Jobs scheme — good in parts

The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS) is arguably the world’s largest public works programme, spanning all districts of India. The scheme has fared well vis-à-vis other government programmes despite instances of corruption, discrimination and poor planning. Ritu Anand, Chief Economist of IDFC, which recently brought out the India Rural Development Report, told Business Line that in recent years the trend in guaranteed jobs has declined and distress migration has restarted in some States .

What has MGNREGS’ coverage and assets creation been like?

The coverage is extensive. It has provided around 50 million households or almost 30 per cent of all rural households 40-50 person-days of work in a year on an average, the Ministry of Rural Development (MoRD) data suggested. However, since its peak in 2010, the household coverage and employment generation has plateaued. About 2.1 billion person-days of work have been created in the last couple of years (2012 and 2013) compared with the peak of 2.8 billion person-days of work in 2010.

From its inception in February 2006 to 2012, about 10 million works were completed, but frankly, it is difficult to interpret these statistics meaningfully in terms of assets created and their quality. Incomplete and abandoned works have been an issue in many States. While the quality and durability of assets varies widely, various studies, including a survey carried out by the Centre for Economic and Social Studies, Hyderabad, indicate that in most cases quality and durability are unsatisfactory. However, our fieldwork showed that where a community worked together to improve common property and maintain them, results were much better.

Did your findings vary from the official ones?

Actuallythe MoRD and the National Sample Survey (NSS have different data. For instance, for 2009-10, nationwide registration of rural households was 69 per cent according to the ministry and 36 per cent according to the only NSS Employment Unemployment Survey on MGNREGS. The average person-days of work generated per household in 2009-10 was 37, according to the NSS while the ministry puts it at 54.

Our analysis relied more on NSS data and our survey corroborated some of those findings.

Could you arrive at any figure on the rural poor reverting to seasonal migration?

There is no hard or systematic data on migration. Several studies have shown that implementation of MGNREGS reduced distress migration as it provided work close to home and under decent working conditions.

But more recently, anecdotal evidence — including our survey — indicates that some of the problems in the scheme’s implementation, such as delays in provision of work or wage payments, have reversed the positive trend. However, it is not clear how widespread this is.

What about work not given to the eligible or non-payment of wages?

Based on NSS data there is substantial “unmet demand” for work, i.e. those seeking work did not get it. Focus group discussions in our surveyed villages provided anecdotal evidence of “job rationing” at two stages — non-issuance of job cards and not providing work. In fact, our field surveys revealed that generally the poorer villages had proportionately fewer households with job cards, even lesser average work per household. Therefore, where it is needed the most, MGNREGS has not performed as well.

While this may be because poorer villages do not have the capacity to plan and administer the scheme, our survey showed that it is also due to lower awareness and empowerment of the people to demand their rights.

Significantly, more people in Category I villages, which have lower poverty and higher literacy, were aware of the provisions of MGNREGA and demanded work in writing, whereas people in the poorer Category II and III villages often just waited for the sarpanch to give them work. Similarly, although delays in payment of wages were noted in all three categories, delays were over two-and-a-half months in Category II and III villages.

Has management expertise at the grassroots developed to handle such a programme?

Delays at various stages, inadequate technical expertise, and corruption are problems. There are shortfalls in administrative and technical staff at the block and panchayat levels.

For instance, the junior engineer is in charge of both MGNREGS and non-MGNREGS work, and therefore often cannot devote enough time to the scheme, leading to delays and poor project outcomes.

Also, many States have failed to appoint a full-time programme officer. Instead, the block development officer over scheme-related responsibilities as an additional charge.

As with other government programmes, MGNREGS is also susceptible to corrupt practices at all levels including the gram panchayat.

Though many transparency provisions and safeguards built into the programme made corruption under this scheme difficult, these became the reasons why officials and local leaders did not prefer it to other government schemes. However, the new operational guidelines seek to address many of these problems.

Is MGNREGS a failure?

Despite being criticised for its high cost, the scheme appears to have fared significantly better than other subsidy programmes in delivering to people who need it. Self-targeting has worked to some extent — with women, SCs and STs seeking work in large numbers.

The scheme has contributed to reducing poverty, both directly and indirectly.

The fact that poor households spend almost their entire income from the scheme on food shows its direct contribution to food security. Indirectly, it has created upward pressure on the reservation wage, below which a worker would be unwilling to work.

Yet, corruption, though at a lesser degree than in other schemes, remains an issue as does the poor quality and maintenance of assets created.

Even in the limited instances where the social audits (public checks on scheme implementation by the gram sabha) actually were carried out, their decisions have not been adequately enforced and disciplinary action has not been taken.

How can the new operational guidelines plug the loopholes for better results?

The new guidelines try to address several issues such as awareness, timely provision of work, payment delays, poor planning capacity, asset durability and corruption.

For instance, the guidelines insists on regular door-to-door surveys to weed out fake registrations, and pinning accountability on specific officials for fudging muster rolls and delays.

They suggest a more robust quality monitoring system using internal and external monitors to ensure greater durability of works.

The guidelines also expand the list of permissible works to increase the pipeline of works and permit complementarity with other projects.

However, as noted by the World Bank’s recently released World Development Report , the scheme should also be extended to those who are physically unable to perform hard manual work, in order to lift the poorest.

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