Reduced to just a toehold in Afghanistan

Many in India feel rebuffed by the way new Afghan President Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai has ignored India and instead given more priority to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, China and Iran, where he went visiting for crucial talks.

The shift may have been for tactical reasons, but the snub has a symbolic significance that New Delhi cannot discount.

India’s mistakes

As things stand today, President Ghani has already rescinded a request for weapon supplies by India suggesting he can get arms from anywhere. New Delhi had firmed up with Russia to supply small arms, field mortar and air support platforms to the Afghan army.

Now that the US promised to support 352,000 Afghan personnel until 2017, the relevance of Indian assistance gets less important. But, to cover it up, India is expected to hand over three multi-role Cheetah helicopters while Ghani is in town.

Many would suspect that Ghani might review the gamut of India’s economic commitments for his country; including the Chabahar Port linking project, iron-ore blocks and steel plant in Hajigak. Also what holds for the Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) with Afghanistan now, with Kabul looking for military support from Islamabad?

Is India’s Afghan policy in crisis? Firstly, it appears India’s somewhat impulsive efforts have not cut much ice. A Pakistani analyst wryly wrote “India trains Afghan forces but does not arm them… does not build houses — so morally weak army join the Taliban insurgents.” Interesting observation, but India’s concern here was to respect Pakistani sensitivity.

Secondly, was the wisdom of committing $2 billion was driven by some woolly ideas of winning goodwill among Afghans or was it based on sound strategic assessment? India genuinely may have desired to help Afghanistan.

But it clearly hasn’t worked that way, because politics does not necessarily work on logic. Politics is also not about showing benevolence, magnanimity and display of riches. Clearly, some short-term objectives and assessment may have dictated India’s Afghan policy. Thirdly, why did India go alone without joining hands with other partners? In contrast, the Iranians, Russians and Chinese thinking proved smarter.

Sadly, there are no visible strategic gains for the resources spent by India. It seems the money has gone down the drain. For now, let us consider that we have earned some good puniya (merit) in Afghanistan and hope that it will help India in our future destiny.

All likely scenarios are visible, including Pakistan gaining a leeway to thwart Indian plans. In the current context, even the Russians seem lending support to Pakistani efforts. Clearly, India needs to reassess its Afghan strategy.

In April 1992, when the pro-Pakistan Mujahideen group took control of Kabul, it appeared for a while that India would have no friends left in Afghanistan. By 1992-end, the ISI lost control and Kabul once again looked at New Delhi as a window to the world outside. Pakistan then sought to spread widespread propaganda about Indian pilots, engineers and personnel helping the Rabbani-Masood regime.

The ISI then created the Taliban in mid-1994, to get rid of the Rabbani-Masood-Dostum regime and to counter the India-Iran-Turkmenistan railway connectivity plan and push for a Unocal–Saudi Delta gas pipeline project.

With the Taliban coming to power, India departed away from its traditional practice of recognising any regime that controlled Kabul. The key reason apart from its obscurantist doctrine and display of bigotry was that the militia was specifically created, nurtured, fostered and anchored by Pakistani ISI to serve its agenda. To be fair, the Taliban showed no particular antagonistic overture towards India.

India vowed to get the Taliban’s opponents back to power, but the much-proclaimed Gujral Doctrine for better relations with Pakistan inevitably poured cold water on that plan. In fact, in May 1997, when Mazar-i-Sharif fell to the militia, India signalled to deal with whosoever was in control in Kabul. The BJP then in the opposition criticised the government for being indecisive in supporting the Northern Alliance.

India’s concerns today in Afghanistan are linked to terrorism rather than inter-ethnic differences. New Delhi’s current fears are tied to Lashkar-e-Tayyaba’s networks in Kunar and Nooristan. The policy option of joining hands with Iran is still on the table.

This, however, would be once again a folly. India should continue to play the game not by using the financial incentives but deploying its skilful political manoeuvring power. Clearly, the US will play a key role, but for an enduring transformation in Afghanistan is not possible unless two major Asian powers, India and China, find a common strategic understanding.

Many fear that the greatest beneficiaries of Afghan stability, apart from the Afghan people, are going to be India and China. But Pakistan may scuttle that prospect. Indian and Chinese interests historically converged in Afghanistan, and if they make a calibrated move for working together in Afghanistan, the outcome could be more harmonising than conflicting.

The author is a former Ambassador and a strategic thinker

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