI; filling the numerous vacancies that have been crippling the effectiveness of the agency; and increasing the present two-year tenure of the CBI Director so that he gets enough time to settle down and leave his mark.

All these and other reforms will come to naught without insulating the premier investigating agency from political pressure. The answer here is not to give the CBI a free hand to do whatever it wants.

The L.P.Singh Committee to revamp the IB and the CBI in the light of the Shah Commission's recommendations had proposed three salutary measures to balance independence with accountability: Fixed tenure for the Director; filling the post with the best person for the job, selected from outside the police service, where necessary; and having an oversight board a la the committee suggested by Mr Raghavan to exercise continuing superintendence.

A directive on the above lines by the SC will relieve the Court of the burden of monitoring and supervising investigations in individual cases.

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