The Supreme Court on November 4, 2015, refused to interfere with the Madras High Court order directing the CISF to guard the court premises, replacing the Tamil Nadu Police. Taking the State police to task for failing to prevent unruly advocates from storming court halls and disrupting proceedings, Justice TS Thakur observed “The Chief Justice and other judges are entitled to seek not only CISF but Army and BSF protection if the need arises.”

The CISF appears to be better at securing premises, owing to their highly visible deployment in airports and other installations. They do so by enforcing appropriate protocols specially designed for particular premises.

We often see police personnel stationed on court premises staring aimlessly, fiddling with their phones or chatting amiably. When active, they are seen shooing away peanut vendors or roughing up pavement dwellers. This is evidence of lack of both training and of role clarity.

No crowd control experience

I have been following ‘security’ in the Madras High Court since 2002. An extract of my published article referred to in the 2007 judgement of the Court in the Registrar General Vs. The State of Tamil Nadu is relevant: ‘ It will not be out of place to refer to an interesting article written by a practising lawyer of this Court Ms. Swapna in the Economic and Political Weekly Commentary dated 08.06.2002 to the title ‘Of Guns and Poses — A study of Security in Courts” and the learned writer about the very same Court, wrote as follows: “Special training must be given to a contingent of policemen for crowd control. They must know the plan and layout of each building. On the occurrence of an incident, they must be capable of confining the problem to the particular hall, lobby or floor. They must also be able to contain the crowd in the halls and lobbies and guide them through the most convenient exit.”’

The lack of professional organisation and training in the TN police was starkly evident during the violence in the Court precincts on February 19, 2009.

The interim report of Justice BN Srikrishna Commission found: “Some policemen picked up the stones hurled and hurled them back at the lawyers, despite attempts by their seniors to restrain them. This continued for about 15 minutes.”

The Judge indicted the striking lawyers but failed to pull up the commanding officers for inability to prevent their subordinates from exercising illegal and excessive force — a breakdown of command structure. Command responsibility demands that commanding officers be held accountable for the behaviour of the forces deployed under them.

The right protocol

A court security system whether manned by TN State Police or the CISF, must not only ensure the security of judges but also of litigants, lawyers and the general public, with the following features:

The security force needs to carry appropriate weapons. The firing of lethal weapons currently issued to the police — Glock handgun and INSAS 5 rifle — in crowded or walled places could result in panic and stampede, unintentional deaths and injury by bullets fired and ricocheting.

The visible police presence must be non-threatening. Armed police, trained arrest teams, anti-terrorist and bomb squads, well- equipped riot control teams in riot gear, with tear gas shells, rubber bullets and riot control devices must be out of sight but near at hand.

‘Bandobast’ teams cannot control riots. Each policing activity must be performed by specially trained, equipped and prepared personnel. This is necessary for professional and humane policing. Police personnel should be courageous and possessed of moral fibre.

Command unit must have mission control, command hierarchy and communications. Constant monitoring of perimeters with electronic surveillance devices would provide real time data to security analysts on- and off-site. On-site teams should be trained to protect their equipment.

Strategically placed barricades, controlled entrance and directed movement of crowds would minimise risk. Crowd control teams need to know the layout and routes to every building. Supported by negotiators and investigators in plain clothes, they should be able to contain a volatile area without permitting a crowd to swell, or a riot to spill out.

Judges should be trained to respond to threat by dropping to the floor, moving rapidly behind a cordon or to take cover. The judge should not stand on ceremony nor show unnecessary heroism. Their personal security guards must also be suitably trained.

An ambitious plan would be to provide the court campus with a Special Jurisdiction Police force drawn from the general police. The security forces of the court may be divided into the outer perimeter at the gates and compound walls, and the inner perimeter around each block.

There may also be a ring around each sensitive court hall. The court security officers should be specially trained to deal with situations in the midst of crowds and in enclosed spaces. They should be adept at unarmed combat and close quarter battle to minimise the use of lethal weapons.

Why change the force?

The deployment of security cannot disregard basic human rights. They are not mutually exclusive. In fact, in an ultimate sense the object of security is to guarantee basic human rights, including safety of the human person. It is necessary to work towards a strategic reconciliation of the need for security and the imperative of upholding human rights.

Policing court premises is different from policing nuclear installations, airports, seaports, power plants, sensitive government buildings and heritage monuments which have controlled access and routes.

For instance, a passenger in an airport has a fixed point of entry, a fixed path of travel and a fixed point of exit.

Further, internationally recognised protocols and standards are already laid down for policing of several types of installations and buildings, such as airports and seaports, nuclear installations and factories.

Unless similar protocols are prepared for the High Court in advance of the deployment of the force, the CISF is not likely to make a substantial difference. It is preferable to utilise the consultancy services of the CISF to provide appropriate measures and use their personnel only for specific threats in which the State Police is not adequately trained or prepared.

An establishment of a standard world-class protocol for policing the court premises and commensurate training would serve the interests of security better than a change of force.

The writer is Managing Director of IP Dome Strategy Advisors, Chennai

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