Change of guard in China, but little else

As from March 14, Hu Jintao made way for Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) of the Party, as the President of China.

The next day Li Keqiang took over from Wen Jiabao as the Prime Minister. It was a smooth and orderly transition effected with the unanimous endorsement of the 3000 deputies constituting the 12th National People’s Congress (NPC) which concluded in Beijing on March 16 after a fortnight’s session.

It is not a little amusing that China-watchers in the rest of the world should be going with a tooth comb over the personal traits of Xi and Li to divine clues as to what changes in policies or approaches may be in the offing. For instance, Xi is seen brimming with back-slapping bonhomie as much as Hu Jintao was dour and unsmiling, and Li is viewed as a sourpuss as much as “grandpa” Wen Jiabao was a warm-hearted extrovert. So, the commentariat has quickly concluded that Xi will be in sync with the reformist spirit and easier for the West to do business with, while Li will be conservative and on guard, and a pain in the neck!

All these facile speculations as regards change of guard in China are misplaced. It is a country ruled by a single monolithic Party, which has made sure of having its vast military machine within its fold and whose binding principles are unity, uniformity and unanimity. Its policies are avowedly the result of extensive intra-party consultations and introspections (or reviews) from the village units upwards and once in place, are to be unquestioningly acted upon at all levels.

RUBBER STAMPS?

This, strictly construed, is not a feature deriving from the traditional understanding of Marxism-Leninism, but is one of the many Chinese characteristics of its political and economic dispensations. Indeed, in its fundamentals, and in its application to the affairs of state, Chinese communism borrows from the basic beliefs of Confucianism, one of which being that the wise, all-knowing state knows what is best for the people at large.

Thus, whatever the composition of the NPC and whoever the leaders rising to the top, they will have to necessarily function within the ideological superstructure that has become both sacrosanct and immutable. In that sense, they are no different from apparatchiks and it is unrealistic to expect them to deviate from a course that had also stood the country in good stead and brought it to the present stage of pre-eminence.

It is also good to remember that words such as ‘rubber stamps’ and ‘party puppets’ and the like applied by some observers to China’s party caucuses are indicative more of derision than of discernment because the regimentation to which party congresses and party members are subjected in China is not dissimilar to what obtains in political party forums in so-called democracies.

Further, China has proclaimed as its ‘core interests’ certain goals such as safeguarding its security, sovereignty and territorial integrity, particularly with respect to Tibet, Taiwan, and Xinjiyang, protection of its economic, commercial and maritime hold in regard to South/East China Sea and Yellow Sea, and defence of its fundamental political systems, to the furtherance of which it is irrevocably committed.

The use of the expression (core interests) itself proves my earlier statement about Confucian characteristics dominating Chinese communism. For, it is simply the literal translation of hexin liyi which was central to the Confucian principles of statecraft.

PUZZLE

Xi and Li thus have got their hands pretty much tied both externally and internally. On both counts, change of guard will not mean any change of tack. Externally, it will be more of the same and internally there will be no tampering with the political and economic systems since ‘the defence of fundamental systems’ can only mean one thing: Continuance of the status quo and the implied rejection of the demand for change from the existing situation to suit the Western political palate.

In this background, what is it that the Chinese Premier Li has sought to convey when, in reply to the congratulations of India’s Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, he says that China “would like to work with (India) to promote their relations of strategic cooperation and partnership to a new stage”? What is the kind of new move or direction that can befit the description of ‘new stage’?

Trade is already proceeding along expected lines, and the most that can be done is to enlarge the basket and enhance the pace. China is doing its own thing, without worrying how it may affect India, in its relations with other countries, especially, Pakistan and the US. It is extending its sphere of influence with its ‘string of pearls’ and concessional aid to, and construction of projects in, South Asian and African countries. It has shown no qualms in disregarding the susceptibilities of India whether in asserting its position on Arunachal Pradesh or building up Pakistan’s nuclear assets. In short, in every respect, there is little evidence of ‘strategic cooperation and partnership’.

The puzzle is: How does Chine propose to ‘promote’ a non-existent something to a ‘new stage’?

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