Dealing with an overbearing China

There are multiple layers in China's approach to its relations with India. At one level, there is a recognition of India emerging as a power that cannot be ignored. Chinese interests are served by being seen to have cooperative relations with India, in forums like BRICS and the G20.

India is, therefore, described as having an “independent” foreign policy, even as concern is periodically voiced over growing US-India strategic ties.

This ostensibly positive approach is balanced by heaping ridicule on India, or making threatening noises, whenever India enhances its space and missile capabilities, or seeks to bolster its defences along its borders with the Middle Kingdom. But, above all, there is a dominant theme of “containment” in its policies.

The Pakistan stratagem

This is undertaken by strengthening Pakistan's conventional, nuclear and missile capabilities. China recognises the legitimacy of the former's control over areas such as Pakistan-occupied Kashmir but refuses to take any action that provides legitimacy to Indian control of Jammu and Kashmir. Similar policies are adopted while dealing with India's other South Asian neighbours, most importantly, Nepal.

China's “containment” policies have also included attempts to undermine our Look East policies, deny us legitimacy on global nuclear issues in forums such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group and obstruct measures in the UN to declare Pakistan-based terrorist groups like the Jamat ud Dawa as international terrorist organisations.

For over two decades now, India has often been caught on the wrong foot in dealing with these Chinese policies. As China's economic and military power expands, it is becoming increasingly assertive in dealing with its neighbours, particularly on differences over its land and maritime borders.

The most serious manifestation of this growing arrogance has been its propensity to threaten virtually all its coastal neighbours on issues of sovereignty over islands in the East and South China Seas.

China now claims that the entire South China Sea is an area of “core interest,” periodically sparking direct naval confrontation with Vietnam and the Philippines. This, in turn, has led to its neighbours pleading for a greater American naval and military presence in the western Asia-Pacific region.

Washington has not hesitated to oblige. An important factor behind this enhanced Chinese assertiveness appears to be recent estimates that the South China Sea has oil and gas reserves equivalent to 17.7 billion tonnes of crude oil.

After India was warned by China not to undertake offshore oil exploration projects with Vietnam and an Indian naval vessel told not to enter the South China Sea, India and Vietnam jointly stated: “Disputes like the East and South China Sea should be resolved by peaceful means in accordance with universally recognised principles including the 1982 UN Convention of the Law of the Sea and the 2002 Asean-China Declaration on the conduct of Parties in the South China Sea.”

Perfect timing

India's new-found candour on the South China Sea could not have been better timed. China found itself cornered at the November East Asia Summit at Bali.

All but two of the 18 participating nations — Myanmar and Cambodia — raised the issue, with Singapore, otherwise circumspect in references to China, playing a prominent role.

This approach by the Asean countries was adopted despite a warning from China's Global Times : “Any country that chooses to be a part of the US chess game will lose the opportunity to benefit from China's economy.”

India's growing partnership with Japan has also not gone unnoticed in the Middle Kingdom. Japan is now clearly among India's most important economic partners, with its commitment to the development of rail and industrial corridors across India. The sad reality is, however, the snail's pace at which India has proceeded in implementing these projects.

Japan, which has faced hostile behaviour from the Chinese on their dispute over the Senakaku Islands in the East China Sea, particularly over the past two years, now sees India as an important partner in building a stable balance of power in Asia.

Bilateral military exercises with Japan have been reinforced by a trilateral India-Japan-US dialogue and trilateral military exercises off Okinawa. But India still appears to hold back when it comes to military cooperation with Asean members.

While expanding economic and security cooperation is essential for the success of its Look East policies, it is important that New Delhi enhances its military deployment and strengthens confidence-building measures along its borders with China.

It is unlikely that the border issue will be settled anytime soon, or that China will give up its irredentist claims to the whole of Arunachal Pradesh.

China will, however, not find it either wise or beneficial, if it seeks it to launch a military adventure on its borders with India, especially if India is well-prepared militarily.

(The author is a former High Commissioner to Pakistan.)

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